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AUTHORITY IN PRESENT-DAY RELIGIOUS TEACHING

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Several well-defined types of authority have appeared in the religious world: (1) An external authority which rested its claim on the Scriptures and tradition as interpreted by a hierarchical portion of the church, which culminated finally in the supreme, indefeasible, and solitary infallibility of the Roman pontiff when speaking *ex cathedra*, by which, if he is not placed above both Scripture and tradition, he is at least on a par with these and not less essential to faith. (2) The earlier Protestant view of an authority arising out of the Christian consciousness, as this is awakened and controlled, not by the Scriptures as a whole, but by the gospel in the Scriptures. (3) A view that the ultimate authority of religious faith is found in the Scriptures, not indeed as we now have them in any tongue, but as they were in the original manuscript when interpreted according to their divinely intended meaning. (4) The final authority lies not in the Scripture nor in the church, but in the reason alone, since here is the source of truth. Between these camps the advocates of authority in the Christian community have been mainly divided. The separation has not been always sharp; not seldom have the advocates of one position taken over some notions held by those of different views; but, in general, these have been the distinguishing notes of each group.

Recently, however, a change has taken place with reference to the whole question of authority. It is not so much that the question itself has been central—although in some important instances this is true—as that attention has been shifted to other values, with the result that redefinitions of authority have become necessary or authority itself has been retired into the background. Several particular occasions for this change are in evidence: a new view of the Scriptures, a different conception of revelation, a fresh evaluation of Christian experience, a pragmatic attitude toward truth, new emphasis on social values, the modernist movement with an altered estimate of history, and the exigent demands of religious education. The aim of this article is to show what use is made of the principle of authority in the more popular writings of the present day which have a bearing on religion.

First then, with reference to books which are based on the Scriptures. There are indeed those who without further ado accept the entire Bible as authoritative, or if they qualify their attitude they make no attempt at definition. They assume that their readers will take the Old and New Testaments at their face values. The simplest statement of this position is as follows. "The standard of authority here used is the Bible and final appeal is always to its pages."¹ Such a declaration is open to several interpretations, as that the author aims to present only what the Bible contains on selected subjects, without attempting to argue or justify its teachings, or that he believes in the infallible inspiration of the Scriptures, although he does not obtrude this belief upon his readers, or that, while he may not be unfamiliar with the results of historical criticism, he does not deem it wise to perplex his readers with these. Elsewhere in this book it is affirmed that the Bible is "certainly a literature, but it is not literature alone. . . . It claims to be a revelation of God. . . . There is a supernatural element which cannot be ignored."² This is the attitude maintained throughout a series of books of which more than one hundred thousand copies have been sold, and which have formed the basis of careful study. The large sale of works of this class shows that a

¹ H. T. Sell, *Bible Study by Doctrines*, "Prefatory," p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 126.

real need is met, it shows also that a great number, perhaps a majority, of readers do not wish to be disturbed in the background of their beliefs, but are satisfied with a middle-of-the-road teaching which is committed neither to pure traditionalism nor to advanced modern views, but is simple, direct, informing, and for the most part wholesome.

A series of documents, entitled *The Fundamentals*, published at intervals at the expense of "two consecrated Christian laymen," of which six volumes have already appeared, is sent to about two hundred and fifty thousand pastors, evangelists, missionaries, theological professors and students, Y.M.C.A. secretaries, college professors, Sunday-school superintendents, and religious editors in the English-speaking world. In these pamphlets of about one hundred and twenty-five pages each, such subjects are treated as the Virgin Birth, History of the Higher Criticism, Fallacies of the Higher Criticism, My Personal Experience with the Higher Criticism, the Bible and Modern Criticism. The general basis on which the articles rest is presented by Rev. James M. Gray, dean of the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago, in a paper on "The Inspiration of the Bible, Definition, Extent, and Proof."³ The author holds that the historicity of the Bible is the ground of its authority. The extent of this authority depends on the question of inspiration. While inspiration is defined only negatively, its object is stated to be not men as subjects of it, but the Scripture writings. These are, however, identified not with any writings in existence either now or, for that matter, for the past sixteen hundred years, but with autographs or writings of Moses, David, Daniel, Matthew, Paul, John, and Peter. It is affirmed that the inspiration extends not only to the whole but to every part of these supposititious documents, form as well as substance, word as well as thought. The paper closes with this quotation from the deliverance of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in America in 1893: "The Bible as we now have it, in its various translations and revisions, when freed from all errors and mistakes of copyists and printers (is) the very Word of God, and consequently wholly without error." It is to be assumed that many of these books are on their reception

³ *The Fundamentals*, III, 7 ff.

relegated at once to the waste-basket, or read in part only to be rejected, while some are preserved for reference as samples of a style of religious teaching characteristic of a bygone age. When all allowances are made, however, no doubt thousands of readers welcome the presentations as wholesome testimony to the true faith and a much-needed corrective of a disturbing and dangerous radicalism. This conception of the basis of authority is unquestionably the simplest to affirm and in itself the easiest to maintain. It is a priori, dogmatic, wholly indifferent to historical inquiry, unsusceptible of verification, and exists by the breath of its own self-assertion. In principle it is not to be distinguished from the authority of the Roman Church.

In certain other important particulars, authority as derived from the Scriptures has been seriously modified by the changed attitude toward these. Instances of present-day positions are as follows: "The moral and religious teachings of the Old Testament are not for us finally authoritative. . . . Christ alone . . . becomes our ultimate standard by which all that precedes must be tested. . . . We are therefore free to judge the Old Testament by Christ so far as ultimate truth is concerned." This newer historical attitude toward the Bible "does not allow the theologian of today to use the Bible in the same way as the older theologians . . . to quote indifferently from every part as of equal authority with every other . . . as for example the Westminster divines used it." Farther along, the author affirms that belief in the divinity of Christ is based on a series of propositions "all of which concern his character and personal relations." These propositions are not, however, to be received in the abstract, nor upon authority alone, but must be the outcome of one's own personal experience of Jesus Christ. Thus no appeal is made to proof texts or to dogmatic findings of councils or to great names or to purely theological significance, but the evidence is open to everyone to seek.⁴ In a similar vein, another writer affirms that the "doctrine of a uniformly authoritative Bible is being replaced by the inspiring sense of the spiritual worth of the Bible as disclosed through historico-literary criticism and the experience of the Christian community. The modern man yields

⁴H. C. King, *Reconstruction of Theology*, pp. 152, 154, 244.

only to what he finds to be real."⁵ Another writer claims that the attitude of the educated man toward the Bible is nothing less than a revolution. "Instead of the authoritative pronouncement of the Deity through arbitrarily chosen instruments, the Bible is now regarded as a great body of literature, one part differing from another part in glory." The value of the Old Testament lies in the fact first, that it presents characters supremely worthy of reverence; secondly, that it records the discovery of our fundamental religious truths; thirdly, that it is essential to a correct apprehension of Jesus Christ.⁶ Still another writer intimates that his use of the Old and New Testaments is simply to illustrate the growth of ideas. He holds that the Bible contains a collection of purely human documents, extremely interesting from a historical point of view. He will treat it as we should treat Froissart or the Saxon Chronicle.⁷ One need not infer that this exhausts the author's notion of the Scriptures, but it is suggestive as revealing the reverent freedom from dogmatic authority with which the most influential clergyman of Great Britain handles the sacred writings. Dr. Charles E. Jefferson in *Things Fundamental* asks, Is the Bible infallible? and replies, It is better to say that it is useful. Is it inspired? This may be known by the fact that it inspires. Is it unique? This may be established by comparison.⁸ These samples taken quite at random from men of constructive religious aims, whose works are widely read by inquiring and thoughtful people, are symptoms of a new attitude toward authority as related to the Scriptures. Such men do not believe less than those of a former day, but the content of their belief is in part different, the grounds of belief are not quite the same, and authority is not discredited but sought for in a different quarter. To many of those who are accustomed to the old wine, the new seems strange and distasteful. There are others, however, who have never been satisfied with the old and are seeking a more rational basis for their faith. There are still others in colleges and universities and

⁵ Shailer Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 53.

⁶ A. W. Vernon, *The Religious Value of the Old Testament*, pp. 1 ff.

⁷ R. J. Campbell, *Christianity and the Social Order*, p. 22.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff.

technical schools—and their number is increasing—who have never known aught else than the new, and these are destined to become centers of vital influence in ever widening circles of religious belief. To the Protestant to whom the Scriptures have hitherto been the sole source of authority to the exclusion of church and tradition, this newer attitude is fraught with far-reaching consequences.

In this shifting of the basis of authority from the entire Scriptures there appears a pronounced tendency to concentrate it in Jesus Christ. In some instances this is done with no attempt to set up a comparison of the teaching of Jesus with the rest of the Bible. He is simply drawn into the foreground and with but the slightest explanation given the supreme place. For instance, Rev. J. D. Jones of Bournemouth, England, inquiring as to the source of the authority of Jesus, refers it to his character, his knowledge, and his love.⁹ Professor Peabody takes a similar position: "The character of Jesus Christ speaks with its own convincing authority to the mind of the present age."¹⁰ Professor Rauschenbusch says that Jesus' secret was that he had realized the life of God in the soul of man, and the life of man in the love of God.¹¹ Yet neither Professor Peabody nor Professor Rauschenbusch seeks to penetrate into the ultimate secret of Jesus' authority through a metaphysical or theological construction of his person.¹² In other cases a definite comparison of the teachings of the Old Testament with those of Jesus results in the conclusion that the teaching of Jesus is paramount. Professor Zueblin, treating of personality, orthodoxy, authority, church and state from the point of view of religion, finds religion to be "man's relation to the universal, ultimate, and infinite." He holds that nowhere is the decay of authority so evident as in the religious world. This, however, is not to be interpreted as if people were becoming less religious, but they are passing from the religion of authority to the religion of the spirit. At present the emphasis is on the character of Jesus and his ethical teaching. "The moral power of the unsullied life of Jesus is an

⁹ *The Gospel of Jesus*, pp. 56 ff.

¹⁰ F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 33.

¹¹ *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 48.

¹² Cf. also Harnack, *What Is Christianity?* and *Christianity and History*.

increasing vital force." Accordingly, the coming authority will be that of the spirit, i.e., the spiritual life of democratic religion.¹³

Another writer in a more searching inquiry concerning the character of Jesus' teaching lays bare the ground of his authority. First, Jesus judged himself by other standards than ours; then, he taught after a different manner from the modern teacher, convincing and rebuking with the voice of God; finally, the secret of it all lay not in momentary impulse or simple-mindedness, but in his inmost consciousness—in the highest degree a God-consciousness. Hence "his authority may not be doubted, since it was the authority of the Father, Lord of Heaven and earth, and he who spake was the anointed one, the Christ of God." An even deeper ground of Jesus' authority is laid bare in the perpetual presence of the living Christ in the church. Professor Knox maintains that the appeal is to the test of reality, "to the Word still made flesh and dwelling among us, the present and living unity with the past, his church one with him."¹⁴ Accordingly, the authority of the historical Jesus is in no sense set aside or lessened. The Christ of the flesh has vanished only to reappear in mightier power as a spirit of life. His authority "is not external, but is a voice which speaks within us as well as to us." In harmony with this view, H. Rashdall adduces several considerations to sustain the claim that every Christian is to own the authority of Christ as the primary ground of faith: (1) Christ's own promise that the Spirit of truth should continue the enlightenment which he had himself begun, so that the indwelling Spirit is identified with the exalted Christ. (2) The incarnation is a perpetual fact in human life, hence not only the creative Logos through whom all things were made is united with the historical Jesus, but is also the mysterious Power working in every human soul. (3) Not the historical Jesus of Galilee and Judea is the primary ground of faith, but the "Christ that died, nay, rather that is risen again," i.e., the indwelling Christ. (4) If Christian faith regards this, i.e., the spontaneous assertions of the basal personality, as due to the indwelling Christ, religion may regard these as the voice of God within us, and philosophy as the "self-revelation of

¹³ Charles Zueblin, *The Religion of a Democrat*, pp. 85 ff.

¹⁴ G. W. Knox, *The Gospel of Jesus*, pp. 181, 84, 117.

the objective in our subjectivity."¹⁵ With this may be compared the declaration of Inge in *Faith and Its Psychology* (pp. 117-18) that the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" is the response of our spirit to the stimulus supplied by the Scriptures, and this he holds to be the primary ground of faith. Hence "the ultimate authority which alone is infallible is the eternal and living truth."¹⁶ The doctrine that both the historical and the living Christ is the ultimate source of authority is certainly that of Paul, but must be referred for its chief modern advocate to Schleiermacher. According to him the explanation is found in two facts, the God-consciousness of Jesus, and the perpetuation of that consciousness in his community.

This position is closely related to another, viz., the new theory of revelation. In the modern conception of revelation two demands are insistent, first, that it be continuous, and secondly, that it be intelligible. Revelation may be defined as the progressive disclosure within man's consciousness of the purpose of God which is also progressive. It is not therefore to be conceived of as something communicated once for all, closed, complete, unchanging, final, but as unfolding in dramatic form in history and in the experience of individual souls. Moreover, the change in the doctrine of God whereby emphasis is placed on the divine immanence has resulted in a change in the notion of revelation as something given not to but in men. Here the newer conception of the incarnation is nothing less than creative. "A revelation that is not an incarnation is no revelation at all, but blank mystery and magic."¹⁷ The incarnation is therefore not merely an event which took place once for all in Galilee and Judea, but is perpetually renewed in those in whom the eternal Spirit dwells. Still further the content of revelation as limited to the Scriptures points in the same direction. For here are truths, ideals, preparations, hopes, institutions, which must be developed under the constant inspiration and leadership of the same Spirit through whom they first emerged in the consciousness of men. As the Old Testament is

¹⁵ H. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 139, 125 ff.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁷ W. De W. Hyde, *The Forgiveness of Sins*, p. 56.

incomplete without the further unfolding of its implications in the New, so the New Testament with all its comprehensiveness and finality is incomplete without the age-long evolution for which its teachings furnish the exhaustless impulse and the indefeasible type. The revelation must, however, be intelligible as well as continuous. "An attribute or act of God that cannot be translated into appreciable human terms can have no meaning for us."¹⁸ No message can be called a revelation which contains something unknown, sealed and delivered to a recipient, by him to be passed on to others, without having first become an organic and integral part of his own consciousness.¹⁹ Revelation is a disclosure of "something which can be construed by the mind, which is conveyed to it in terms of human thought, which can be expressed in coherent propositions."²⁰ The need of the intelligibility of revelation is enforced by three further considerations: First, the nature of religion. The essence of religion has been defined as the "intimate personal relation between the individual and the God whom he recognizes"; and since the Hebrew religion was marked by two features—its monotheism and its faith in the indissolubility of religion and conduct, "it is evident where we should look for the seat of authority and its test."²¹ Secondly, revelation and Christianity or the gospel must be regarded as opposite sides of the same shield; or Christianity may be conceived as the product of revelation whether as original with Jesus or continuous since his day. The meaning of Christianity may be ascertained and judged, according to Professor Knox, by the purpose which Jesus set before himself to realize among men—the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man; it may be defined as the religion of all who call Jesus Lord. Or with Harnack, one may describe the gospel as "trust in God, humility, the forgiveness of sins, and the love of one's neighbor." Here is nothing metaphysical, nothing simply historical, as the mode of Jesus' birth or resurrection, no theology formed on the Greek model. We are concerned only with the kingdom of God and its coming, with God

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Cf. C. A. Beckwith, *Realities of Christian Theology*, p. 8.

²⁰ J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. 1881, p. 75.

²¹ W. L. Courtney, *The Literary Man's Religion*, p. 8.

as Father, and the soul's infinite worth, with the higher righteousness and the commandment of love.²² We must then find Christianity not in Jesus alone, but also in his disciples, in the institutions which owe their initiation to him, and in the life which is continually kindled afresh by his spirit. Thirdly, a growing number of thoughtful people have become impatient at the subtleties of scholastic speculation, at the arrogance of dogmatic theologies, and are content to find in Christianity, not mysteries however ancient and transcendent, but the simple ethical values which suit the daily life, who as we shall see later resolve Christianity into a social program and in its service realize the highest satisfaction. The bearing of all this on the notion of authority is obvious. First of all, authority may have its roots in the past, but since the present is no less sacred and pregnant and divine than any earlier moment in the history of the world, authority must attach itself to the realities of today with a supreme claim. And secondly, since "all authority for man has been in the reason of man from the beginning," men now "are looking for that light in their own souls, and are unwilling to submit to any other authority."²³ Once the moral and religious consciousness is sure of its ideal and its task, it accepts these with a devotion, and if need be heroism, which has never been surpassed.

In our day the conflict between external authority and autonomy which has once and again broken out in the church has become greatly intensified. These two aspects of authority have been thus summarized: First, "authority is the right of the species over the individual, autonomy is the right of the individual with regard to the species." Secondly, "authority is a necessary function of the species . . . for very self-preservation . . . it may be transformed, it cannot disappear." Thirdly, "autonomy and authority are not fixed quantities, but states essentially stable, and always yet to be." Fourthly, "like every good teacher, authority should labor to render itself useless . . . the method of direct intuition and experiment succeed the method of authority . . . as the necessary effect of the development of the conscience and the

²² A. Harnack, *What Is Christianity?* pp. 90, 35.

²³ John Francis Dobbs, *The Modern Man and the Church*, p. 42.

reason." This applies both to the individual and to humanity.²⁴ These statements contain indeed a profound truth. One is perhaps not disposed to quarrel with the position unless it is to be accepted as an ultimate presentation of the case. Undoubtedly the race has a right to impose its experience upon the individual in such a way that he may be sure to enter into that experience and thus to share the racial, i.e., normal development. The truth in the above theory is that the human race is an organic unity, that its evolution has been in great part conditioned by common customs, institutions, and ideals, and that its dreams of the future are of a social good—its Utopias are all a social state. On the other hand, the individual has in addition to the impulse of imitation an innate tendency to initiative and divergence, from which has resulted much of the most significant progress of humanity. Yet there is no essential antinomy between authority and autonomy. Neither society nor the individual, neither authority nor autonomy reaches its goal—to say nothing of maintaining its existence—independently of the other; the two are reciprocally conditioned in the unfolding of human life.

This brings us to the basis of authority in experience. This is not new, since it has been the characteristic of every great religious teacher both in Christendom and beyond, but men are reflecting on this fact more deeply than ever before. When rather more than twenty years ago it was proposed to test Christian doctrine by an appeal to the Christian consciousness, the suggestion awoke a violent protest, on the ground that a certainty was about to be exchanged for an uncertainty. The certainty was regarded as the established teachings of the church, the uncertainty, the shifting and unreliable moods of subjectivism. Accordingly, those who trusted in dogma as the sheet anchor of Christian belief viewed with suspicion such a setting forth into the uncharted seas of experience. A score of years has, however, wrought great changes in this entire attitude. Many of those who were then hostile to this point of view, or at least suspicious of it, have come to give it a place not only by the side of dogma but even above it. They are now willing to

²⁴ A. Sabatier, *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, pp. xviii ff.; cf. G. B. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*.

acknowledge that dogma had its rise in the exigencies of experience and may authenticate itself in the experience of the present, and that unless it does so authenticate itself it lacks the truth and vigor which were its earlier marks. Principal Rainy gave expression to this condition in his address at the opening of the New College in 1904: "There is a craving in many minds for a fixed external authority which shall ensure our fidelity to at least the essentials of our faith. There is no such authority and no such security. Our only security against apostasy is to be sought in faith, in prayer, in the work of God, in the presence and power of the Spirit, in the maintenance of fellowship with our living King. . . . To place our trust elsewhere is an apostasy."²⁵ Moreover, a new generation rapidly increasing in numbers and influence is lighting its torches at those of Schleiermacher and Ritschl and blazing forth the truth that Christian reality has meaning only so far as it shines in the consciousness of the Christian man. Now it is no longer argued but rather assumed as an axiom that whatever may be true of the source of authority, its seat is the Christian consciousness. While, therefore, there is very general agreement that authority resides in this consciousness, one discovers much diversity of opinion concerning the relation of the two. A. Sabatier in his *Philosophy of Religion* appears to hold that our ultimate religious convictions are validated by a peculiar immediacy which admits of no further analysis. These are not explained by ordinary psychological experiences, but by rare, unaccountable moments of insight, extraordinary uprushes from the subconscious regions of personality which thus become the crises of personal and social religious history. A similar doctrine is advocated by the late Professor James. That is true which has forced itself into consciousness by an experience over which one had or has no control. In a comparison of rationalism with mysticism, he unhesitatingly declares in favor of mysticism. Rationalism has the prestige of logic and loquacity, but in contrast with intuition it will neither convince nor convert; intuition is from a deeper level, i.e., the subconscious and the non-rational, the sphere of inarticulate feeling. When, therefore, one has an intuition or feeling of reality as in religious experience, "something in you

²⁵ Quoted by J. Omar in *Faith and Freedom*, p. 24.

absolutely *knows* that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it."²⁶

Other writers, while locating authority in the religious consciousness, attribute to it a more definite intellectual content. Dr. McComb affirms that "the ultimate standard is the religious consciousness in which all men have a share, enlightened, moulded, penetrated, and shaped by the teaching of Christ in the gospels, in the history of the church, and in the enlightening influence of the Spirit. Each age has its own vision of Christ. In the ultimate analysis it is by this vision that all must be tried."²⁷ Yet this is not final in the sense that posterity may not go beyond it. Professor Knox also maintains that the "fundamental appeal" is to "the experience of the individual."²⁸ Professor Royce holds that the inner light which shines in our own individual experience is adequate for all religious illumination. He will not, however, wholly explain this on the purely individualistic basis of Professor James or on the purely social basis of other recent writers,²⁹ but he refers it in part also to the reason as disclosing the superhuman divine unity of intelligence, to the will through whose action we meet the absolute, to morality which is defined by loyalty and involves religion, and finally to sorrow which, if it appears to hinder, at the same time really leads to the discovery and attainment of the religious aim.³⁰ The emphasis on experience has given rise to two attitudes toward the Scriptures and the dogmas of the church. In one the aim is to find the common element in the Scriptures, Christian dogma, and experience. With reference to the Scriptures, it is not indeed assumed that present-day experience is equal to the experience of the writers and actors of the Bible, but that the Scriptures themselves originated in great religious experiences, and these, although superior to experiences of today, provide

²⁶ William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lecture III, "The Reality of the Unseen"; cf. J. B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 243 ff.

²⁷ S. McComb, *Christianity and the Modern Mind*, p. 10.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

²⁹ Cf. E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. vii; I. King, *The Development of Religion*, p. viii.

³⁰ J. Royce, *Sources of Religious Insight*, "Bross Lectures," 1911.

both the source, the impulse, and the type of religious experience of every age. In this view the ultimate authority of experience lies in the Scriptures, but this is seen in its reality and power only when it is reflected in the life of men now. With reference to Christian doctrine a change has taken place in the explanation of its nature and origin. It is now recognized that it came into being not to meet a speculative demand, and that its content is not simply metaphysical, but that it was born in the travail of great experiences, and that it had to preserve these experiences in the thought-forms of the age in which they began to be. And now, even though and so far as these dogmas are authoritative for belief, this is partly to be referred to the enduring experiences of the Christian life. The other attitude toward present-day experience as related to the Scriptures and dogma offers this experience as both test and interpretative principle of these. With reference to the Scriptures, a recent instance along this line is Professor W. A. Brown's *The Christian Hope*. A special interest is lent to his discussion of this high theme by the fact that a Presbyterian clergyman has felt moved to write an open letter, charging heresy, and expressing the hope that the author may be censured by the New York Presbytery for his subjective treatment of the Gospels.²¹ According to this attitude of Professor Brown, which increasingly prevails among Christian scholars, Christian experience of today, while not perfected and final, presents the most authoritative norm by which to judge the ideals and hopes contained in the Scriptures. Even the teachings of Jesus as they are recorded in the Gospels are not exempt from this ordeal. There is still closer agreement among scholars respecting the bearing of present-day experience on the dogmatic teachings of the past. Here Schleiermacher blazed the way; in the light of Christian experience he reinterpreted and, where necessary, by his magic touch transformed every doctrine of the church. He was followed by Ritschl, who stripped Christian doctrine of what he conceived as foreign admixture and adulteration from Greek metaphysics and scholastic philosophy, and later by Harnack and, in greater or less degree, by the entire Ritschlian school. In Great Britain Coleridge, in America Horace Bushnell

²¹ Cf., e.g., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

were only leaders of a long succession of virile and influential writers who have made experience paramount as a source of Christian truth. One of the most beautiful of recent statements of this attitude was offered by Dr. Gunsaulus in the Lyman Beecher lectures at Yale Divinity School in 1911: "Certain doctrines can never be held as true in the mind, unless they are lived willingly and lovingly." Spiritual life is itself the only way to the authentication of truth. Life must take up into itself the truth and live it—the truth of God, the divinity of Christ, incarnation, atonement, immortality, else it is known only as an abstract and formal proposition.³²

The question of authority has been deeply influenced by the pragmatic attitude toward reality. This may be roughly characterized as follows: elimination of the metaphysics which has been traditionally associated with Christian doctrine as furnishing its philosophical content; supplementing or replacing this "by that type of philosophy which finds its ultimates in values rather than in alleged axioms or intuitions";³³ disavowing the causal in favor of the teleological interpretation of reality; rejecting the static and substituting a changing and developing order of existence; abandoning a-priori deductive theology for the history and science of religion; substituting hypotheses for dogma; discarding transcendental idealism and the Absolute which this affirms, knowing only an empirical order whose contents are disclosed in and through the processes of life; religious experience conditioned not by knowledge of a divine Being conceived after the manner of the schools, defined with exhaustive logical precision, receiving its binding force from Bible or church or both, but by the fact that the conscious person is conterminous and continuous with a wider self—a MORE of the same quality—through which saving experiences come, that this wider self is other and larger than our conscious selves, yet not necessarily infinite or solitary, operating in the universe outside of us, with which one can keep in working touch.³⁴ The influence of these positions on authority is not far to seek. Traditional authority is swept clean off the boards. This

³² F. W. Gunsaulus, *The Minister and the Spiritual Life*, pp. 107 ff.

³³ Shailer Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³⁴ Cf. William James, *op. cit.*, pp. 485 ff.

means not that there is no authority but that it is differently conceived. For example, Professor Leuba holds that it is not necessary to understand or even to know God; the only question that signifies is whether he is useful. Life not God is the concern of religion.³⁵ Professor Patton maintains that the test of truth is action, and this takes place when the whole man is aroused.³⁶ It is evident that the principle of authority has undergone a transformation; it is not from without, general, dogmatic, finally and unalterably fixed, but is inward, personal, teleological, progressive, cumulative. The most penetrating statement of this attitude is that by Professor Knox: "Man is not *under* authority, but he wills authority." The scope of authority has been fundamentally modified; one is no longer bound to the transcendental—this has departed with the metaphysics which gave it birth—but to the intelligible, the ethical, to that which arises in and yields itself to experience.

Since religious attention has been so largely shifted from theology to social questions—family, property, capital and labor, charity, politics—it was to be expected that the principle of authority would be influenced thereby. Professor Peabody has said that the whole meaning of the Christian life is not found in "worship, praise, prayer, belief, conformity, confession, a creed, a state of heart, a submission of the will, a consent of the mind to Christian truth," but it is "ethical, social, political, industrial, human."³⁷ There are those who assert that religion is man's consciousness and conservation of the highest social values. Accordingly, religious beliefs are the varied and progressive attempts to define the meaning of these values.³⁸ Religion is thus conceived of as a form of social evolution, subject to the same laws and conditions which are valid in other regions of human development. And this holds good of the Hebrew and the Christian religion as truly as of the Greek, the Persian, and the Egyptian. This means that there is a natural history of religious as of other ideas, that revelation must be conceived otherwise than formerly, and that the sanctions of religion

³⁵ J. H. Leuba, "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *The Monist*, Vol. XI.

³⁶ S. N. Patton, *The Social Basis of Religion*, pp. xiii ff.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 275-76.

³⁸ E. S. Ames, *op. cit.*, *passim*; H. Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*.

are derived not from a direct supernatural source or from an anticipated future world, but from the customs and necessities of the social organism. Dr. Smith, in a study confined to the Old Testament, of the agents, process, results, and tendencies of social development, seeks a "frank account of the growth and function of the various Hebrew institutions with some attempt at their comparison with like institutions in similar social growth."³⁹ Along with other social forces he traces the idea of God as developing and watches the working forms which this idea assumes and its actual bearings in the practical world. Professor Patton seeks for the social basis of religion; starting with the doctrine of one supreme God, he sets out to reinterpret the conditions with which religion is concerned, as, e.g., the fall or social degeneracy, regeneration or the reincorporation of social outcasts into society, personal uplift through contact, influence, and suggestion, progress through peace and love, the Messiah or lofty inspiring leadership, service, social and personal responsibility, and the wages of sin as death.⁴⁰ Such programs as these are extremely attractive to all who are not obsessed by dogmatic theological assumptions which yield nothing to the modern spirit. They make no appeal to an occult authority which can be discovered and defended only by abstruse a-priori considerations accessible to learned scholars alone, but they present the actual conditions and customs and ideals of religious people in a way intelligible to the average man. The authority here under discussion does not indeed ignore God, but its chief attention is directed to the social body. It may perhaps be designated as immanent, as residing in the social order, as enforcing itself through custom, as varying with changing conditions. This social historical conception of authority has hardly more than begun to influence religious thinking, but it would be hard to overestimate its future development.

Two notions of authority underlie the "Modernist" movement in the Roman Catholic church. One takes its rise in a conflict between an authority which is purely external and rules by force

³⁹ Samuel G. Smith, *Religion in the Making*, p. 36; cf. H. Waring, *Christianity and the Bible*, p. 25; "The method of testing the claims of all religions must be the same, although the results be very different."

⁴⁰ S. N. Patton, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

without insight or sympathy, and without respect for the rightful autonomy of the individual, and an authority which has regard for the initiative and responsibility of the individual. When the former is claimed as authentic, Paul Sabatier asks, "What must a spiritual authority be which does not even dream of getting its decrees ratified by the conscience of its members," and "when it does not even occur to it that the sword is not enough, but that it ought to carry a light in the other hand, were that light but a modern lantern!" Under the influence of that for which Modernism stands he pictures a time when religious authority "will become a more inward matter. No longer will there be on one side omniscience and on the other absolute ignorance; . . . there will be on one side understanding and on the other obedience; the obedience of a being who feels his weakness and his want of guidance, but has already a glimpse of vaster horizons."⁴ The other aspect of authority on which Modernism relies is the principle that the judgment of history is the seat of authority. Newman without prevision of its consequences lent the weight of his great name to this principle in the oft quoted words, "Securus judicat orbis terrarum," by which he was carried over to Rome. He legitimated the development of doctrine by the well-known tests: (1) preservation of type; (2) continuity of principles; (3) capacity of doctrinal assimilation; (4) anticipation of further development, (5) which will obey a law of logical sequence, (6) by which the original creed is established and illustrated; (7) it bears the test of time. The Modernist has built on the truth in this foundation. Religion in common with all life is subject to the law of growth and change. The God of the Old Testament is not the same as the Father whom Jesus proclaimed. The meaning and in part the form of our beliefs differ from the "Rule of Faith" in the second century. "But the law of change is not inconsistent with the authority of belief. For though truth is changeless, its image as reflected in human minds continually alters. The living faith is the important thing; the forms which it employs in the vain attempt to be articulate are mutable and imperfect." Mrs. Humphrey Ward has proposed a somewhat similar notion. She conceives

⁴ *Modernism*, pp. 144, 142-43.

history not so much as the development of doctrine as the condition of arriving at truth. In contrast with abstract dogmatic theories, "history has come into being, . . . is divine and authoritative . . . marches slowly on its way; through many mistakes; through hypothesis and rectification; through vision and laborious proof; to an ever broadening certainty. History has taken hold of the Christian tradition." And she adds that history has at last presented to us the actual Christ and his working through two thousand years upon the world. "*There*, for the modernist, lies revelation, in the unfolding of the Christian idea."⁴² Accordingly, authority attaches, first to the simple Christian fact which history is able to disentangle from the legends and traditions of the past, and secondly, to the successive stages in the development through the Christian centuries of the idea which sprang from this fact—the whole a revelation in the present.

There are three other fields where the study of authority is extremely interesting; each is definitely educational and has produced a literature of considerable volume. Reference is made to Sunday-school helps, to works prepared for Y.M.C.A. classes, and to books of religious instruction published by the University of Chicago. Concerning books for use in the Sunday school, one discovers two opposite tendencies in the church. The first follows the traditional lines of teaching from the point of view of the unqualified authority of the Scriptures and dogma, the second is in harmony with the modern trend in education, historical interpretation of the Bible, and the meaning of life as disclosed in the theory of evolution, in psychology, and in the study of social forces. Attention is here directed to the second of these two tendencies, and particularly to what it proposes for young people. The mental life of the child is studied with a view to adapting all teaching to the specific stages of the child's intellectual, moral, and religious needs. Since this is the time of rapid physical development, in which some functions undergo swift transformation, the consciousness of sex awakens, and home, family, friendship, and love begin to assert their claims, the time also of the quickening and pursuit of ideals, of dreams, hopes, possibilities, and partial realiza-

⁴² *The Case of Richard Meynell*, pp. 621-22.

tions, the choice of religious educative material is adapted to this condition. Where the International Lessons are followed, this becomes sometimes more difficult than in the more freely chosen courses. In either case, the following tendencies are increasingly effective, by which religious instruction is brought into line with instruction in other fields: (1) to quicken the mind of the child by an orderly presentation of the simple elements of religion; (2) to make him aware of both the natural and the social world into which he has been born; (3) to guard and promote his normal physical development; (4) to teach him his rights and duties in relation to his fellow-men. In the Old Testament special use is made of geography, excavations, history, comparative religion, parallel movements in social and religious life among other peoples, and references to parallel Scriptures. In history, biography is employed for its presentation of heroes and ideals—the whole treated in a way as simple and natural as the history of the social and religious movements of other great people are described. One author shows how the plagues in Egypt followed the natural order of these events. Another says of the crossing of the Red Sea that God saved the Hebrews through one of the forces of nature—a strong east wind which drove the waters back and the people passed over in safety, to which another authority adds, “probably the people had no knowledge of the physical agency employed.”⁴³ Describing the battle of Beth-Horon, it is said that the identical thing happened which occurred to the Austrians at the battle of Solferino: a hailstorm of unusual severity broke upon the armies, the hail was driven full in the face of the Amorites and it seemed as if the shafts of Jehovah were piercing them. “A poem was written to commemorate the event, just as the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ was written to commemorate a victory of the American army.” Many other instances might be cited, but these are sufficient to illustrate the method employed. No question is raised as to an external authority, or authority of a special kind; the story is simply interpreted (“as we should treat Froissart or the Saxon Chronicle”), made more vivid indeed by historical and individual

⁴³ Cf. *Leaders of Israel*, Intermediate textbook, first year, Part I, p. 44; Kent, *Heroes and Crises*, *ad. loc.*

parallels among other religious peoples. Thus the lesson simply presented is left to make its own impression and the divine authority being implicit is even more effective than when presented in the traditional manner. It is not truth or fact plus authority, but the authority of the fact or truth itself under interpretation.

In the rapidly growing literature published by the Y.M.C.A. for use in classes among its membership, one discerns everywhere a central purpose and organic unity. The aim of the studies is to stimulate men to higher Christian ideals and more efficient action. Manliness and efficiency are the keynotes. The object is thus immediately practical. When one adds that the great majority of those who have to teach these lessons are not technically trained in ethics or religion or theology, and that those who are taught are engrossed in practical affairs, one can but admire the good sense which has presided over both the choice of themes and the prescribed method of treatment. What then is the authority enshrined in these studies? Unquestionably it lies in part in the fact that such studies effect the results in ideals, in character, and in service which they are designed to produce. In their efficiency for a definite aim lies their reason for being, and authority is interpreted from a pragmatic point of view. Very little theology is made use of, although what there is frequently reveals itself in a point of view or in the shaping of a phrase. If apologetics is the theme, then both the questions and the mode of presentation differ radically from standard works of reference on apologetics or in periodicals addressed to cultivated and thoughtful readers.⁴⁴ It seems more like a lunch counter where a hungry traveler snatches a few bites while the train waits, and the bell rings for him to hasten, than a quiet dining-room where at his leisure one may go through an elaborate bill of fare. Critical questions are lightly touched, rarely in a radical or controversial spirit. The results of historical and literary criticism are taken for granted. Almost an exception to this general regimen is the *Book of Isaiah* by Professor George L. Robinson, where, in spite of the almost entire consensus of scholars to the contrary, the judgment is expressed that we have no adequate

⁴⁴ Cf. R. A. Falconer, *The Truth of the Apologetic Gospel*; F. S. Schenck, *Christian Evidences and Ethics*.

or convincing proof of the composite character of the book. Accordingly, references to Cyrus in chapters xlv, 24-xlv, 25 are "explained best by supposing that the prophet projected himself into the future from an earlier age."⁴⁵ Where the aim is to provide material for Christian workers, the treatment is much the same.⁴⁶ The presentation of Old Testament characters, Jesus Christ, and Paul is preceded by certain pertinent general considerations and followed by discussions of well-known Christian workers through the centuries. Attention is everywhere concentrated "upon the duty and opportunity to live to help men to know God and to lead them to Jesus Christ." The favorite fields are history and biography,⁴⁷ for here the personal and social aspects of life are the characteristic features. In this field ideals emerge and are tested, and the moral qualities that crown endeavor with success or darken it with defeat are most vividly portrayed and are also most impressive. There is a predetermined avoidance of questions which arouse controversy. Attention is concentrated on subjects which are personal, historical, social, ethical, religious. Slight stress is placed on literary matters. One writer says in his introduction that "the teacher will find himself dividing his material perforce into about three classes: knotty questions that he straightens out and lays aside; material that he teaches; vexing problems that clothe the mind like sackcloth. Only the second class mean anything to his students, and only these things are to be taught—but taught with enthusiasm, in enforced oblivion of non-essentials and unsolved difficulties."⁴⁸ The Hebrew prophets are especially serviceable. Never have these men and their message been so popular or so influential as at present. Their religion knew of no God who was postponing to a future life all the good he had for them. Here and now, on the earth and among its people, his interest was focused, his will present, and his activity manifest. With respect to authority, the same remark is to be made as was

⁴⁵ Pp. 13, 137.

⁴⁶ Cf. H. A. Johnson, *Studies in God's Method of Training Christian Workers*.

⁴⁷ Cf., e.g., L. K. Willman, *Men of the Old Testament*; G. F. Kent and R. L. Smith, *The Work and Teachings of the Earlier Prophets*; W. W. White, *Studies in Old Testament Characters*; G. L. Robinson, *op. cit.*; A. G. Leacock, *Studies in the Life of St. Paul*.

⁴⁸ L. K. Willman, *op. cit.*, p. v.

offered concerning the Sunday-school literature. The books are written from sincere conviction, they are to be studied and taught with enthusiastic, single-hearted conviction, they are to be received without question as true and incorporated at once into character and life.

A few words of explanation concerning the relation of authority to the newer movement in religious education may preface the reference to works published by the University of Chicago Press. The matter of authority was comparatively simple when religious education was limited to the catechism, to certain doctrinal statements, to assent to dogmas, and to the immediately accredited teaching of properly ordained clergymen. It was hardly more complex when this instruction was confined to the Bible, in which texts of Scripture were recited, followed by question and answer, always within the confines of denominational dogmas and interests. The aim was to place in the mind of the pupil the exact notion exactly as formulated by the mind of the teacher and the section of the church represented, without increase, or diminution, or modification, or doubt. The material was ecclesiastically formulated dogmas and certain interpreted portions of the Bible. The method might be described as the process of education by injection. The teaching was dogmatic. The habit of the teacher was to convey the truth as it was given to him, and the ideal of the pupil to receive in the way of memory and absorption without assimilation, except as related to certain earlier instruction of the same sort.⁴⁹ A different theory of religious education as represented by the Religious Education Association moves toward a different end by the use of different materials and methods. This theory of education is not indeed new, since it has had a long series of distinguished advocates, as Comenius, Rousseau, and Froebel. But what they divined from a sympathetic insight into the nature of the child, combined with a more or less restricted view of the world, is now becoming scientific, self-conscious, and broad-based. The new psychology makes possible a kind and accuracy of observation and experiment and interpretation of the religious nature of the

⁴⁹ For this theory of religious training, cf. a Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Education upon Sunday schools, cited in Burton and Mathews, *Principles and Ideals for the Sunday School*, p. 29.

child never before attainable. The new pedagogy holds that for religious education no other principles are valid than are sought after and applied in so-called secular training. If the Bible is to be the chief source of material for religious culture, i.e., of the ideals and motives involved in Christian character and civilization, then it must be used not as fetish or talisman or storehouse of mysterious but unintelligible truths to be received by implicit faith, but "brought into relationship with the human spirit through the same channels of sense, intellectual perceptions, reasoning processes, and emotional response that are employed in connection with other types of educational material."⁵⁰ Like any other body of literature both the understanding of it and its influence depend upon intelligent apprehension and responsive feeling. Moreover, the end sought is not simply preparation for another world whose conditions are either unknown or supposedly far otherwise than those of the present life; on the contrary, attention is drawn forward to this world, the world which offers itself to physical science, to economic, civic, and political well-being, to poetic contemplation, to human service, in a word, to the only world of which we have any knowledge through experience, in which alone the character of living men is formed. This means not the disappearance of mystery in human existence with which traditional authority is concerned but only a shifting of its center, changing its point of view, and therefore a difference in its content. Mystery is no longer the focus but the fringe of interest. Religious ideals are saturated with ethical values, and religious education is preparation for the school of earthly experience and service.

The most considerable attempt to illustrate and enforce the point of view here indicated is offered in a series of Constructive Bible Studies prepared and published under the auspices of the University of Chicago. The intention is ultimately to provide suitable textbooks for religious instruction, based mainly on the Scriptures, for all the grades of the Sunday school, together with numerous volumes for adult classes which include church history and sociology. In the working out of this proposition, there are, e.g., a general introduction to the Bible, several volumes devoted

⁵⁰ George E. Dawson, *The Child and His Religion*, p. 54, University of Chicago Press, 1912.

to the heroes of Israel, to Jesus, and to Paul, the single books of the Old and the New Testament, and finally Old Testament history, Gospels, Acts, and Epistles treated from the point of view of more advanced historical study. Many of these books are already published, others are in preparation. The special point of interest for us is the attitude of these studies toward authority. This is perhaps best stated by Professors Burton and Mathews. Having set aside the suggestion that the teacher is to rely upon his own authority or that of his church, the authors outline their own ideal of the teacher's task: first, to find the exact meaning of the Scripture writer; then, to recognize the child's individuality with his right to investigate and to raise questions; further, for the teacher to become a humble interpreter of the Scriptures and obedient to the truth; finally, to lead the pupil to study the Bible honestly and to obey the truth. This is based on the conviction that the Bible is not a collection of atomistic proof-texts but the literature growing out of a historical process, the record of an unfolding revelation of God. In this one may distinguish stages of revelation and so degrees of authority, until these culminate in the perfect life of our Lord Jesus Christ.⁵¹ This point of view may be regarded as representing the general attitude of all the writers in this admirable series of Bible studies. One's attention is arrested by several common qualities. First, the use of the story in its simple concrete features.⁵² Secondly, the very great use of biographical material.⁵³ Thirdly, the naturalness, simplicity, and reverence with which all the material is handled. Fourthly, harmony with the findings of historical and literary criticism of the Scriptures.⁵⁴ Fifthly, the treatment of miracles and moral difficulties as adapted to the developing intelligence of pupils. Sixthly, letting the truths and facts of the Scriptures make their own unforced impression upon the pupil. Finally, awakening a spirit

⁵¹ Burton and Mathews, "The Basis of Authority in Teaching," *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff.

⁵² Cf. Georgia L. Chamberlin and Mary R. Kern, *The Child in His World; Walks with Jesus in His Country*; Georgia L. Chamberlin, *An Introduction to the Bible for Teachers of Children*; C. S. Ferris, *The Sunday Kindergarten: Game, Gift, and Story*.

⁵³ H. W. Gates, *The Life of Jesus: a Manual for Teachers*; T. G. Soares, *Heroes of Israel*; L. W. Atkinson, *The Story of Paul of Tarsus*.

⁵⁴ Cf. H. F. Waring, *op. cit.*; H. L. Willett, *Studies in the First Book of Samuel*; W. R. Harper, *The Priestly Element in the Old Testament; The Prophetic Element in the Old Testament*; Louise S. Houghton, *Hebrew Life and Thought*.

of further inquiry and investigation, with supreme reference to the effect of all this upon character. In all these studies the principle of authority is not external but immanent, not legal but spiritual. It is inseparable from the structure of the Bible and may be trusted to assert its full power in the consciousness of the student. Nowhere in books for Bible study will one discover a finer illustration or more adequate use of the principle of authority than in these Constructive Studies.

From this survey of the field of authority several facts emerge: (1) If the Scriptures as a whole are regarded as authoritative, there is little or no attempt at definition of this, there is a manifest avoidance of controversial material, attention and interest are directed upon those portions which are most immediately available for the quickening of individual and social ideals. Different values are given to the Old and the New Testament respectively. The force of "proof-texts" is seriously impaired. The historical spirit rules, and the Scriptures are studied not for their science or theology so much as for their disclosure of God and the way in which man is to attain to the fulfilment of the divine purpose. (2) The chief authority of the Bible is concentrated in Jesus Christ. Emphasis is laid upon his character and his consciousness rather than upon his metaphysical nature or the particular points of his teachings. This reference is expanded to include the continued influence of the Spirit of Christ in the Christian community or the power of the unfolding and living truth. (3) Authority is derived less from the mysterious than from the intelligible aspect of revelation. And since revelation is discovered in the ethical and religious instead of the speculative and metaphysical, authority itself becomes practical. As the revelation is continuous, the authority is likewise continuous. (4) Authority has not only its seat in the individual but also in the race as developing. The social group has, therefore, the right to impose its progressive customs and ideals upon its members, in order that these may reproduce the type of life which the group is striving with whatever of self-consciousness to realize; this, however, not to the entire elimination of the individual's initiative or divergence. (5) Experience is recovering the place in the field of authority which it formerly held in the New Testament and in Augustine. Thus, it is located partly in

immediate and irreducible feeling, partly in the processes of reason, and partly in the supreme purpose by which personal action is determined. Experience receives something from the New Testament and Christian dogma, but it also contributes something in the interpretation of these. (6) So far as pragmatism is able to validate its claims, it brings into the foreground the teleological aspect of authority, and instead of a perfectly rounded and fixed body of truth, it binds the developing person to a flying goal, to an ideal the more vital the more it springs out of felt values and ever unfolding needs of the will to live. (7) From the social point of view religion formerly conceived of as an affair dealing with the transcendental, is presented as a conservation of social values whose meaning becomes clear the moment the old theological terms are translated into their social equivalents. And whereas, hitherto, there have been those who could neither see the force nor understand the meaning of religion when couched in technical phrases, now, these persons under the social interpretation, find it both easy to comprehend and of irresistible binding power. (8) "Modernism" is impressing on us an aspect of authority which is always in danger of being lost sight of, namely, that under changing forms of statements of belief, authority remains inviolate and concerns itself less with the symbol than with the reality of which it is always the shifting but never wholly adequate expression. (9) In the more recent advance in educational ideals and methods a new courage has overtaken the principle of authority. This is evidenced, first, by the growing and solid conviction that only the truth is safe, and, secondly, by a pedagogic approach to the truth in which values to the developing consciousness determine the content and method of teaching.

In all these aspects and changes of authority one becomes aware of the subtle operation of a mighty force which can be nothing else than the Spirit of God. What transformations are yet to arise no one would be bold enough to forecast. The more spiritual, however, the more certain these will be. Only this we know, that the word of God is ever more surely established. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth. *So is every one that is born of the Spirit.*"

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

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.. Has the doctrine of the Trinity any practical aspects? Apparently few of importance, if we may judge by the comparative neglect into which it has fallen, in these days when the practical value of doctrines is so highly emphasized.

Nevertheless it seems improbable that a doctrine which has held a predominant place for so many centuries should be without elements of high importance to the religious life. If we can discover such elements and bring them into clear light and into closer relation with the life of today, in a word, if we can modernize the doctrine, we shall be making a real contribution to religious progress.

At the very outset we can perceive one practical aspect in that the doctrine serves as the dividing line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. This is not the only question that perpetuates the separation, but there is no other that seems to involve a more irreconcilable difference. If, then, it should prove that this difference is to a great extent one of language, and that the fundamental elements of the doctrine may also be found among those who reject it, an important point will have been gained.

It is noticeable that while acceptance of the doctrine is widespread, this is very far from implying strict adherence to its traditional form as embodied in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds. Of the laity little more is expected than a willingness to be enrolled in a church maintaining the doctrine, and among the clergy widely differing interpretations are freely permitted. In general it may be said that even the clergy are not expected to have clear and definite ideas on the subject. So long as some sort of Trinitarian idea is maintained, little more is demanded.

At the first glance this would seem to signify that the doctrine holds its place as a relic of bygone times, which men merely lack

courage to discard. But I am convinced that this is not so, and the experience of those who have given the matter thought will, I believe, confirm my conviction.

While there is no longer any general agreement among Trinitarians as to the precise form of the doctrine, it will be found that there is a very general agreement, of feeling if not of thought, that there are embodied in it elements of truth which cannot be abandoned without great religious loss, even though it may not be possible to define them with accuracy. In other words, Trinitarians hold in some way to the elements from which the doctrine was built up, even though they do not hold to the creedal forms into which they have been combined.

Let us endeavor, then, to learn what these elements are. To do so we must of course go back of the time of the creeds, to the period when the beliefs were first enunciated which afterward took this form. Fortunately, this leads us for our principal inquiry not to times even more unfamiliar than those of the Council of Nicea, but to those best known to us of all antiquity, the period of the New Testament.

It is generally recognized that the doctrine of the Trinity is not directly taught in the Bible, but it is claimed that we do find there set forth with great earnestness the various elements, the *disjecta membra*, as they are called, from which the doctrine was built up.

This claim has been vigorously combated from the Unitarian side, particularly with regard to the question of the deity of Jesus which is often identified with that of the Trinity. It has been shown that while superhuman attributes are everywhere attributed to him in the New Testament it is at least extremely doubtful whether he is anywhere in those writings referred to as God, while in the Pauline and Johannine writings, where his exaltation above men is most pronounced, his subordination to God is explicitly declared. It will be, however, one of the main points which I shall endeavor to bring out that these two questions, as to the deity of Jesus, and as to the Trinity, are not identical but distinct, though related, and that in fact the latter has been held apart from the former.

Keeping this distinction in mind, it must be acknowledged that

we do find in the New Testament certain ways of regarding God which were the elements which were afterward combined into the doctrine of the Trinity. It would then appear that in this respect modern Trinitarians are in much the same position as the early Christians, refusing as they do to be bound by the terms of the creeds, and declining generally to accept the deity of Jesus, however strongly they may maintain the uniqueness of his divinity, yet holding earnestly to certain elements in the doctrine which they believe to be of great value.

What are these elements? And how came it about that the early Christians, coming from the intensely monotheistic atmosphere of Judaism, developed a belief which bore so strong an outward resemblance to the despised polytheism around them, yet still maintaining that they believed in but one God?

Let us endeavor to answer the latter question first, with the expectation that in so doing we shall be led also to an answer to the former.

The direct effect of polytheism is generally and rightly rejected. Whether it may indirectly have had influence in modifying the form of the doctrine is a question which may deserve more attention than has generally been accorded to it. But this has little to do with our inquiry, for the experiences which went to the making of our doctrine were entirely unconnected with polytheism, and received their first formal expression in the words of Paul in the apostolic benediction.

The profound impression which Jesus made upon his disciples, not only as a preacher of righteousness, but as one who was in intimate communion with God, whom he knew, and whom he would have them know as Father, is so universally recognized as to need nothing more than mention as the first step toward this enlarged conception of God. This new thought of him was very different from that which they had hitherto held, yet there is nothing to indicate that it suggested to their minds any distinction in the Godhead. But after the death of Jesus, the sense of a special and peculiar fellowship with God through him was greatly intensified by the assurance that he had risen from the dead and was living in heaven, and that he had appeared to Peter and afterward

to the twelve and to others of his followers, and that men might continue to have fellowship with God as Father through him. It was this conviction which formed the starting-point of the Christian church.

In close connection with this there arose a strange series of phenomena which made a deep impression on the early Christians. Chief among these was the "speaking with tongues," a form of ecstatic utterance. Those who were of "The Way" were convinced that such utterance did not originate with the speaker himself, so different was it from the ordinary method of speech, but was caused by some superhuman influence which had taken up its abode in the subject. In so far as such utterance was adjudged worthy it was regarded as coming from the spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which spoke through the subject. This gift of the Spirit was generally regarded as the highest and most characteristic mark of those who were of "The Way." Indeed, it is probable that that most primitive of all names for Christians was due largely to this experience.

As this fellowship with God through Christ and these gifts of the Spirit were so closely associated, they were often identified, Christ, or the spirit of Christ, or the Holy Spirit being used indifferently. So far did this go that an increasing number of scholars would identify the appearance of Christ to five hundred at once, related by Paul with the gift of tongues on the day of Pentecost, remote from one another as these two accounts appear to us.

Thus to the early Christians the heavenly Christ stood for any special manifestation of God in the Christian life.

It was Paul who first established a distinction between the heavenly Christ and the Holy Spirit. In his great discussion concerning spiritual gifts in Corinth he refused to confine those gifts to such startling manifestations as speaking with tongues, and included among them prophecies, governments, and the like, setting forth as the one fundamental gift the spirit of love, of which these special gifts were but varying manifestations. The gift of the Spirit thus became identical in his thought with the daily Christian life as a whole.

On the other hand, the heavenly Christ was to him also primarily

and fundamentally a personal religious experience. "It pleased God to reveal his Son in me," is his great confession of faith. This experience he felt to be the same as that of the Jerusalem Christians and it was this that united him to them, widely as they differed in other matters. It was this also that made them recognize him as a fellow-Christian. To him the Christ after the flesh was of little concern; what was vital was that his life should be "hid with Christ in God." The only important things as to his earthly life were that he had lived, had been crucified, and had risen. The essential elements in this may be expressed for us thus: "God was manifest in the flesh as a Christlike God. This was so much in opposition to current ideas of him that the one so coming had been put to death. Nevertheless this Christlike God is not dead but liveth forevermore."

This heavenly Christ Paul regarded as pre-existent with the Father from the beginning, humbling himself in taking on the likeness of man and then resuming his rightful position. This sonship of the Christ was to him the mystery of all ages, now made manifest, but to be felt rather than to be understood. Of this general conception the Johannine Logos doctrine is but the natural development.

With this highly summarized sketch of the development of ideas concerning God and Christ in the New Testament, we may endeavor to set forth the elements out of which the doctrine of the Trinity was formed. In addition to the previous Jewish conception of the Deity they are three, namely, the Christlikeness of God, the indwelling spirit of God, and the mystery or incomprehensibility of God. They are all elements of incalculable value without which our Christian life would be poor indeed. Traces of them may be found in pre-Christian thought, but the first two especially are very far from having the same emphasis that they acquired when Christianity arose.

That these elements, especially the first two, were widely present at the dawn of Christianity is beyond dispute. The question is whether in the form stated they are sufficient, in particular whether a belief in the Christlikeness of God is an adequate statement of that element of the doctrine, or whether it must be reinforced by the belief in the deity of Jesus.

But before taking up that point a few words are necessary of a more general character. It is to be noted that these elements are all matters of experience rather than of logic. The early Christians believed in these things because they had felt them. For Paul, the distinction between the spirit of Christ and the Holy Spirit was a reality corresponding to differing religious experiences in his own life and in that of those around him. Logically, however, the distinction is not clear, and there is no quality in the conception of the Holy Spirit that may not be included either in that of the Father or in that of the Son. With the subsidence of the speaking with tongues and other extraordinary "spiritual gifts" the conception of the Holy Spirit as a peculiar manifestation of God fell into the background, and as related to the question of the Trinity has never received more than perfunctory treatment.

This doctrine of the Holy Spirit is, however, of great significance in the question immediately before us, in confirming what has been said regarding the elements of the Trinity being a matter of experience, rather than of reasoning concerning matters of historical occurrence. It is conceivable that Jesus should have been deified because of the wonderful works that he was believed to have done, but it is not conceivable that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit could have arisen in that way. The only reason for differentiating the Holy Spirit from the Father was that the two concepts corresponded to two different religious experiences.

The more we study the concept of the Christ the clearer it becomes that it arose in a precisely similar way and that the question of the nature of the historical Jesus, which to modern minds seems so vital, was to the men of the first century a subordinate question on which they held varying opinions. The earliest Christians regarded him as a wonderful man whom God had raised from the dead and made both Lord and Christ. Paul, as we have seen, distinctly put this question in the background, holding that the pre-existent Christ had taken upon himself "the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men and being found in fashion as a man." This may not imply Docetism but it is not incompatible with it and even suggests it. Certain extreme Paulinists, the Docetists, followed

out this suggestion, holding that the Christ had become man in appearance only. Finally the author of the Fourth Gospel, himself a Paulinist, set forth, in opposition to the Docetists, his conception of the earthly life of the Christ, endowing him with many superhuman attributes, so as to come very near at least to making his humanity a matter of the flesh alone, yet retaining certain human traits which the Docetists rejected, and distinctly asserting his subordination to the Father.

Summing up, then, even at the risk of repetition, we reach this conclusion. The early Christians were unanimous in believing that God was manifest in Christ Jesus and that, in a new way, as an ever-living Christlike God with whom they might have fellowship. Whether this man, in whom God had thus dwelt, was something more than a man was a subordinate question on which they were not agreed. Only those were rejected who regarded his manhood as in appearance only. Naturally the tendency was strong to ascribe to this wonderful man more and more wonderful deeds. Nevertheless discussion of this question remained largely in abeyance for many years. Not only this, but in general the question of the historical Jesus largely fell out from discussion and even from current religious thought in relation to the Christ and the Deity. Even the *Didache* says, "Whencesoever the Lordship speaketh there is the Lord," and, as Harnack¹ tells us, the apologists do not seem "to have assumed the unique nature of the Logos in Jesus," "they do not even consider it necessary to mention *ex professo* the appearance of the Logos in Christ." "When they speak of the Christ as made man, 'homo' merely means appearance among men." When we recall the words "was made man" in the Nicene Creed, the significance of this last statement becomes apparent.

How completely interest centered in the question of the manifestation of God in Christ, rather than in that of the nature of the man Christ Jesus may be seen in the case of Origen and of Tertullian. These two did more than all others to develop the doctrine of the Trinity, yet it is well known that Origen was at least reluctant that prayers should be addressed to Christ, a

¹ *History of Dogma*, II, 218, 220, 240.

reluctance only to be explained on the ground that he was fearful lest it should seem as though men were addressing their prayers to a man.

As to Tertullian, we find many passages in his principal work on the Trinity of which the following is but the most succinct example:

If the Father and Son are alike to be invoked, I shall call the Father "God" and invoke Jesus Christ as "Lord." But when Christ alone is mentioned I shall be able to call him "God." . . . For I should give the name of "sun" even to a sunbeam, considered in itself; but if I were mentioning the sun from which the ray emanates, I certainly should at once withdraw the name of sun from the mere beam.²

It is highly significant that it was not until after adoption of the Nicene Creed that the christological controversy arose. The one man whose name shines forth in that post-Nicene age as having exegetical and historical insight, Theodore of Mopsuestia, maintained his loyalty to the Nicene Creed and at the same time his belief in the humanity of Jesus. Not until the Council of Chalcedon over a century after Nicea was the doctrine of the deity of Jesus and of his two natures finally established.

The reason for this neglect of the question of the nature of the historical Jesus is not far to seek. It was overshadowed by that other question concerning him which had for the Christians of the first three centuries not only greater intellectual interest but, as they conceived it, far greater practical importance, the question that is of the nature of this new divinity, this new kind of God-experience and its relation to the old. Was the Christ God subordinate to the God of the Jews, was he equal, or was he superior? And whatever their comparative greatness, were they antagonistic or in harmony with one another? That, as I conceive it, was a question of great practical importance. At any rate they so felt it, and the idea that the conflict of three centuries on this question was a mere logomachy is in so far mistaken. Indeed the character of an Origen or of an Athanasius should be sufficient to show its inadequacy.

How soon the feeling arose that there was any element of antagonism between the new idea of God and the old it is not easy to say.

² *Adv. Praxean*, c. 13 *ad fin.*

It lies latent in the Pauline antagonism between law and gospel, though it does not directly come to the surface in the New Testament, but it was soon very keenly felt and found expression in the Gnostics and in Marcion. Their reply was that the God of the Old Testament was a distinctly inferior being who had created or at least ruled this present evil world, while in Jesus was manifest a far higher form of God.

But the sense of the unity of God, and the teaching of Jesus himself, were too strong an influence to be overthrown, and the church as a whole declared its belief first and foremost in God the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and in Jesus Christ as his son. This was a great victory for monotheism, but it was not complete.

If the "Maker of heaven and earth" was supreme, what room was there for the Savior-God? Was he only a different aspect of the ruler of the universe? Or was he a subordinate created God of a different though perhaps similar substance from the creator? Or was there some other way out of the dilemma in which at the same time the unity of the Godhead and the distinction between the Savior-God and the Creator could be maintained?

The final controversy was between the last two alternatives. Why the first did not come more prominently into view we shall consider presently. But, setting it aside for the moment, it is easy to see that as between the other two the interests of monotheism were identified with Athanasius rather than with Arius. If there is any practical importance in monotheism as opposed to polytheism, then the adoption of the Nicene Creed was a practical question which we will concede to have been of great importance.

It has been said that there was but an iota of difference, but in that iota was involved one of the great questions of the world. Prominent Unitarians have testified emphatically to the importance of this victory for the conception of the divine Unity.

But this victory was won at great cost, at the cost, that is, of adopting a self-contradictory creed. The contradiction is so plain that the merest child can see it. The first paragraph declares belief in one God, and the next a belief in a second God begotten of the first, who is not the first and yet is one with the first and the

third as well. Why not say that these are but different aspects of one and the same God, in whom there is no real distinction, instead of taking refuge in a declaration of mystery? It would all be so plain and simple. Even the question of the nature, or even the two natures, of the man Christ Jesus might be adapted to this view.

But as we have seen, the doctrine of the Trinity was not developed for the purpose of maintaining the deity of Jesus. That is to put the cart before the horse. The deity of Jesus was asserted as a supposed corollary of the doctrine of the Trinity. That no such inference is necessary may be seen not only logically but historically. Men did hold the one without the other, they do so in ever-increasing numbers at this day.

The reason for the assertion of the distinction in the Godhead lies far deeper than that. It lies in the fact that the conception of the Christlike God cannot be made to harmonize logically with the conception of God as the ruler or guiding spirit of the whole world, upholding all things by his might. Yet we can dispense with neither of these ideas. God is at the bottom of all things, otherwise this world is nothing but a hideous jumble. In some way all that is, finds its true source in him. To use the tremendous words of the prophet, "He makes peace and creates evil."

But God is also working in the world for righteousness, hating evil and caring for our sorrows and infirmities. In a word, he is like Christ. For, if not, there is something in the world that is greater than God, namely, the spirit that was in Jesus that we see even now subduing all things to itself. Yet there are not two Gods but one God. Is God then at controversy with himself? That is the riddle of the universe.

It perpetually presents itself in various forms as the problem of good and evil, or the problem of the one and the many, of fate and freewill, of matter and spirit, of God and man. It is also the practical problem of everyday life, of the widow standing by the bier of her only son, and of everyone as he meets the great disappointments and tragedies that come into every life or who faces the awful conditions that exist in our social life and yet holds to the belief that this is a good world. It finds its supreme illustration in the crucifixion.

This is the problem that we find stated in the doctrine of the Trinity. It is no man-made mystery that we have here but the mystery of all ages set in theological form.

The trouble with the modal view of the Trinity is that it does not meet this problem. It is too simple. Orthodox Trinitarianism constantly verged toward the modal view by eliminating more and more the distinction between the Son and the Father. The Son thus came to be thought of as the judge of all the earth and practical religion revenged itself by introducing a new Savior-God in the Virgin Mary and the great company of saints.

The Nicene doctrine does meet it. It does not solve it, or attempt to. It sets forth both sides of the contradiction and declares them both true. The Athanasian creed fairly flings the contradiction in one's face. Hard and even brutal as is the statement, it is not mere word-juggling but an attempt to set forth the ultimate problems of life and to declare that they are to be solved not by reason but by faith, or, if you choose, the will to believe.

We cannot explain how God is at the same time the high and lofty one who inhabiteth eternity and the one that dwells with him that is of an humble mind, but all that is best in us, in reason, instinct, and feeling, maintains the truth of both these propositions. In the old creedal language we can neither confound the persons nor divide the substance; we can only bow in humility and say, "O Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

According to our inquiry, then, the essential elements of the doctrine of the Trinity resolve themselves into this antithesis of the two conceptions of God and the assertion of their fundamental unity. It should be stated that this does not imply that this distinction exists of necessity in the nature of the Godhead. It exists of necessity in our conceptions of him. Back of that lies mystery, and mystery is of the essence of the doctrine.

These essential elements are also highly practical. The experience of many centuries shows that both these conceptions are essential to a well-developed spiritual life. The different types of that life are largely determined by the relative importance given to these two conceptions.

It remains, then, to inquire how widely these ideas are held.

It is the bane of religious controversy that we almost inevitably misunderstand one another. Unitarians easily come to consider that all who are called Trinitarians must hold to every statement of the Nicene and Athanasian creeds or else be insincere. In like manner, Trinitarians come to think of Unitarians as bald rationalists and absolute monists, to whom every thought of mystery and every conception of a Christlike God must be foreign. The injustice of the one idea has already been set forth, a few words are here in order concerning the equal injustice of the other.

The name Unitarian has never been accepted by the body, which bears it, as adequate. It was accepted by Channing and his associates under strong protest and on condition that it be not understood in its literal sense but only as indicating their dissent from the doctrine of the Trinity as then set forth, particularly with regard of course to the deity of Jesus and the tritheism into which it so easily degenerated. There has been much change since then, but there have never been wanting those who have proclaimed that a mere bald unqualified unity was an utterly inadequate conception of God, and that to discard all mystery as to his nature was to go over into the abyss. James Freeman Clarke belongs to an older generation but his words are worth remembering:

A simple Unity may be a bald Unity and an empty Unity. It leaves nature godless; leaves Christ merely human; leaves the soul a machine to be moved by an external impulse, not an inward inspiration. No doctrine of Orthodoxy is so false in its form and so true in its substance as this [of the Trinity]. There is none so untenable as dogma, but none so indispensable as experience and life.

The latest exposition of Unitarianism is that of Professor Emerton. It aims to set forth not only his own ideas, but those that are generally received with scrupulous fairness. No such sympathetic words regarding the doctrine of the Trinity appear in it. But in different language similar ideas prevail. He says:

Absolute Deity is as hard to comprehend and as useless for actual living as is the Absolute in any other human affair. . . . Out of the tangle of Hellenic subtlety playing upon the too bold simplicity of the Jewish tradition there emerged the—not new, but novel—conception of the Logos. . . . It was a

discovery wholly in harmony with the declaration of the great new teacher. . . . It bridged the chasm between Absolute Deity and the universe of things, including the heart of man.

He also lays stress on the limitations of human thought and language in any effort to apprehend the nature of God, and on the mysteries which we encounter when we attempt to realize the relationship between our wills and his will.

But still more striking is the fact that the most radical school of philosophic thought, which is finding wide acceptance among Unitarians as well as elsewhere, is that known as pragmatism or pluralism. It is no mere quibble to say that there is something incompatible between pluralism and absolute Unitarianism. Nor is it, I think, mere fancy to see in pluralism a reassertion of ideas latent in the doctrine of the Trinity. One of the theological exponents of this philosophy, Professor Doan, has set forth a theology which seems to me to show, though apparently unconsciously, a closer affinity with Trinitarian doctrine than would at first appear.

What, then, are the conclusions to which we are drawn?

In brief, that as regards the Trinity the ideas held by Unitarians and liberal orthodox, though expressed in varying language, are not essentially different. The real difference in so far as it exists is one of emphasis in which it may be that each has something to learn from the other. Both sides are Unitarian in that they hold earnestly to the fundamental unity of the Godhead.

There is, also, if the contention of this paper has any truth in it, a general acceptance on both sides of the fundamental ideas of Trinitarianism, without, however, the acceptance of the precise definitions of the doctrine as expressed in the ancient creeds. In particular, the doctrine of the deity of Jesus and his two natures has ceased to have binding force, and any qualification there is the giving-up of the fundamental principle.

It would seem, then, that the way of reconciliation is open so far as this doctrine is concerned. It is not the only dividing question, but there is no other which has seemed to present such an impassable barrier. Notwithstanding the elements of incalculable value contained in the doctrine of the Trinity, it seems not unlikely

that by that name it may disappear from view. The ancient creeds in which it is stated are becoming untenable to a continually increasing multitude of Christians, while to restate it in modern form would so change it as to leave it questionable whether the name of Trinity were still applicable.

Such a disappearance would not be without great practical advantages, but the loss would be far greater than the gain if the truths which it contains were allowed to be obscured. Like the ancient Jewish law, it is not to be destroyed but fulfilled.

THE HEBREW SENSE OF SIN IN THE PRE-EXILIC PERIOD

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The article entitled the "Hebrew View of Sin" published in the current number of this journal for October, 1911, in which Professor Henry Preserved Smith shows that "two separate views of sin may be traced in the Hebrew Scriptures, one social and the other ritual," does not render unnecessary the historical study of the subject herewith presented. Any emotion so primitive, so genuine, so universal as that feeling of uneasiness called "sense of sin" is not something posited in life by conscience or by the arbitrary expression of commands; it must have developed in the "adjustment of habits to ends through the medium of a problematic, doubtful, and precarious situation."¹ This must have been the "ground-pattern upon which the present intelligence and emotion are built"; and it is in an endeavor to trace this ground-pattern in the life of the Hebrew people that the present study is made.

In early society, social sentiments were the product of the instinctive impulse of self-preservation and self-assertion and were developed through the formation of habits and customs and by the occurrence of crises and control. Once formed, custom indicated the method of achieving results, hence any breach of custom spelled misfortune, want of adjustment, conflict. When the misfortune was keen enough to awaken fear or when it involved the disapproval of the group offended, including in the group the spirits associated with the interests and value of the group, then the conflict of desire and fear within the individual produced the emotion or feeling called sense of sin. In other words, it was the feeling associated with evil, although evil as ethical wrong and evil as misfortune were not sharply differentiated as with us; that was bad which

¹ John Dewey, "The Interpretation of the Savage Mind," published in Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 185.

was bad for something. This is well illustrated in Arabia today, where the consciousness of sin is scarcely to be found among the ignorant without the accompaniment of misfortune, so that sin and misfortune are practically correlative terms.²

Among the Hebrews, the earliest notion of sin is indicated by the use of the Hebrew **חָטָא** as failure of an action to achieve an end or goal inherent in its own activity, when the failure involved some real misfortune: e.g., a seeking which does not find (Prov. 8:36;³ Job 5:24,⁴ both Kal), such a hastening with the feet that one misses the path and thus defeats all haste (Prov. 19:2),⁵ making a certain tale of bricks each day and failing to do so when punishment and misfortune followed (Exod. 5:16, cf. 5:13, 14, 17, 19),⁶ failing in the intrigue for a throne when life hung upon the issue (I Kings 1:21), failure in those services due from a butler and baker to a king (Gen., chap. 40, cf. 41:9), questioning as to the action in which the failure lies, as Abimelech of Abraham (Gen. 20:9, cf.

² Samuel Ives Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion Today*, p. 124.

³ Prov. 8:36, **חָטָא** means failure in finding the object sought for, as shown by comparison with the parallel in verse 36a: "Whoso findeth me findeth life. . . . He that misseth the way wrongeth his own soul."

⁴ **פָּקַד** signifies "to inspect, to investigate" (I Sam. 14:17), or "to pass in review, to muster" (Brown, Driver, and Briggs), evidently for the purpose of finding (Isa. 13:4).

⁵ Prov. 19:2. Wildeboer says: "Wo keine Erkenntniss (oder Überlegung) ist, da ist (selbst) der Eifer nicht gut." Haste in itself misses or fails (Prov. 21:5; 28:20).

⁶ Exod. 5:16, "And the taskmasters were urgent, saying: Fulfil your works, your daily tasks as when there was straw (vs. 13) . . . and they demanded of them, Wherefore have ye not fulfilled your task both yesterday and today in making brick as heretofore?" (vs. 14). "Then the officers of the children of Israel came and cried unto Pharaoh, There is no straw given thy servants and they say unto us, Make brick; and behold thy servants are beaten and thy people sin" (do not fulfil the daily tale of bricks when the issue is punishment). The answer comes, "Ye are idle, ye are idle . . . go therefore now and work; for there shall no straw be given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks" (Exod. 5:13-19). The MT reads **וְהִטְאוּ עִמָּךְ**; LXX Pesh reads **וְהִטְאוּ לְעַמֶּךָ**; **וְהִטְאוּ עִמָּךְ**; **וְהִטְאוּ עִמָּךְ**. Dillmann says (*Kom.*, p. 51): "und es sündigt dein Volk," d.h. Israel, welches doch auch dein Volk ist, ist sündig und schuldig (Gen. 43:9); zu **עַם** als fem. vgl. Jud. 18:7; Jer. 8:5 und zu **וְהִטְאוּ** für **וְהִטְאוּ** Gen. 33:11, so Kn; s. auch zu 32:17. The text has caused considerable trouble. Dillmann says: "Aber richtig kann das nicht sein." Baentsch (*Hand Kom.*, *in loco*) says of the reconstruction of the LXX Pesh: "Freilich ist denn die Rede etwas scharf wie sie sich für Bittsteller nicht recht ziemt, aber MT giebt keinen Sinn." If translated as indicated above, the difficulty of the text disappears.

31:38), David of Jonathan as concerns King Saul (I Sam. 20:16). In the Hiphil it occurs with נָשׂוּ (Judg. 20:16) "shooting at an hair's breadth and not missing," in the Piel (Gen. 31:39) losing certain of the flock in the shepherding, albeit by wild beasts or theft by night. This confusion of sin and misfortune is further evidenced by the use of the same Hebrew root for both. עָרַף is the shocking brutality at Gibeah (Judg. 20:12, 13), a mischief or injury done one man by another (Gen. 26:29; I Sam. 25:21; Judg. 15:3; 11:27), a wilful transgression paralleled with עָשָׂה (I Sam. 24:11). It is also the misfortune which overtook Lot (Gen. 19:19), the loss to Joseph of his golden cup (Gen. 44:4, cf. Gen. 50:20), a loss enhanced by the divining use of the cup; and any misfortune in general; "shall evil befall a city and the Lord hath not done it" (Amos 3:6, cf. Jer. 2:3; Neh. 1:3; Judg. 15:3; Ps. 90:15). "Behold this evil is of the Lord; why should I wait for the Lord any longer?" (II Kings 6:33, cf. Amos 9:4; Exod. 32:12). In the priestly law עָרַף and עָשָׂה denote both the trespass and the payment which is to make good the trespass (Lev. 5:21-26; 6:19, 23; 19:21, 22; Num. 5:5-7; 6:12; 18:9; II Kings 12:17; I Sam. 6:3).

In the early Hebrew community the pressing needs of life were met as they arose; there was little co-ordination of interests, for "tribal or social solidarity was not so much a recognition of community interests as a proof of the vagueness of man's ideas concerning the boundaries of his own selfhood." His concepts of the natural forces were indefinite and incoherent like the concept of his own interests. Good and the means of its attainment were related in inconsequential and magical ways. Death, misfortune, disease were not the mechanical outworking of the natural forces but they were the punishment exacted by the wilful, animistic powers on the general principle of vengeance controlling human society. This confusion of thought was manifest both in the treatment of disease and in the half-physical, half-moral concept of sin as illustrated by the infection of clean and unclean. Unclean taboos were certain forbidden animals (Deut., chap. 14; Lev., chap. 11; Gen. 8:20; 7:2; I Sam. 14:32 f.; Lev. 17:15; 22:8; Exod. 34:26), certain persons and things connected with birth (Exod. 19:15;

⁷ Ralph Barton Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 233.

Lev., chap. 12; 15:18; Deut. 23:11; I Sam. 20:26; 21:6; II Sam. 11:4, or with death (Num. 19:11-16; 31:19; 9:6-10; 5:2; Lev. chap. 21) and certain unclean diseases (Lev. 13:15; 22:1-6; Num. 19:11-16; II Kings 5:27). It is well known that these taboos connect with the two great taboos existent among early tribes, those of food and of sex. The physical infection incurred was variously conceived as sin, disease, possession by an evil spirit, or misfortune. As in the early Babylonian religious literature, they are all one and the same thing; a half-physical, half-moral something which has entered the body by magical or supernatural means,⁸ whether in retaliation for the act or whether because of a certain kinship between the evil spirit and the doer of the deed, is not always clear, as the use of the term "sons of Belial" indicates.⁹ Thus, every patient was a sinner, the curing of sickness and the expiation of sin were identical (Lev 14:19b), "morals were materialized and nature was demoralized."¹⁰ The law of uncleanness states: "They shall keep my charge lest they bear sin for it" (Lev. 22:9), sin being a bodily imperfection, as the great sin brought by Abraham's action upon Abimelech (Gen. 20:9, 17, cf. 12:17; אַשָׁם in Gen. 26:10). It was the leprosy laid upon Miriam when she rebelled against Moses: "And Aaron said unto Moses, Oh my

⁸ Julian Morgenstern, *The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion*, p. 6; Justus Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade*, pp. 6, 23; Fritz Bennewitz, *Die Sünde im Alten Israel*, p. 50; R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. 194.

"Dass dieses Sündengefühl fast regelmässig durch Erfahrung eines äusseren Leides ausgelöst erscheint, dass Sündenvergebung und Wegnahme des äusseren Leides miteinander identifiziert werden d.h., dass die Vergebung in äusserer Wiederherstellung erlebt sein will, dass kultische Sünden ebenso ernst genommen werden wie schwere religiös sittliche Verfehlungen lässt diese Psalmen freilich hinter höchsten Äusserungen israelitischer Frömmigkeit, wie sie z. B. in Psalm 73 zu Tage tritt um ein Beträchtliches zurückstehen. Immerhin aber pulsiert in ihnen ein kräftig religiöses Leben und wir haben auf jeden Fall ein Recht, sie zu den edelsten Erzeugnissen auf dem Boden heidnischer Religiosität zu rechnen."—Bruno Baentsch, *Monothelismus*, p. 13.

⁹ כָּרַךְ-בְּלִיַּעַל is a term used both for the sin and the sinner (Judg. 20:13, cf. 19:22; Deut. 13:13; I Sam. 1:16; 2:12; 10:27; II Sam. 16:7; 20:1; I Kings 21:10). It indicates the voluntary disposition as does the word for folly כָּרַךְ (Gen. 34:7; Judg. 20:6, 10; 19:23; II Sam. 13:12, 13; I Sam. 25:25, cf. II Sam. 3:33, "should Abner die as a fool dieth?").

¹⁰ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 458; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, II, 264 f.

Lord, lay not, I pray thee, sin upon us, for that we have done foolishly and for that we have sinned. Let her not, I pray thee, be as one dead of whom the flesh is half consumed when he cometh out of his mother's womb" (Num. 12:11-15). An epidemic was the sin brought by Aaron upon Israel (Exod. 32:20 f., cf. 32:25 and Deut. 9:21), where death probably came to the guilty through drinking the magic water after the manner of the ordeal (Num. 5:23 f.), a remnant of the account being contained in 32:1-6, 15-20, 35. It is the plague of Egypt, the sin of all the nations that go not up to keep the feast; Saul's melancholia was a sign of impurity within, "an evil spirit from the Lord." The half-physical, half-moral character of disease is shown by the plagues brought by Moses upon Egypt by the use of his wand and laid by the same magic means. In the period of the New Testament, this thought of epilepsy and insanity as demon possession still persists, the unclean spirits leaving the man to enter into the swine, bringing immediate destruction upon them. Perhaps the same confusion between sin and disease lay at the basis of Jesus' words to the sick of the palsy: "Son, be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven thee" (Matt. 9:2, cf. Mark 2:5; Luke 5:20); to the bystanders at least it bore the implication of the cure of his disease. The half-physical conception of sin colors the description of it as "something alive, crouching like a wild beast, ready to spring upon one" (Gen. 4:7); "sure to find one out" (Num. 32:23); "to be drawn as by a cart rope" (Isa. 5:18); capable of lying dormant in the soul from birth to be awakened by law (Rom. 7:8); having energy and life of its own as in Eden (Gen., chap. 3). Sin, like disease, is cleansed by magic washings (II Kings 5:10 f.; Lev. 13:6, 34 f.; 14:11-20; 16:26); by burnings (Num. 16:46; Isa. 6:8, cf. Ps. 6:1, 2); by exorcism (I Kings 17:18, 21; II Kings 4:31-33); and by transference by means of the scapegoat (Lev. 6:24-7:7; 16:21 f.). The indefiniteness and scope of the notion of sin in this early period was due to the fact that man was an indefinite and incoherent aggregate of interests which had not yet assumed the form of even individual and community purpose.¹¹ Whenever, for any reason,

¹¹ "The moral feeling at this stage is not disengaged from a prudential dread of human vengeance or of mysterious forces in which there is nothing peculiarly moral."
—Hobhouse, II, 73.

a social custom vital to the life and welfare of the *community* became conscious of itself, it was formulated as the expression of the personal will of the god or spirit. When Yahwe entered into historical relations with Israel as national God and Deliverer, he appeared as the protector of custom, law, and justice.¹²

Any breach of custom or law becomes, then, an act of disobedience, of rebellion against God who avenges all such affronts to his holiness (Josh. 7:11; I Sam. 14:35 f., 38; 15:24). This is the prevailing conception of sin in the Old Testament founded upon the social *mores*, given supernatural sanction (I Sam. 15:22; Exod. 21:1; Deut. 4:13, 14). In the national religion in which the conception of Yahwe was better co-ordinated and in which custom and taboo had more definitely and consciously outlined the approach to Yahwe, every breach of ritual was regarded as sin. Yahwe was to be approached under carefully prescribed conditions of ritual cleanness (Gen. 35:2; I Sam. 6:19 f.; 7:1), a quality not ethically conditioned but physically and ritually so, a quality attainable by a man (Gen. 35:2; Exod. 19:10 ff.), by an object (Exod. 30:37; I Kings 7:51; Lev. 17:10 ff.), or by a place (I Kings 8:64; Exod. 3:5), in equal degree, but which when attained effectually bars its possessor from profane or common life. It really answers the purpose subserved by the later idea of property, separating by its infectious holiness everything belonging to Yahwe and his service.¹³ Any accidental or careless disregard of the divine sanctity reacted automatically upon the offender, as in the case of Uzzah and of the sons of Eli (I Sam. 2:12 f.). The fear of Yahwe (Gen. 31:53) was the restraining influence, a fear so real that a sin against the cult was more serious than moral sin; the distinction between clean and unclean was more important than that of good and bad. The earliest customs to come to consciousness were those relating to sex (Gen. 13:13; 18:20; 20:6; 34:7; 35:22, cf. 49:3; Judg. 19:23; 20:6-10, 12 f.; II Sam. 12:13; 13:12), to blood revenge (Gen. 4:10, 13-15, 23 ff.; 9:6; 42:22; Exod. 21:14; Judg., chap. 8;

¹² Gen. 4:10 (J); 42:22 (E); 18:19; 31:49 f.; 38:1-10; 50:20; Exod. 18:15 ff.; chap. 20; 21:14; 22:20 ff.; chap. 34; I Sam. 20:42, cf. 20:23; II Sam. 21:1-3.

¹³ "Possession is not property; but when society recognizes one's rights to a thing and undertakes to protect him in that right, that is property."—Thomas N. Carver, "The Economic Basis of the Problem of Evil," *Harvard Theological Review*, I, 107.

II Sam. 4:10-12), to hospitality¹⁴ (Gen. 18:2 ff.; chap. 19; Judg. 19:23; I Sam. 25:39), and to property (Gen. 31:32; 44:9; Exod. 21:22-26; 22:2-17; II Sam. 12:1-7, 13; I Kings, chap. 21). An oath, vow, and ban were especially sacred in times of war or in national danger, their breach precipitating pestilence, famine, and defeat (Josh., chap. 7; Judg., chap. 11; I Sam., chap. 14; 15:14 ff., 21, 32 ff.). So direct and sure was the vengeance of Yahwe that it had the aspect of the automatic. And the "conception of inherent retribution following as an automatic consequence of the wrong act lies close to the permanent moral consciousness of mankind, closer than the alternative theory, that of punishment *ab extra*, since it is in the moral order itself."¹⁵ No one can read the narrative of the dramatic discovery, condemnation, and elimination of the sin of Jonathan and Achan without noting the completeness with which the "consequences of the act are referred back to the original impulse and enter into the structure of consciousness."¹⁶

Sin, then, has no fixed content, it is not to be judged by an absolute ethical standard, the essential thing is that it should function in the fulfilment or organization of an interest. The point is not the ethical value of the custom or taboo, it may be irrational or repellent to the modern; its connection with the life-processes of the group might be accidental, due to the limitations in the experience of man and to the confusion of intellectual categories. Sometimes an absurd custom or an act, immoral by our standard, is "embedded in the life of the people, knit together with the whole body of memories and traditions, carrying as well as carried by the customs involved in the whole scheme of social life. It can be condemned only by showing how obsolete the situation is."¹⁷ Such, for example, are the sex cults prevalent in the Orient today, and such were the sex disabilities connected with the ownership of women current among the Hebrews during the Old

¹⁴ "In der Ausübung des Gastrechts sah man ein Gottesgebot, in der Verletzung des Gastrechts wurde die Gottheit beleidigt. Die grauenvolle Art auf die der Mann der zu Tode geschändeten die Schandtat bekannt macht lässt uns die furchtbare Erregung nachfühlen, die ihn durchzittert. Hos. 8:4."—Bennewitz, p. 117.

¹⁵ Hobhouse, I, 53.

¹⁶ J. Dewey, unpublished lectures on the "Evolution of Morality."

¹⁷ Dewey, unpublished lectures.

Testament period. It is true that certain acts, such as murder, adultery, stealing, have been pretty generally condemned as destructive of social values, but it is just this human experience which proves them such. Even so, they have to be redefined and analyzed in every new social situation. The concept of adultery has varied through the ages in accordance with the sex of the party concerned. "Two crimes are acknowledged as shameful and sins among the Arabs: adultery and murder. But murder, when on a raid or in blood-revenge, is no murder."¹⁸ In Israel it was a sin that David should number his people (II Sam., chap. 24), but it was right that Jephthah should offer his daughter in payment of a vow (Judg. 11:34 ff.), or that Abraham should sacrifice Isaac (Gen., chap. 22). "The habit of cleanliness is so ingrained into the Japanese character that in Shinto actual personal dirt is more than moral guilt. To be dirty is to be disrespectful to the gods."¹⁹ Here cleanliness has become an object of attention in itself, the social expression of the fulfilment of an interest. Personal dirt creates, then, a moral situation just as a breach of taboo, a harmless thing in itself, was found to have done.

The period of the prophets brought the fundamental reconstruction of attitudes and habits, the occasion of change being emigration into new natural environment and conflict with a nation whose methods of warfare were more developed and whose civilization presented new needs, new desires, new ends. The readjustment issued at first in a disorder marked by the breaking-down of the old *mores* without a conscious adoption of the new—"every man did that which was right in his own eyes," by the use of individual wit and judgment. After the first stage of settlement and of local conquest, organization became the demand of the new life both for internal order and for external conquest. With the successful wars of the king, treasures began to pour into the kingdom, followed by a rapid development of trade by land and by sea (I Kings 5:25; 9:26 ff.; 10:11 f., 28 f.; Hos. 12:6; Isa. 30:6; I Kings 9:18, cf. II Chron. 8:9). That the rapid development produced conflict is shown by the rise of political parties and the

¹⁸ Curtiss, p. 124.

¹⁹ Quoted from Irving King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 112.

frequency of revolution each backed by a special interest. The importation of foreign goods, foreign ideas and manners also made luxury, self-indulgence, power, and wealth the great ends in life. In the scramble for these, class feeling and personal injustice displaced the old equality and love of freedom (Amos 5:10-12; Hos. 4:2), which had been emphasized anew at the formation of the Northern Kingdom. Shameless exercise of power, inequality before the law, disregard of contract, and commercial fraud made social and economic questions difficult, the free, virtuous, and beautiful activities of life impossible for the poorer and weaker classes. Oppression and extortion marked the attitude of the one, the urgency and necessity of mere living characterized the other; the enjoyment and profits of trade had been appropriated by the one, the burdens of long and continuous war bore heavily upon the other; the rich were adding field to field (Isa. 5:8 f.), the small landowners were being sold into slavery for debt; the oppressors were making good with the judges by bribes, the case of the weak was being thrown out of court; the rich were dissipating their lives in feastings and frivolities and corrupting practices at the high places; the poor went naked and unfed. That really happened which has repeatedly happened in the progress of nations: the individual reacted more quickly than society was able to do, with the result that the individual best fitted to do so had survived in the struggle, those disadvantaged had gone to the wall. In north Israel, revolution had kept the balance by weakening the central government until commercial life had developed a new group principle. Those who failed in the struggle fell into the inferior status of slave with the loss of civil rights, such as the right to hold property (even their own wives and children—Exod. 21:4), right of marriage, and the right of personal freedom. Those who succeeded became leaders, masters, independent of the group, and serving or using the group at will. This disorganization of society incapacitated the government at the time when coherence and unity were necessary for the political salvation of the state. With no well-developed doctrine of rewards in a future life and with the burning sense of injustice on the part of the suffering poor, supplemented by the enervation of character resulting from the sudden attain-

ment of wealth on the part of the rich, there was no inspiring incentive for the common man to cope with an enemy whose numbers, organization, and zeal had changed the map of the then known world.

During this period, the worship of Yahwe was enriched by the appropriation of the Canaanite high places with their mazzebahs, asherahs, and round of agricultural feasts and magic practices associated from time immemorial with Baal and his female complement. As a matter of fact, the forms of worship at the high places had the closest possible connection with the old Semitic forms found in Phoenicia, Arabia, and Babylonia²⁰ and took their origin in the animistic concept of the Semites to whom the mutilations, dances, feasts, ecstasies, and sacred prostitutes connoted certain social values of fertility, power, and well-being (I Kings 12:24; Amos 2:7; Hos. 4:13; Deut. 23:17, 18).²¹ Reactionary movements appeared in the cult when Saul sought to suppress witchcraft and necromancy (I Sam. 28:9), when Jerubbaal threw down the altars of Baal (Judg. 6:25-31), and when Asa deposed the queen mother for making an image of Astarte (II Kings 15:12 f.). A definite change in attitude toward Baalism was registered in the reaction led by Elijah in which the exclusive principle resident in Yahwe gained historical embodiment. It was a conflict between the type represented by the desert and that represented by the new land of agriculture, of commercial and political alliances: a conflict between registered values in symbols in which the concept of Yahwe as the god of war and of justice, the champion of the weak, the oppressed, the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, was welded with the concept of exclusiveness, just because both concepts were sufficiently *vital* to the needs of the situation to prevail. The problems of life which pressed hardest upon the nation were no longer

²⁰ The Semitic material first gathered by Robertson Smith from literary sources has found abundant illustration both in the Semitic customs existent among the Arabs today and in the tablets brought to light by modern explorations. For the interpretation of Deut. 24:8 ff., see Schwally, *Kriegesalterthümer*, I, 81 ff.

²¹ The worship of Astarte, the goddess of fertility, was as characteristic of the Semitic race as its language. Cf. Dr. George A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*; Sellin, *Tell Ta'annek*, Wien, 1904; Bliss and Macalister, *Excavations in Palestine 1902*; *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement*, 1904, pp. 229 ff.

those connected with an animistic view of nature. The impassioned words of Amos, Hosea, and Micah ring with the enthusiasm of new values and the claim of new spiritual and fundamental necessities. Justice was the demand of the hour; to oppress the poor with violence and to retain the favor of Yahwe by providing a pilgrimage or a feast at the high places (Amos 2:8; 4:4; 5:5 ff.; Hos. 6:1-3; 13:2 ff.; Isa. 1:21-23; 3:13 ff.) was repugnant to the moral sense of the prophet, and, we may well believe, to the moral sense of others also. Ethical standards in commerce were gradually shaping themselves to meet the necessities of business enterprise. The need and value of honesty, veracity, just balances, and keeping faith are traceable in the prophets who studied the field and in numbers of proverbs culled from trade, such as "a false balance is an abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is his delight" (Prov. 11:1; 16:11; 3:27, 29, 31; 10:4; 11:3, 4, 5; 22:1, 7, 22 f.). A trade like that of Solomon's with Egypt and the provinces in Asia Minor could not have been built up upon mere shrewdness in bargaining. The code of Hammurabi has a series of elaborate laws controlling trade by boat and caravan. It governs business relations between the merchant who is the principal and his agent who goes off to seek the market (§§101-7); it regulates warehouses (§§ 122-25), deposits of interest on money (§§ 49, 50, 100), debts (§§ 115-17), sales (§§ 35, 278-79), and hire (§228). Such laws in Israel would connect with those fixing responsibility for loss in case of loan or guardianship (Exod. 22: 7-15).

The standard of purity for women had developed so that the demands of the cult at the high places had grown offensive to the better class of citizens (Gen. 38:20 f.; Isa. 3:16-4:1; Hos. 2:1-13; 4:10-14; Deut. 23:18; I Kings 14:24; 15:12 f.; II Kings 23:7), the natural elements being calculable in so far as to bring the fertility of the earth more or less under human control. In other words, the cult at the high places had broken loose from life and was being developed as an end in itself, for true religion had left it behind as a survival of the outworn, a very obstacle to morals and to religion.²² It was like the sex cults of the Orient today which

²² Alfred Bertholet, *Kommentar zu Deuteronomium*, p. xiii.

are outworn and yet have never been reinterpreted into the life and thought of the people. The primary religious need of the times was the destruction of the high places and the extirpation of the *animistic powers*, a need which the priests must have felt as forcibly as the prophets.

The prophet of the eighth century organized these individual interests into an interest of the community. He caught up the great values of his day, right and justice, and created a definite active attitude toward them upon the part of the community. No doubt the original incentive to this activity was given by the disaster threatening the state. Yahwe, the national god, was angry with his people; such serious misfortune awaited them that national sin was indicated. That sin would be found in the moral realm is not unique to the Hebrew prophet. A similar consciousness of injustice, dishonesty, violence, and oppression as sin is found in the Shur-pu tablets of Babylonia²³ and in the Egyptian Book of the Dead.²⁴ The unique thing in Israel is that our prophet connected morality with the element of exclusiveness; he conserved the internal and the external interests by welding the concept of a national god and that of a world god into an organic whole. To Amos the ritual ceremonies were not only evil but the cult as performed was hateful to Yahwe; it was no longer a means of communication between God and man. That more important to Yahwe is to do justice and to practice mercy and truth (Amos 5:21-24; Hos. 6:6, cf. 10:12; Isa. 1:11 ff.; 29:13; Mic. 6:6-8; Jer. 7:21-28). Commercial wrongs were not matters of business only, having no bearing upon religion; they are of the greatest concern to God, more important than taboo or ritual. In other words, the moral issues have become so paramount that Amos swings the moral into the place heretofore assumed by the ritual and by this change of emphasis he conserves the new social values evolved and gives to the religion of Israel that unique ethical quality which differentiates it from the religions of Phoenicia, Canaan, and Arabia. Hosea discerns the real character of the

²³ H. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen umschrieben, übersetzt und erklärt*, 1885, and *Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete*, Leipzig, 1905.

²⁴ E. A. Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, London, 1898, 1901.

worship at the high places to be Baalism. Their idols (3:1; 4:17), images (8:4 f.; 11:2; 13:2), the whole apparatus of the high places (4:8, 13 f.; 8:11-13; 13:1), partake of the spirit of whoredom (1:2; 2:4-7; 4:11, 12, 15, 18; 5:3, 4, 7; 6:10; 9:1; 11:7). Baal is the false lover who has led Israel astray, the representative of nature and the animistic, natural powers. With this allegory of marriage Hosea gets a purchase whereby he can oppose Yahwe to Baal and bring the consciousness of the moral laws to the common man. Not only is Yahwe different in character from Baal but true religion partakes of a mystic and pietistic character; it is an inner relation of faith, loyalty, and truth. Isaiah develops this relationship to mean that every lack of confidence in Yahwe, every feeling of pride, haughtiness, and disbelief is sin (1:2; 2:6-22; 3:8-16 f.; 7:3; 10:6 ff., 15, 33 f.; 22:8-11; 31:7) against the holy and exalted Lord God of Hosts (Isa. 5:16; chap. 6; 30:18). A mere ecclesiastic insistence upon the exclusive principle resident in Yahwe would not have affected the people at large²⁵ had not the new movement in Yahwism been representative of the new social and ethical values. It was the concept of social justice that stirred the social judgment and will and that fused religion with morality into a union more organic than that existent among other oriental peoples.

Israel did not come to the concept of monotheism by the way of speculation. Like belief in the future state, the thought of Yahwe as a world god was the working rule for the solution of a practical difficulty. The interests of Israel, commercial and otherwise, had led her among the nations of the earth. The temple of Yahwe at Elephantine and Leontopolis and the custom of making contracts show that Yahwe, like the good mother of the modern home, had to cross the threshold of his own land in order to conserve the welfare and interests of his children. Now that Canaan was the arena of the struggle for empire and now that her highest interests were identified with the establishment of the moral, these external and internal interests could be achieved only by a god able to cope with the world-forces outside of his own territory. For

²⁵ Cf. the ecclesiastic reform of Pharaoh Amenophis IV.—Adolf Erman, *Aegyptische Religion*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 67-69.

while he was no longer indissolubly connected with Israel through physical kinship, he was indissolubly identified with her supreme interests. If he could not conserve these, he would be superseded as a god. But loss of nationality did not necessarily involve the loss of Israel's supreme interests; disaster regarded as punishment would rather indicate its use as a corrective leading to healing and restoration. Thus the moralization of the national god and his identification with the world-god are the evolution of the same historic crises; they were the center of attention, of the national consciousness, at the same time. Once obtained, this concept of Yahwe would find support in all the activities heretofore ascribed to him; the fact that he was not identified with a symbol, that he was located in the heavens, and that he ruled over nature would strengthen the hypothesis until, like a scientific theory, its truth was believed to have been demonstrable. The prophets, as the intellectual and religious leaders of the race, were the men of faith who tried to make Israel good by the elimination of evil, who taught the ultimate conservation of all values, through the acceptance of moral truth, promising that in the future "every man shall sit under his own vine and fig tree and none shall molest them or make them afraid."

The work of fusion, however, was not that of an hour or of a day. The public preaching of the prophet was followed by the formulation of the prophetic ideas in writing, the rewriting of the patriarchal stories, the interpretation of history from the new point of view, and the development of law as a standard of duty and of rights, for civil rights become effective only when enforced or redressed. In the pregnant phrase of Aristotle, the administration of justice is also its determination,²⁶ that is, its discovery and promulgation. The conflict of interests that arose during the prophetic period could be settled only by the clearer formulation of legal details. As a matter of fact, "the fear of Yahwe" is no substitute for the courts. The Deuteronomists attempted to collect the laws which were effective in the community in their time and to modify

²⁶ "The principles of legal justice are not due to crude legislation but to the continuous and co-operative attempts at doing justice in concrete cases. Principles are judgemade."—S. P. Mezes, *Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 306.

these in so far as the reform in the cult and the higher ideals of justice demanded (Deut. 30:11-14).²⁷ They preserved the traditions of the law in the various strata reaching back to the agricultural and nomadic period and by the publication²⁸ of the new contributions as an essential part of the Mosaic code. Despite the fact that Deuteronomy is a compilation, it makes a substantial contribution to justice and reform. In the legal reform of the cult, the new Yahwism allied itself with all the reactionary forces in religion, with the assertion of monotheism against everything foreign, immoral, animistic, and Baalistic. The extirpation of foreign cults (13:1-9; 17:2-7), asherahs and mazzebahs (16:1 f.; 12:3; 7:5), mourning rites (14:1 f.), all kinds of divinations, magic (18:10 f.), and Moloch worship (12:31; 18:10) are demanded with "sanguinary thoroughness."²⁹ The reform was ineffective in breaking up the popular use of idols as shown in the later books of the Old Testament and in the recent Aramaic finds in Egyptian excavations.³⁰ The moral did, however, gradually cast out the unethical, modifying or reinterpreting all the practices in which religion was formerly expressed, such as the covenant, circumcision, clean and unclean. Thus the cult was removed as an obstacle to the higher religious development. Idolatry becomes, then, a breach of the law of Yahwe and an offense against the law of the state, to be punished by the total destruction of the city or the individual practicing it.

²⁷ Karl Steuernagel, *Kommentar zu Deuteronomium*, pp. x ff.

²⁸ It is manifest that the knowledge of law by the people would be one of the strongest elements in the maintenance of impartiality in judgment and in the upholding of the innocent in their rights: cf. the purpose of publication avowed in the prologue to the code of Hammurabi: "That the great should not oppress the weak, to counsel the widow and orphan, to render judgment and decide the decisions of the land and to succor the injured . . . that the oppressed who has a suit to prosecute may come to my image, that of a royal king, and read my inscription and understand my precious words and may my stele elucidate his case" (cf. Deut. 31:9-13; 6:6-9, 20-25; 11:18-29).

²⁹ G. F. Moore, *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, article "Deuteronomy," p. 1093.

³⁰ "Man kann allenfalls fünf Götter aus den Papyri herauslesen; zwei, Jähö und Herembethel sind bezeugt, und 'Anat-Bethel, 'Anat-Jähö und Išum (?) -Bethel können als Götter gedeutet werden (cf. Jer., chap. 44)." — *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus Elephantine*, bearbeitet von Ed. Sachau, p. xxvi.

Public punishment,³¹ originally reserved for acts shocking to public conscience (I Kings 21:9, 13, 21; Exod. 22:28, cf. Lev. 24:10 ff., 16; Job 2:9), especially in times of community danger, such as war (Gen. 34:30; Judg., chap. 19, esp. vs. 30; Judg., chap. 20; Josh., chap. 7; Deut. 23:9 ff.; I Sam., chap. 14; II Sam. 21:5 ff.), now includes injury to the person (17:8-13, cf. 19:18; II Chron. 19:8-11), to the property, or to the reputation (22:13-21). Justice dispensed in order to force a settlement of quarrels or feuds grown dangerous to the community now attempts an impartial decision (16:18-20; 25:1; 27:25) between the rights and claims of different claimants.³² Judgment by means of ordeal³³ or by the pronouncement of a magical decision has come to rest upon testimony as to the facts in the case (Deut. 19:15-21; 17:6), the number and responsibility of the witnesses being fixed by law. "Although there was still a blur of justice and injustice, an undeniable effort was made to realize justice by overcoming fraud, bribery, and partiality." Life is to be protected instead of merely countenancing retaliation³⁴ (19:1-13; 21:1-9); rights are generally recognized which had been claimed only by individuals and enforced by superior strength (24:16, cf. Jer. 31:29; Ezek. 18:4). Great ideals of personal conduct were conceived, such as justice, goodwill, loyalty, and love (10:18-11:1). Character, the attitude or subjective disposition of a man, becomes the subject of moral judgment. The magico-animistic basis of obligation is discarded; duties and rights attach to members of society as such or are based upon the voluntary covenant with Yahwe and his demands in presence of the national danger. Thus a sentiment against the commission of certain social and religious crimes was growing at

³¹ "The bulk of acts which infringe the right of other men are not, strictly speaking, acts regarded as inherently wrong but as legitimate occasions for vengeance to be inflicted by the sufferer and his kinsfolk, if strong enough to do so."—Hobhouse, II, 73.

³² For the establishment of justice between man and man, two things are requisite, an authoritative law on the one hand, and an authoritative tribunal on the other.

³³ "The survival of even one case of ordeal by holy water leaves no doubt as to the sense of the 'fountain of judgment' (En-mishpat) or 'waters of controversy' (Meribah), Gen. 14:7; Exod. 15:25, where Moses decided the cases too hard for the tribal judges."—W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, pp. 179 ff.

³⁴ Dewey and Tufts, chap. vi; Hobhouse, chap. iii and appendix to chap. iii.

the very time when the captivity and the fall of Jerusalem, by prohibiting sacrifice and ritual, emphasized the moral values and the subjective disposition. Repentance, obedience, and reconciliation became the study of the exile with the purpose of putting away a lower past and readjusting life to meet an ideal good. Responsibility for the stern enforcement of these laws with the fear of divine retribution created at last the sense of sin at their breach with the result scarcely anticipated by the prophets, that of fixing the will of Yahwe in a written law.

Conduct came to be tested by a standard, by conformity to a hard and fast rule, rather than being a "matter of spirit and of constant reconstruction"³⁵ and liberation of spirit as Jeremiah (31:31, 34) and Jesus conceived it to be. Sin is a term used, then, for those acts contrary to the moral order of human society, the punishment of which is gradually assumed by the courts and which is known to modern law as crime or tort. Sin, in this sense, is the infringement of individual interests upon the totality of interests, a refusal to recognize social duties and obligations. Just because the Jews became a religious body within a political state, a confusion of legal with moral guilt arose. The sense of sin at the breach of law became so great that a professional class of interpreters of the law arose and the law finally displaced the cult as the center of Judaistic religion. At the same time that this distinction of sin as an objective act was being emphasized, sin became also the disposition, attitude, or evil will back of the act. This element of ethical inwardness in the prophets was taken up by Christianity into the concept of the "outgoing, objectifying, socially effective attitude of will which proved a man's motive or his sinfulness."³⁶

In this study, then, the primitive meaning of sin "to miss the mark" is to fail in achieving an immediate or ulterior interest with reference to which action is performed. This identifies itself with a certain definite social feeling aroused by the breach of custom and taboo, just because custom and taboo hedge about the conspicuous points of failure. The authority of custom lay in its

³⁵ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 103.

³⁶ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 189.

appeal to human experience; its lack of finality in the interpretation of that experience as the work of magical and wilful natural powers and in the fact that no discrimination was made between moral and physical evils. The first human values to evolve were health, fertility, prosperity, victory in battle; the sense of sin was focused at the breach of those primitive customs which imperiled these values, such as the customs relating to sex, blood-revenge, hospitality, and property, or at the breach of the ritual through which the mysterious will of Yahwe might be appeased. We have traced the growth of interest to include social justice, good will, and moral service. Perhaps the early control of nature by the Hebrews is discernible in their repudiation of the magical, animistic powers of fertility and in the ascription to Yahwe of control over the heavenly bodies (Gen. 1:16; 2:1; Judg. 5:20; Isa. 40:26; Job 38:7; Deut. 6:19; Jer. 10:2) and the change of seasons (Hos. 2:8, 21; Isa. 1:3). Society formed and reformed its values according to the fundamental necessities of the environment and according to the ends and interests which it was called upon to sustain. Custom grew up to conserve these new interests and values and conscience developed in determining the significance of new habits to society. All sin is sin against God, not so much because God is the protector of right as because he is a moral personality whose purpose is become the national purpose, that of a thoroughgoing establishment of the moral in Israel and the world.

The conception of misfortune as punishment for sin has undergone all the transformations characteristic of social justice. Originally every misfortune was the punishment of Yahwe upon a sin against himself, be that sin intentional or accidental, known or unknown. At first, it was only a working rule representative of a crude sort of justice by a power which was impulsive, jealous, and vengeful. That was *קִרְיָן* which conformed to certain objective standards, without regard to the ethical element in the case.³⁷ Later, as the concept of justice developed away from the principle of revenge toward that of retribution, bringing back to the agent the evil consequences of his deed, the basis of judgment was more

³⁷ Emil Kautzsch, *Ueber die Derivate des Stammes קִרְיָן im Alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch*, Tübingen, 1881.

carefully interrogated. As we have tried to show, it was in the struggle for legal and social justice and in the endeavor to conserve the highest interests of Israel that the prophets fused morality with religion and welded the national god with the world-god. Sin and punishment are not two heterogeneous things, but hang together in the closest subjective relations, as Hosea and Jeremiah have shown. Sin is its own punishment. It, itself, separates from God. The history of Israel is worked through from this point of view, the rise and fall of nations are explained through the out-working of moral justice. Its application to the individual is more difficult, but practical difficulties did not disturb the faith in God nor the prestige of morality. For when the comparative fate of the individual was felt to be inexplicable upon the basis of conduct, another world was posited in which justice might restore the balance of disturbed law by rewards and punishments after death.

THE OFFICE OF APOSTLE IN THE EARLY CHURCH

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The justification of a paper on this subject is not in a previous neglect of it by New Testament scholars. On the contrary it has been the subject of discussion not only in lexicons and commentaries but in a number of monographs by able writers.¹ The differences of opinion among those who have written, and in the view of the present writer at least, a certain inharmoniousness of their conclusions with the evidence even when they are most in agreement with one another, demand and warrant a re-examination of the whole question. Under these circumstances, moreover, it seems best to examine the evidence from the beginning rather than simply to criticize the views of those who have already written upon the subject. We begin, therefore, with a treatment of the usage of the word *ἀπόστολος* in literature preceding the time of the New Testament.

I. CLASSICAL AND OTHER NON-CHRISTIAN USAGE OF *Ἀπόστολος*

The word *ἀπόστολος* is manifestly cognate with the verb *ἀποστέλλω*. In classical authors it is employed both as an adjective and as a noun. Joined with *πλοῖος* it was used much as our modern word despatch is, the phrase meaning a despatch boat, i.e., a boat in commission. In Demosthenes 252:7; 262:15 *et al.*, *ἀποστόλος* (paroxytone) alone signifies a naval expedition. In Hdt. *ἀπόστολος* (proparoxytone) is used of a person, meaning an ambassador or delegate, a person commissioned by another to represent him. Thus in 1:21, *ὁ μὲν δὲ ἀπόστολος ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἦν*; in 5:38, *ἐς*

¹ For example: Lightfoot, *Commentary on Galatians*, 6th ed., pp. 92-101; Harnack, "Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel," in *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, II, 93-118; Hincks, "Limits of the Apostolate," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1895, pp. 37-47; Haupt, *Zum Verständnis des Apostolats*; Monnier, *La notion de l'apostolat*.

Λακεδαίμονα τριήρεϊ ἀπόστολος ἐγένετο. In a similar but more general sense, it occurs in the LXX (A) and Aq. in I Kings 14:6, ἐγὼ εἰμι ἀπόστολος πρὸς σε σκληρός, "I am a hard messenger to thee," I bring thee heavy tidings. It is found also in Sym. at Isa. 18:2, but not elsewhere in the Greek Old Testament. In Josephus, *Ant.*, XVII, 11, 1, ἀπόστολος apparently means a despatching, a sending, ἀφίκετο εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πρεσβεία Ἰουδαίων, Οὐάρου τὸν ἀπόστολον αὐτῶν τῷ ἔθνει ἐπικεχωρηκός ὑπὲρ αἰτήσεως αὐτονομίας, there came to Rome an embassy of Jews, Varus having granted the people the privilege of sending it for the purpose of asking for autonomy. The indirect evidence of Christian writers seems to show that in the post-Christian period the Jews used the term ἀπόστολος, or a Semitic term which was expressed in Greek by ἀπόστολος, (a) of persons despatched from Jerusalem to other cities especially to gather the temple tribute, and, after the destruction of Jerusalem, (b) of those who were associated with the patriarch in deliberations and in the carrying out of what was agreed upon. See the evidence in Lightfoot, *Commentary on Galatians*, pp. 93 ff.

II. NEW TESTAMENT USAGE IN GENERAL

In the New Testament the term is used of persons only. Its general meaning, clearly seen in passages in which it is used in a non-technical sense, is a delegate, a representative, one commissioned by another to represent him in some way. Thus in II Cor. 8:23, and Phil. 2:25, it is used of persons delegated by a church to execute a commission.²

In Heb. 3:1 Jesus is spoken of as "the apostle and high priest [ἀπόστολος καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς] of our confession," and is immediately afterward characterized as faithful to him that appointed him.³

² In both cases, a journey is involved, the matter to be attended to a financial one, and the person who makes the journey does not simply bear a message, but in a larger way represents the church. This may, indeed, be accidental coincidence, rather than decisive indication of the constant usage of the word. Yet compare the Jewish use of the term, as stated above.

³ A similar idea of Christ is several times expressed in the Gospel of John, e.g., John 17:3, "This is life eternal to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."

In John 13:16 the word is used in such a way as almost to involve a definition of the word. "A servant is not greater than his master, nor a delegate [*ἀπόστολος*] greater than he that sent him."

III. THE APOSTLES OF CHRIST

But in the majority of its occurrences in the New Testament the word is used of a class of persons in the Christian church, or among the followers of Jesus. The full expression was evidently *ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ*, or *ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* (II Cor. 1:1; 11:13, etc.). But for this full expression *ἀπόστολος* alone is much more frequently used. It is found in nearly all the books of the New Testament, and was evidently in the apostolic age the common term for a well-known class in the church.

The earliest references to the apostles of Christ (reckoned by the date of the writing in which they occur) are found in the Pauline epistles, and bear witness not only to Paul's claim to be himself an apostle but to the existence of other members of the class, who were apostles before him (Gal. 1:17). In the effort to trace the development of the apostolate it will be well therefore to begin by inquiring as to the identity of these apostles before Paul.

1. *The apostles before Paul.*—(a) The twelve and their earliest designation: In the number of those who were apostles before him, Paul evidently includes Peter, and in all probability John (Gal. 1:17-19; 2:9). In the Gospels there are frequent references to twelve disciples of Jesus, whom Matthew once calls the twelve apostles and Luke refers to as the apostles, but who are most frequently spoken of simply as the twelve. Of this company Peter and John were members. These facts do not warrant the assumption that the twelve and the apostles are identical, especially in view of the apparent distinction between them in I Cor. 15:5, 7; but they suggest the wisdom of beginning with an inquiry concerning the twelve, while avoiding any presupposition as to their precise relation to the apostles.

The expression "the twelve," *οἱ δώδεκα*, in I Cor. 15:5, consisting simply of the numeral with prefixed article, taken in its context makes it evident that when the epistle was written this was a recognized title of a certain group who had been in his life-

time disciples of Jesus. This is made the more clear by the fact that, according at least to the Third Gospel and the Book of Acts, the company consisted at the time referred to, not of twelve, but of eleven persons. The existence of this company which Paul predicates for the time immediately after the resurrection, the Gospels carry back into the lifetime of Jesus. All the four Gospels frequently mention "the twelve," οἱ δώδεκα, with evident reference to a company of Jesus' disciples (Mark 4:10; 6:7; 9:35; 10:32; 11:11; 14:10, 17, 20, 43; Matt. [20:17, text uncertain]; 26:14, 47; Luke 8:1; 9:1, 12; 18:31; 22:3, 47; John 6:67, 70, 71; 20:24).

It should be observed, however, that all the references in Matthew and all those in Luke except 8:1 and 9:12 are parallel to passages in Mark and probably derived from that source. Mark (3:14, 15) followed by the other synoptists records the selection of these twelve by Jesus, and Matthew and Mark give the list of them by name (Mark 3:16-19; Matt. 10:2-4; cf. also Acts 1:13, 14). That such a company did exist not only in Paul's day, when retrospectively at least it was referred to as the twelve, but also in Jesus' own day—on this point there is no reason to question the testimony of the Gospels.

It is not so clear by what name this company was known in the lifetime of Jesus. In Mark 14:20 Jesus is said to have used the words, "one of the twelve," but this may mean only one of the twelve then at table with him. John 6:70, "Have I not chosen you the twelve?" is also indecisive, especially in view of the late date of the Fourth Gospel. Yet in view of the evidence that this was a very early, probably the earliest now extant, name for the inner circle of Jesus' disciples, and of the probability that even in Jesus' ministry there was some common title for the company, it is not unlikely that it was then known as "the twelve." The persistence of the name, even in the latest gospels, and its occurrence in Acts 6:2 shows that it continued in use also to a late period in the apostolic age.

The phrase οἱ μαθηταί, frequent in all the Gospels, probably often refers to the twelve, but is not in itself restricted to them. The expression οἱ δώδεκα μαθηταί occurs in Matthew only (10:1;

11:1; 26:20), and is in all instances clearly a secondary form of expression, due to the editor, not to his sources.

(b) The application of the term "apostles" to the twelve. Reference has been made above to the evidence that Peter and John, who were among the twelve, were also counted by Paul among those who were apostles before him. Matt. 10:2 shows that when this passage of the First Gospel took its present form, all the twelve were accounted apostles. Yet this designation of the twelve as apostles is rather infrequent in the gospels. It occurs, besides Matt. 10:2, in Mark 3:14 (on the text see below); 6:30; Luke 6:13; 9:10; 17:5; 22:14; 24:10 (perhaps also in Luke 11:49). Of these passages Matt. 10:2 only uses the expression *οἱ δώδεκα ἀπόστολοι*, found elsewhere in the New Testament in Rev. 21:14, and in early Christian literature in the title of the *Διδαχή*. In Matthew it is clearly an editorial equivalent of *οἱ δώδεκα μαθηταί* in vs. 1, which itself represents the simple *οἱ δώδεκα* of Mark 6:7.

In Luke 22:14 *οἱ ἀπόστολοι* represents *οἱ δώδεκα* of Mark 14:17. In 17:5 and 24:10 we have no source with which to compare the Lukan form of the passages, but in view of 22:14, the word *ἀπόστολοι* cannot with confidence be carried back to any older source than the editor of this gospel. In Luke 9:10, however, the expression is taken over from Mark 6:30, which therefore attests the use of the term as a title of the twelve as early as the date of the Second Gospel, subject only to the possibility of an early and now unattested corruption of the text. Only Mark 3:14 and Luke 6:13 ascribe this usage to Jesus.⁴ The text of Mark 3:14 is open to some doubt. The words *οὗς καὶ ἀποστόλους ὠνόμασεν*, though attested by *NBCΔ et al.*, and on this evidence included in the text by WH and set in the margin by RV, are rejected by Tisch., Tr., W. The words are evidently either in Mark a scribal addition from Luke 6:13, or in Luke are taken over by the editor from Mark. In other words, we have here a single witness, either the second evangelist or the third. Whatever the date of this testimony it does not affirm that Jesus *at this time* gave to the twelve the name

⁴The utterances of Luke 11:49 and John 13:16 are ascribed to Jesus, and in both cases the term *ἀπόστολοι* includes by implication his immediate followers, but it is not restricted to them or employed as a title for them.

apostles, and does not necessarily mean that he at any time conferred on them the *title* of apostles. If it is of late origin, it probably referred in the author's mind to the bestowal of a title, but if early may have meant only that he was wont to speak of them as his messengers, using the term with descriptive rather than titular force.

According to Acts 1:21-26 there existed within the company of one hundred and twenty disciples of Jesus who gathered in Jerusalem after his death and resurrection, a smaller company having a distinct *διακονία*. This smaller company constituted not an indefinite group, but an organic body of definite number and function. The context leaves no room for doubt that it is the twelve that are here referred to. Note the list of the twelve in vs. 13, the mention of Peter and Judas, vss. 15, 16, and the implication of a definite number, within the company of the one hundred and twenty, which is to be kept complete. This passage purports to represent the thought of the twelve themselves very soon after the death and resurrection of Jesus. The Acts author by his use of the word apostles in vss. 2 and 26 attaches these ideas to the apostolate. The divergence between the conditions here implied as those of the apostolate and those which the rest of the book shows to have been regarded by the author himself as necessary, makes it improbable that the passage has been essentially modified from the source. For example, these conditions would have excluded Paul from the apostleship. Yet the general point of view of the Acts author forbids us to suppose either that he denied that Paul was an apostle, or that it was his intention to bring into prominence the conflict between the early Christian and the Pauline definition of apostleship. The reasonable explanation of the existence of this narrative is that the Acts author took it over substantially unchanged from some earlier source. As concerns the historicity of this source, it might conceivably have been an anti-Pauline source written with the purpose of excluding Paul from the apostolate. But two things are against this. First, Luke was evidently unaware of any such anti-Pauline bias in his source; and secondly, the word apostle does not occur in the body of the passage, as would almost certainly have been

the case if it had been written to bear a part in the controversy over the apostolate. It seems probable, therefore, that this passage, which undoubtedly reflects the idea held at some period of the apostolic age as to the function and status of the *twelve* at the beginning of that age, does in fact convey to us the thought of a very early period.

But a part of the same evidence which points to the early existence and recognition of *the twelve* as a definite group with a distinct *διακονία* indicates also that this group was not yet called *the apostles*. The Acts author, indeed, not only in this passage but throughout the first twelve chapters of Acts, assumes the identity of the twelve and the apostles. But this identification belongs to the author, not to his sources. In the narrative of the selection of Matthias, the term apostle does not occur either in the speech of Peter or in the body of the narrative, but appears first in the statement of vs. 26 that Matthias was numbered with the eleven apostles, the language of which is naturally referred to the Acts author rather than to an earlier source. While, therefore, the author of the source clearly conceived of "the twelve" as constituting in this early period a definitely organized body, and the Acts author thought of them as the apostles, the evidence indicates that in the period of the events here recorded the twelve were probably not as yet known as apostles.

In Gal 1:19 Paul applies the term apostles to a company some of whom at least were included in the twelve. It is improbable that Paul would have used the term as he does in this passage unless those whom he there calls apostles were also so designated in their own circle. That he speaks of them as having been apostles before him implies that before he entered on his career as an apostle they were already exercising the function by virtue of which he now called them apostles, most naturally also that they bore the name before that time. Paul is thus in agreement with the Acts author in Acts 1:26, in that he carries the apostolic function at least back to a very early period in the history of the Christian community.

If now we compare this evidence with that of Luke-Acts each will perhaps be found to throw light upon the other. It is

clear from evidence cited above, that when the Gospel of Luke was written, all the twelve were counted as apostles, and that they were supposed to have constituted the original company of the apostles. To say "the apostles" when speaking of the life of Jesus was, therefore, equivalent to saying "the twelve." From the usage of the Third Gospel that of the first twelve chapters of the Book of Acts differs only in that Matthias takes the place of Judas. With the latter portion, in which Paul and Barnabas also receive the title, we are not at present concerned. What we have to note is that from the point of view of Luke-Acts all the twelve were apostles and had been such from the beginning. The apostle Paul also refers to certain of the twelve as apostles, and though he does not definitely include *all* of them under the term, yet in the absence of any limitation of the title to a part of the twelve, it is probable that he is in agreement with Luke on this point. The usage of Luke-Acts in this respect would then be carried back to the date of Galatians at least, and by probable implication to a point a decade or two earlier, when Paul became an apostle. Farther than this we cannot go with confidence. It is not indeed improbable, in view of Mark 3:14 and the evidence of the early designation of the twelve as apostles, that Jesus was wont to speak of the twelve as his שליחים (messengers), or in Greek ἀπόστολοι. But in view of the fact that our earliest definite knowledge of its use with titular force comes from the sixth decade of the first century, and in view of the possibility that Mark 3:14 and Luke 6:13 may involve some antedating of the usage of a later period, we cannot date the use of the term as a title applied pre-eminently or exclusively to the twelve more definitely than between the middle of Jesus' ministry and the middle of the century, and cannot say whether it was first used as a Hebrew or as a Greek term.

There are indeed four possibilities which with their subdivisions become seven. First, the term apostle may have been applied first of all to the twelve (*a*) by Jesus in his lifetime, (*b*) after the death of Jesus, and in either case have been gradually extended to include other men of like function in the church. Secondly, the term may have first been applied to a company that included

both the twelve and others (e.g., the seventy) (*a*) in Jesus' lifetime, (*b*) after his death, in either case subsequent additions being made to the company. Thirdly, the term may have been first applied to a company within the twelve (*a*) in Jesus' lifetime, (*b*) after his death, in either case the number being afterward extended to include all the twelve and some others also. Fourthly, the term may have been first applied after Jesus' death to a company of influential men, partly of the twelve, partly not, e.g., Peter, James, the Lord's brother, and John, and afterward been extended as on the previous supposition. Bearing in mind these hypotheses we may pass to consider—

(*c*) The extent of the company of apostles before Paul. The evidence already cited tends to show that though Paul had personal relations with only a few of the twelve, perhaps only with Peter and John, yet the expression "apostles before me" would on his lips have included, potentially, all the twelve. It remains to inquire whether it would have included any others.

Reference has already been made to the fact that, according to Acts 1:21-26, within the larger company of Jesus' disciples, the twelve constituted an organic body having a definite number and specific function. Eventual diminution of the number is potentially involved in the limitation (implied in the passage) of those from among whom vacancies may be filled; indeed this limitation implies the extinction of the body within a generation. But the passage makes no reference to such diminution, or to any possible increase of the number; it contemplates only the restoration and maintenance of the number which had been reduced by the treachery and death of Judas. That the Acts author by his vs. 26 associates these ideas with the apostles indicates that he supposed that in the early apostolic age there were twelve apostles, no more, no less. But the passage cannot be cited as evidence that the early apostolic age itself held this opinion; for aside from the editorial setting in vss. 2, 26 it certifies only that in that period it was believed that the number of the *twelve* was to be preserved intact for the time being, and presumably as long as there were among those who fulfilled the conditions here laid down competent persons to fill the vacancies as they occurred. Nothing

is implied as to the opinion of the Acts author on the question how many apostles there might come to be.

Paul's inclusion of James among the apostles (Gal. 1:19) following closely upon the mention of those who were apostles before him (1:17) suggests, but does not necessarily imply, that James was an apostle before Paul was. It does, however, show that as early as when Paul wrote Galatians, probably at the time of the visit to Jerusalem to which he here refers, the apostolic body included others than the twelve, i.e., the original eleven and Matthias. But we do not know whether James was added to the twelve, as Matthias was, by being elected to fill a vacancy, and acquired the title of apostle by virtue of his membership in the twelve, or whether he became an apostle without being numbered with the twelve. It is, however, distinctly improbable that the apostles and the twelve were at the time when James became an apostle wholly distinct bodies. This was clearly not the case when Paul wrote, nor when Acts was written. We have no evidence that it was the case when James became an apostle.

I Cor. 9:3 ff. indicates clearly the existence of a class of apostles which included on the one side Paul and doubtless also Barnabas, and on the other, certain unnamed persons, whose standing as apostles was, however, quite assured and undisturbed. It may be safely assumed that "the rest of the apostles" here spoken of included those to whom in Gal. 1:19 Paul refers as "those who were apostles before me." The mention of Cephas cannot be understood as excluding him from the group of apostles, and since this is so, neither can it be assumed that the brethren of the Lord are so excluded. Yet the most probable explanation of the somewhat peculiar enumeration in verse 5 is that the brethren of the Lord constituted as such a different group from the apostles (i.e., that not all of the brethren of the Lord were apostles, as certainly not all of the apostles were brethren of the Lord), but that they occupied a position in the church, of dignity, influence, and privilege, similar to that enjoyed by the apostles. If we seek an explanation of this withholding of the name apostle from those to whom practically the same position was accorded, it seems to be suggested by vs. 1 compared with 15:5-7. Vs. 1, "Have I

not seen Jesus our Lord?" suggests that to be a witness of the resurrection was now regarded as a condition of apostleship, as Acts 1:22 shows that it was esteemed a condition of inclusion in the company of the twelve, while I Cor. 15:5-7, mentioning specifically the epiphany to James, but none to his brothers, suggests that he alone of the brethren of Jesus enjoyed this privilege and distinction. If this is the correct explanation, the passage, though furnishing no specific names to add to the list of apostles before Paul, makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the limits of the apostolate on the non-Pauline side, suggesting that James was an apostle and his brethren not, though occupying a kindred position in the church, and that the reason for this discrimination was that he was a witness of the resurrection and they were not.

I Cor. 15:5-8 manifestly requires careful consideration in connection with the question of the extent of the apostolate. It reads as follows: "that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve; then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James; then to all the apostles. And last of all as to the child untimely born, he appeared to me also."

The phrase "all the apostles," used in a series such as that in which the phrase occurs here, might refer to a group entirely distinct from those previously mentioned, yet most naturally designates the whole of a group in distinction from a portion previously mentioned. Such portion may be found either in the twelve (so, Chrysostom, who found in the phrase a reference to a band of apostles including the seventy), or in James. The *prima facie* view of the language would also be that the phrase refers either to all who were apostles at the time of the event narrated or to all who were such at the time of writing. The latter hypothesis is, however, in this case improbable. For (*a*) the meaning "all who are now apostles" implies a detachment of the thought from the narrative that is improbable both in itself and because it would involve the mental addition to an original number of apostles of those who had subsequently acquired the title, and (*b*) the phrase would strictly include Paul himself, whom, therefore, since he certainly

was not present at the time referred to, he must have tacitly excepted. That he means "all the apostles" in distinction from the twelve, with the implication that the latter constituted a part of the former, is also improbable in view of the remoteness of the mention of the twelve and the intervention of the mention of the five hundred brethren and of James. The improbability of this view is further increased by the absence of any other evidence that there was at that time any such larger group. If then we set aside the hypothesis that the phrase means those who are now apostles, and the supposed reference to the twelve, and if we assume precision of expression on Paul's part, we shall infer that he is speaking of a company which was composed of those who very soon after the death of Jesus were called apostles, and which included *all* such in contrast with James, who was only one of the company. In this case we shall conclude that James was at that time one of the apostles. But that Paul spoke with such precision of expression is, itself, by no means certain. Such a passage as I Cor. 9:5, in which Paul speaks of "the rest of the apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas," warns us against treating his enumerations as if they were drawn up by a statistician or a logician. If, as is probable, he means by James the same person to whom he refers in Gal. 1:19; 2:9, to affirm that at the time referred to he was not an apostle, would be indeed to beg the question at issue, but it is at least true that we have no evidence outside this passage that he was such, and that this passage is not decisive evidence on this point. It seems necessary, therefore, to reckon with certain other possibilities. Having in mind that James was not an apostle at the time referred to, or thinking of the five hundred as not being apostles, Paul may have used the expression "all the apostles" with the emphasis on "apostles" rather than on "all." Or, thinking of James as now an apostle, he may have been led half unconsciously to the use of a phrase including the word apostle to describe the next group, which, however, still meant all who were apostles at the time of the event referred to. Or without intention of comparison with any previously mentioned person or group, Paul, long accustomed to the term apostle, scarcely aware indeed of a time when the

term was not in use, may have employed the expression "all the apostles" of all who were, at the time of the event referred to, members of the company which at the time of writing had long been known as the apostles. In itself the phrase would not tell us who these were. But in view of the other evidence we should naturally assume them to have been the twelve, or rather, perhaps, the eleven. It may, indeed, be asked why, if the expression "all the apostles" is of identical content with "the twelve," the apostle should have used the two instead of repeating the same phrase. A confident answer cannot perhaps be given to this question, but instinctive desire for variety of expression combined with the intervention of the reference to the five hundred and to James may have been sufficient to lead him to say "to all the apostles," rather than "again to the twelve."⁵

It seems impossible, therefore, to deduce from this passage any definite indication as to who constituted the apostles at the time of the epiphany which Paul here relates, or indeed that there was at that time any definite group of persons called apostles. Read in the light of the other evidence it distinctly implies the existence of a definite company of Jesus' disciples, known at the time of this epiphany or not much later as the twelve, and a definite company then or afterward known as the apostles. This passage itself does not define the extent to which these two companies were identical, but leaves unanswered the question whether they were mutually exclusive, partly identical or wholly so. The last view is, on the whole, more consistent with all the evidence.

The reference to "false apostles" mentioned in II Cor. will require consideration at a later point. It is sufficient at this point to note that Paul's attitude toward them renders it improbable that they were included in those whom he designates as having been apostles before him.

In Rom. 16:7 mention is made of Adronicus and Junias as *ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις*. This is generally understood to mean that they were themselves of the number of the apostles and

⁵ It is a tempting suggestion made by Valckenarius and cited by Heinrici in Meyer, *Kom.*, 8te Aufl., that for *πᾶσι* we should read *πάλιν*; but in the absence of any external evidence the interpreter can scarcely avail himself of this way of escape.

occupied a position of eminence among them. If this is correct these men may well have been among those who were apostles before Paul, as he expressly says that they were Christians before he was. In that case, they were probably like the men referred to in II Cor. in that they constituted an early addition to the apostolic company and, like them, were apparently itinerant missionaries.

2. *The apostleship of Paul.*—With the conversion of Saul and his adoption for himself, or the ascription by others to him, of the title *ἀπόστολος*, that title enters upon a new stage of its history. It evidently passed from the twelve, or the company of which they were a part, to him, not the reverse, but its application to him became the occasion of no little controversy.

Acts 13:1-3 relates that the company of prophets and teachers in the church at Antioch set apart two of their own number for a specific task, which though not sharply defined was apparently that of carrying the gospel into regions as yet unevangelized. There is a manifest parallel between this act and that of the one hundred and twenty in Jerusalem (Acts 1:15-26), and it is not improbable that in this event we have an important step in the creation of an apostolate not authorized from Jerusalem or by the twelve. But as in the case of Matthias, so in the case of Barnabas and Saul, there is no assertion that the term apostle was applied at the time of appointment, but only a subsequent reference to them as apostles by the Acts author, and no distinct evidence that those who took part in the Antioch incident looked upon it at the time as having any important bearing on the development of an office or the definition of a term.

For direct evidence as to the origin of Paul's assurance of his own apostleship and his conception of the functions of an apostle, we must depend upon his own letters. In II Cor. 8:23 and Phil. 2:25 he uses the term, with limitations, in the general sense of messenger or delegate. This evidence is valuable as showing what was for Paul the fundamental idea of the term, but it in no way obscures the fact that Paul applied the term to a certain limited number of persons including himself and the twelve, in a more specific sense. In the salutation of the Thessalonian letter (or letters if II Thess. be from Paul), he couples with his own name those

of Silvanus and Timothy, and adds no title, but in I Thess. 2:6 he uses the term *ἀπόστολος* of himself, or of himself and one or more of his companions at Thessalonica, in such a way as to imply that to be an apostle of Christ carried with it either authority, or the right to be supported by his converts; it is impossible to say with certainty which is the implication of *ἐν βάρει*. In Gal. 1:1-3 he affirms his own apostleship with emphasis, and thereafter in the salutation of all the Pauline letters, except Philippians and Philemon, the term *ἀπόστολος* is closely joined to the personal name *Παῦλος*. In all these cases the term is clearly restricted to Paul himself and is evidently of titular force. Gal. 1:1 and its context also make it clear that Paul's right to this title was disputed, and scarcely less so that the ground of objection was that the title and appointment had not been authorized in Jerusalem. To this his defense was not that he had been duly appointed, but that such appointment was unnecessary, and that he had never sought it, having received his apostleship by direct divine commission. In I Cor. 9:1 Paul couples the assertion of his apostleship with the affirmation that he had seen Jesus our Lord, evidently referring to the post-resurrection vision spoken of in I Cor. 15:8. As therefore the Galatian passage suggests one element of the conditions of apostleship implied in Acts 1:21, 22, so the Corinthian passage suggests another. It is not, indeed, perfectly clear whether he conceded that such a vision of the risen Jesus was a necessary condition of apostleship or, only since he fulfilled it, preferred simply to affirm the fact and so avoid controversy on this point. On the one side, the general type of his thought, his emphasis on the purely spiritual as against the physical in religion, would favor the view that he did not attach vital importance to his having seen Jesus.⁶ But on the other hand, the great significance which he evidently attached to this particular experience, and his apparently careful avoidance of the ascription of apostleship to other missionaries of Christianity, such as Timothy, Titus, and Apollos, point to the conclusion that he included ability to bear personal testimony to the resurrection among the conditions of apostleship. We may concede that his view would have been more thoroughly self-consistent if he had attached no importance to this condition;

⁶ Cf. Hincks, "Limits of the Apostolate," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1895, pp. 37-47.

but it seems on the whole probable, nevertheless, that he did include it in the necessary qualifications of an apostle.

If this is the case it was implied in the view both of Paul and his opponents that the apostleship could not last many years since the supply of those who fulfilled this condition would inevitably be exhausted within a generation. But it is probable that this consideration was deprived of any importance by their expectation of the consummation of the age by the coming of the Lord. Cf. Matt. 19:28.

3. *The false apostles.*—The mention by Paul of those whom he, in II Cor. 11:13, characterizes as "false apostles [*ψευδαπόστολοι*], deceitful workers, fashioning themselves into apostles of Christ," though adding of course none to the list of those whom he accounted apostles, throws considerable light on the whole problem of the conception of apostleship held in the apostolic age. The letter which has been preserved to us in part in chaps. 10-13 of what is commonly known as II Corinthians shows clearly that there had been in Corinth certain persons who, claiming themselves to be apostles of Christ, denied Paul's right to that title. If II Cor. 3:1 (written a little later) refers, as it probably does, to the same persons, it suggests that these persons brought with them letters of commendation, and that not improbably their claim to the apostleship was supported by these letters. We have no means of knowing whether these men had been elected as Matthias was to fill a vacancy in the original twelve, or were an addition to the twelve. In any case, Paul's objection to their apostleship was not based on the method of their appointment, but on the spirit and purpose of the work they were doing. The expression "false apostles," however, confirms what the evidence previously examined implies, that to be an apostle was a definite fact. In other words, while neither Paul nor, so far as we know, the Jerusalem Christians were insisting on the maintenance of the number twelve, the term apostle still conveyed a definite meaning; it was not applied indiscriminately to any preacher or missionary of the Christian message.⁷

⁷The assertion frequently made (see, e.g., Robinson in Hastings' *D.B.*, art. "Apostle," and Robertson and Plummer on I Cor. 12:28) that the expression "false

II Cor. 10:7 and 11:23 strongly suggest that among the qualifications which these persons affirmed that they possessed and Paul lacked was a certain relation to Christ. In all probability this was in part at least personal knowledge of him in his lifetime. This view is in some measure confirmed by I Cor. 1:12 (*ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ*) and 9:1, if, as is probable, the former passage refers to the same persons, or at least to the same movement, as II Cor. 10:7; 11:23, and if I Cor. 9:1 conveys a veiled and passing allusion to that party, with which the apostle for some reason did not, in this letter, wish to deal openly.⁸ Cf. on the general situation Weizsäcker, *Das Apostolische Zeitalter*, p. 299, E. T., Vol. I, p. 354, and Sanday in *Ency. Bib.* I, 905.

When these men set up their claim to be apostles is indicated only by the mention of them in the letter of Paul which we now find imbedded in what is known as II Cor. This would point to a date in the early fifties as the time when they were in Corinth. How much sooner they claimed or were given the title of apostle we have no means of knowing. Whether elected to fill a vacancy in the number of the twelve or added to that number, they may have been accounted apostles in Jerusalem even before Paul acquired the title. His subsequent denial of the title to them, when he discovered the spirit in which they were working, does not exclude the possibility of his having at first accounted them apostles.

apostles" implies that the number of the apostles was indefinite is inaccurate and misleading. The expression shows only that there was difference of opinion as to who were apostles. It suggests no indefiniteness as to what it was to be an apostle, but quite the contrary, for had the term been of quite indefinite meaning (signifying, e.g., only itinerant preacher), Paul would have had no motive to refuse it to the emissaries from Jerusalem, or, it may be added, to claim it for himself. Nor does the term of itself exclude definiteness of number; since an agreement, e.g., that there could be but twelve apostles, would only have given acuteness to the question who were the genuine, who the spurious. Cf. the case of delegates to a political convention. Probably on neither side was the number definitely restricted, but the expression "false apostles" would not of itself prove this.

⁸ It is not improbable that in II Cor. 5:16 also there is an allusion to the same emphasis of Paul's opponents on personal knowledge of Jesus; in which case, however, the apostle's phrase *ἐγνώκαμεν κατὰ σάρκα Χριστόν* must be taken as a general expression inclusive of estimation of Christ on any basis of the physical and external, which estimation he now abjures, whatever may have been, in fact or according to the accusation of his opponents, the case in the past.

Such evidence as there is, however, would suggest that these were relatively late additions to the company of those who bore the title of apostles.

In Rev. 2:2 reference is also had to false apostles in the church at Ephesus, men who call themselves apostles and are not. Whatever the point of view of this portion of the Apocalypse, and whatever the test by which the Ephesians tried them and discovered that they were false, the passage testifies to the fact that to be an apostle was something definite and desirable.

4. *The use of the term in Acts.*—Sufficient reference has already been made to the usage of the word apostle in the first twelve chapters of Acts. It remains only to observe that while in chap. 14 Paul and Barnabas are spoken of as apostles, the word occurs elsewhere only in chaps. 15 and 16, and in the phrase οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ [οἱ] πρεσβύτεροι ἀδελφοί, designating the leading men of the church assembled in Jerusalem. While the epistles of Paul recognize the apostleship of James, and of Andronicus and Junias, and testify that others also claimed the title, which though denied by Paul was apparently conceded by others, the book of Acts makes no mention of any of these as apostles, but restricts the term to the twelve with the addition of Paul and Barnabas.

5. *Summary of New Testament usage.*—These facts, respecting the usage of the word in the several New Testament books, suggest that the term was first used of a narrower circle, then of a wider, and again in certain quarters of a narrower. They do not clearly indicate when the term was first applied to the twelve except that it was at some time before the writing of Galatians. They do not show clearly whether the term was first applied to the twelve only and afterward to others, or whether it first arose as a title of a larger group including the twelve. They suggest that while the twelve were at first the eminent body among the followers of Jesus, and were known simply as the twelve, the raising of James, and in a lesser measure of his brethren, to a place of influence in the Christian community only second, and in the case of James scarcely second, to that of the twelve, gradually led to the partial displacement of the numerical term, the twelve, by the more descriptive and honorific term apostles. Not improbably from the beginning,

this term included all the twelve, but also James. Eventually all who like these were regarded as founders of Christianity were called apostles (cf. below on the function of the apostle). For this use of the term there was doubtless some preparation in earlier usage. This may have been furnished by the use of some such term as *ἀπόστολοι* or *שליחין* not as a title but as a term descriptive of the function of the twelve. Subsequently, doctrinal differences led to the denial of the apostolic character of some of these later additions to the apostolic circle, each party denying the title to those whose views they disapproved, but none apparently questioning the apostolic title of the twelve. The Book of Acts represents a stage of the controversy and a circle of thought in which it was held that in the early days the twelve were the only apostles and there was caution in recognizing the legitimacy of any addition to that number except Paul and Barnabas. Of the persistence in other circles of another point of view, something will be said later in discussing the usage of the *Διδαχὴ*.

If this hypothesis be accepted as probable, we should reconstruct the history of the use of the term apostle in what we call the apostolic age somewhat as follows: In the midst of his ministry Jesus gathered about him a company of twelve disciples who accompanied with him, learning from him as pupils, and sharing in his work as his representatives. The earliest name that we can discover for this company was "the twelve," a title which they not improbably bore even in Jesus' lifetime. Assured by their visions of him after his death that he still lived, they were impelled to continue their organization such as it was, and to fill the vacancy caused by the treachery and death of Judas. They conceived it to be their function to testify to the resurrection of Jesus and in general to transmit the message of Jesus' life and teaching which they had received through their association with him. They were not ecclesiastical officers but bearers of a message. They continued for some time, precisely how long we cannot tell, to be known as the twelve. With them were early associated the brothers of Jesus, of whom James was especially prominent, and these grew in influence. James being a witness of the resurrection and a man of weight and influence assumed functions quite like those of the

twelve. This fact gradually led to the adoption of the term apostles, which may or may not have already been applied to the twelve, as the title of all who shared the function of the twelve.

Converted to an enthusiastic faith in Jesus by his Damascus vision, Paul felt himself called by God to become a preacher of the gospel message, as he conceived of it, to the Gentiles. This was for him a divine commission and he unhesitatingly appropriated to himself the title and function of an apostle of Christ, which he conceived himself to hold by direct divine authority, subject in no way to the control of those who were apostles before him.

When Paul had been at work for some years, there went out into the territory which he conceived to be his and into the churches which he had founded, certain men, perhaps by authorization from Jerusalem, who denied Paul's apostleship, apparently either on the ground that he had not been a personal companion of Jesus, or had not been commissioned from Jerusalem, or both, and no doubt claimed for themselves what they denied to him. These men Paul in turn denounced as false apostles.

It is clear that there had grown up two contrasted views of the conditions of apostleship, having much in common but sharply differentiated on certain points. Both parties were agreed that to be an apostle was something very definite, and, as will appear later, were not widely divided as to what the function of an apostle was. Of the existence of a loose sense of the term as applied to apostles of Christ (II Cor. 8:23 and Phil. 2:25 do not come into account here), either as the only meaning or parallel with a stricter sense, the books of the New Testament give no evidence. The difference of opinion pertained chiefly to the conditions of apostleship. The party of Paul's opponents probably held respecting the apostolate substantially the position which Acts 1:21, 22 takes respecting the twelve. An apostle must have known Jesus personally, must be able to bear witness to the resurrection, and must have been commissioned from Jerusalem. Paul denied the necessity of personal acquaintance with Jesus on earth, or of any commission whatever from men. On the basis of his Damascus vision he claimed to have seen Jesus and so to be a witness of the resurrection. Other conditions than this, he maintained, were

purely spiritual, and apostleship came by unmediated divine commission.

How many of those who were eligible to apostleship under either of the two views eventually came to bear the name apostle it is impossible to state. We can definitely name only about twenty, but quite possibly it was given to all who having been sharers in the epiphanies of Jesus afterward assumed positions of responsibility in the church, especially perhaps if they became itinerant preachers and founders of churches.

6. *The function of an apostle.*—For the interpretation of the epistles of Paul the question what he conceived to be the function of an apostle is of much more importance than the number of those to whom he conceived the title to be rightly applicable. Most of the evidence bearing on this point has been cited incidentally in the preceding sections, but may now be assembled and brought to bear on this phase of the subject.

In Mark 3:14, 15 we read, *καὶ ἐποίησεν δώδεκα, οὓς καὶ ἀποστόλους ὠνόμασεν, ἵνα ὄσιν μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἵνα ἀποστέλλῃ αὐτοὺς κηρύσσειν καὶ ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν ἐκβάλλειν τὰ δαιμόνια*. This passage evidently took shape when it was believed that Jesus himself created the apostolate and gave to its members the name apostles. It shows that at that time it was believed that the primary purpose for which Jesus chose the twelve was that they should be his personal companions and helpers in his work. Learning from him by companionship with him, they were to share in his work by going out to announce his message and to do such things as he had himself been doing (cf. Mark 9:38). Though this gospel was written long after the death of Jesus and when the twelve had long been exercising a function largely created by conditions that arose after his death, and though the expression, "whom he also named apostles," probably shows the influence of later thought, yet with the exception of this phrase the horizon of the passage is wholly that of Jesus' lifetime, and there is in it no suggestion of any work to be done after Jesus' death.⁹ This fact is strong evidence that the substance of the passage comes from a very early

⁹This is the implication of the present tenses, *ἀποστέλλῃ, κηρύσσειν, ἔχειν* and *ἐκβάλλειν*, not, of course, in that they denote present time, but continued or repeated

date, and embodies the recollection of the twelve of their original conception of their primitive function.

But though this original appointment suggested no function extending beyond the period of the personal presence of Jesus, his death resulted not in the dissolution of the group but in the taking on of a new function. Those who had been his chosen companions in his lifetime became the witnesses of his resurrection. See above on Acts 1:21-26. The insistence upon personal companionship with Jesus, as a condition of membership in the body in the new period of its history, was doubtless in part because of the relation between such companionship and ability to be a witness to the resurrection. But the inclusion of the phrase "from the baptism of John" indicates that the bearing of such testimony was not the full duty or only function of the twelve. They must also be able to testify to the deeds and words of Jesus before his death and even from the beginning of his public ministry, and carry forward his work as they only could do who knew him well. On the other hand witnessing to the resurrection was not an end in itself, but the means by which men were to be persuaded to accept him as Lord and Christ. The function of the apostle is therefore comprehensively the winning of men to faith in Jesus through the testimony to his resurrection, and building them up in such faith through the story of his life and teaching. There is thus a clear affinity between the thought of the two passages Mark 3:14 and Acts 1:21-26. The companionship with Jesus which in Mark is a part of the purpose of the choice of the twelve becomes in Acts a condition of membership in the body; and the function of the group, though new in that it includes and makes prominent the testimony to the resurrection, is in substance the same as that set forth in Mark with only such modification as the death and subsequent epiphanies of Jesus, convincing them of his resurrection and messiahship, would naturally call for. Whether at the early period in which this conception of the function of the twelve took shape they were already known as apostles, or, as suggested above,

action, naturally, therefore, thought of as continuous with the time of *διδω μετ' αὐτοῦ*. Had the thought been of a single subsequent sending out, following upon the period of the *διδω μετ' αὐτοῦ*, the aorist *ἀποστειλεν* must certainly have been used.

this name was only later applied to them, the passage in Acts shows that by the time of the writing of Acts the definition of function had become attached to the term apostle, and there is no special reason to question that this took place in the process by which the term apostle was carried over to the twelve or to that larger company of which they were the major part.

Paul's conception of the function of an apostle is conveyed by implication rather than by any express statement. The important passage 1 Cor. 12:28 indicates the place of high importance which he attaches to it, and shows that he regarded apostleship rather as a commission conferred by divine endowment than an ecclesiastical office to which one was appointed or elected by men (see also Gal. 1:1). That the function was local, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ referring to the church at Corinth, or generically to any local church, cannot be assumed in view of Paul's use of ἐκκλησία in the larger sense in Gal. 1:13; 1 Cor 15:9; Phil. 3:6; Col. 1:18, 24, and is against all other usage of the word ἀπόστολος. It is still more clear that in Eph. 4:11 the writer is thinking of the church at large. But neither of these passages gives a clear definition of the specific function of the apostle. The evidence that Paul regarded first-hand testimony to the resurrection as a part of the work of the apostle has already been discussed (cf. 2 above). That the preaching of the gospel was a part of it is clearly implied not only in such passages as Gal. 1:16; 1 Cor. 1:17; Rom. 1:1, but in practically all his references to his apostleship. But neither of apostleship in general nor of his own apostleship in particular would this have been an adequate definition. Not every preacher of the gospel was an apostle; nor was it given to Paul by virtue of his apostleship to preach the gospel without restriction. Limiting his own efforts to Gentile lands (Gal. 1:16; 2:8, 9) and within these lands to fields not already occupied by others, he disclaimed all intention of re-proselytizing to his own conception of Christianity converts already made by others (II Cor. 10:13; Rom. 15:20), and equally denied the right of others to attempt to win his converts to their views (Gal. 1:8, 9; 5:12). We infer that according to Paul's conception the work of an apostle of Christ was that of planting Christianity. Endowed by the vision of the risen Christ with ability to testify to

the resurrection, commissioned by God, and his commission attested by the signs of an apostle, viz., ability to work miracles and success in the work of the gospel (I Cor. 9:1, 2; II Cor. 12:12), possessed of a message for which no man was his authority (Gal. 1:1, 11, 12), it belonged to the apostle not to follow in the footsteps of others, nor to build along the lines determined by other men's foundations, but himself to announce the gospel message, to found churches, and thus to fix the lines of the development of the new religion, or the new type of the Jewish religion. Disclaiming indeed lordship over the faith of his converts as against the working of the Spirit in their own hearts (II Cor. 1:24), yet in the assured conviction of his own apostleship and his own possession of the Spirit (I Cor. chap. 2), Paul did not hesitate on the one side to reprove, exhort, and even to command the churches which he had founded (I Thess. 4:2; cf. II Thess. 3:4, 6; II Cor. 13:2, 10 *et freq.*), and on the other utterly to deny the right of others, whether true or false apostles, to assume such authority over these churches. To be an apostle of Christ was in Paul's thought to be divinely commissioned to found churches of Christ and, by virtue of such commission, to be independent of human authority.¹⁰ It was such a commission and the right and duty to exercise it among the Gentiles, thus practically determining the character of Gentile Christianity as far as his work and influence extended, that Paul steadfastly claimed for himself.

Lacking any correspondingly definite expression of the conception of apostleship held by the other apostles, we cannot say to what extent they would have agreed with Paul's definition of

¹⁰The work of the apostles as a whole might be defined (cf. Haupt, *Zum Verständnis des Apostolats im N.T.*, p. 135) as the founding of the church. But since this is the work of no single man, one could not from Paul's point of view give this as the definition of the function of the apostle (sing.) without the addition of a limiting phrase defining the scope and territory within which the individual apostle was divinely commissioned to act. Yet neither from Paul's point of view was the founding of the church committed to any body of men to be achieved by them as a body. Whether it be due to the difference of judgment between himself and others whose apostleship he was nevertheless unwilling to deny, or to inherent individualism, the apostle held at any rate that to him was given his task and to the others theirs, which each was to accomplish, with recognition of the others' rights and duties, but not co-operatively as a duty laid on them all jointly.

the function of an apostle. It is evident, however, that Paul's conception is closely akin to that which underlies Acts 1:21-26, but that his is more sharply defined in respect to the independence of the apostle. It is evident also that precisely by reason of this peculiarity of Paul's view, it was well adapted to give rise to controversy. A conception of a college of apostles would have called for corporate action in the achievement of a common task. But Paul's individualism, his view that each apostle—he at least—had his own commission from God, and was responsible therefore to God and not to his fellow-apostles, could scarcely fail to bring him into conflict with those who held the other conception. Paul's solution of the problem of conflicting claims that in fact arose was neither to deny the apostleship of the others and maintain his own only, nor to consent to submit mooted questions to a majority vote of a college of apostles, but to affirm the undiminished authority of each in his own field. The pillar apostles, on the other hand, without apparently denying his apostleship did not at first recognize that it required them not to interfere with his work. Later, they concede this in theory, but do not steadfastly conform to it in practice; while the more extreme members of the Jewish Christian party deny Paul's apostleship altogether.

Itinerancy was evidently an incidental rather than a cardinal feature of the apostle's work. The twelve, according to Mark 3:14, were to go out from time to time. But Acts 1:11, 12 makes no mention of itinerancy. The use of the phrase *γυναίκα περιάγειν* in I Cor. 9:5 suggests that the apostles generally and the brethren of the Lord were more or less itinerant, yet rather in the sense that they had frequent occasion to change their home than to be away from home. Paul, we know, was in "journeyings oft." Having no family he may perhaps be said to have had no home. Manifestly also the witness to the resurrection must go where they are to whom the testimony is to be borne, and the founder of churches cannot remain seated in one place. Yet prolonged residence in a given place might be necessary to the accomplishment of a given apostle's task, and no definite limit could be set to the period of such residence. Like the modern missionary bishop, the apostle must be where his work called him, yet not necessarily always journeying. James the

brother of our Lord was never, so far as our evidence shows, an itinerant preacher, nor does it seem probable that anyone who, in the discharge of his function as a founder of Christianity, should find it expedient to take up permanent residence in a certain place, would on that account have been denied the title of apostle. Still less does the evidence of the New Testament permit us to suppose that itinerancy would of itself have entitled a preacher of the gospel to be called an apostle. Nor was the expression equivalent to evangelist, or to the modern term, missionary.

IV. CHRISTIAN USAGE IN THE SECOND CENTURY

To the interpretation of the development of the apostolate and the usage of the word apostle hereinbefore set forth, the use of the word in the well-known passage in the *Διδαχή τῶν δώδεκα Ἀποστόλων*, chap. 11, seems at first sight to interpose an objection:

But concerning the prophets and apostles, so do ye according to the ordinance of the gospel. Let every apostle, when he comes to you, be received as the Lord; but he shall not abide more than a single day, or if there be need, the second; and if he abide three days he is a false prophet. And when he departs let the apostle receive nothing save bread, until he find shelter. But if he ask for money he is a false prophet.

The first injunction manifestly has reference to Matt. 10:40: "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me." And this reference in turn associates the apostle here spoken of with the twelve. Yet, on the other hand it is quite impossible to suppose that the following injunctions were intended to apply to the twelve or arose in a time when they could have been so understood. For surely the twelve never sank to so low a level in the esteem of the church that it was deemed necessary to prohibit their remaining more than two days at utmost in any one church, or receiving anything more than the food necessary to sustain them to their next stopping place. Apparently, therefore, the passage comes from a time when the apostles as a class were still so connected in thought with the twelve that the sentence which the gospel applies to them could be applied to the then existing class of apostles, but when the still living members of the class had so far degenerated as to be regarded with suspicion and

treated with extreme caution. Those to whom the term is here applied are itinerant prophets, living off the churches, but prohibited from receiving any money or subsisting upon any church for more than two days at a time. Violation of these rules proves them false prophets but apparently does not deprive them of the title apostles.

It should be borne in mind that this is the only extant passage in early Christian literature in which any such use of the term occurs. The term is found six times in Clem. Rom., once in so-called II Clement, 16 times in Ignatius, once in Diognetus, five times in Hermas, and once in Barnabas (see Goodspeed, *Index Patristicus*). All of these instances are in line with the usage which from the Book of Acts we should infer prevailed in the latter portion of the apostolic age, most of them very clearly so. Clement of Rome, Barnabas, and Ignatius know of no apostles save the twelve and Paul. In Clem. Rom. 47, Apollos is expressly distinguished from the apostles: "For ye were partisans of apostles and of a man approved in their sight." Equally clear is the usage of II Clem. and Mart. Pol. The usage of Hermas is less clear and may perhaps be more nearly akin to that of the middle period of the apostolic age. He speaks once of forty apostles and teachers (Sim. 9:15:4) and twice of apostles and teachers, without mentioning their number (Sim. 9:16:5; 25:2). These preached the gospel to the whole world and having fallen asleep preached also to those that had fallen asleep before them. The apostles preached to the twelve tribes (Sim. 9:17:1), in which phrase there is, perhaps, a reminiscence of the twelve apostles. Of apostles still living Hermas makes no mention. From Diogn. 11:1 ("Having become a disciple of apostles I came forward as a teacher of the Gentiles"), and the probable late date of this non-Diognesian appendix to the Letter, it might be inferred that the word is used of men of the second century. But the fact that, in the other instances in which it occurs in this fragment (11:3:6; 12:5), the word clearly has its usual reference to the great leaders of the church in the first century, makes it more likely that it has the same meaning here and that the writer intended to say that he accepted the teachings of the apostles, not that he knew them personally.

The usage of the *Διδαχή* remains therefore without parallel in the literature either of the first or of the second century. It is not, indeed, impossible that the persons here referred to were survivors of the company of five hundred witnesses of the resurrection whom Paul mentions in I Cor. 15:6, but they had certainly ceased to exercise the functions which in an earlier period were the characteristic marks of an apostle, and which afterward were regarded retrospectively as the signs of an apostle. In no strict sense can the use of the word in the *Διδαχή* be regarded as the survival of a primitive usage. Of the three ideas, preaching the gospel, founding the church, itinerancy, it was the first and second, not the first and third, which entered into the earliest use of the term as a designation of a class in the Christian community; and of these the second was what constituted the distinctive mark of an apostle; itinerancy was apparently neither a constant nor a necessary feature of apostleship.

A more probable explanation of the usage found in the *Διδαχή* is that it is an offshoot, probably local and rather temporary, from the general stream of usage in both first and second centuries arising out of the conditions of which we catch a glimpse in II Cor., a degenerate use of the term arising from the degeneracy of the class to whom it was applied. The conflict over the apostleship, reflected in the Galatian and Corinthian letters, led on the Jewish-Christian side, possibly on the Gentile-Christian also, to the designation and sending out of men as apostles, first, probably, of those only who had known Jesus in the flesh, but afterward, perhaps, when no more such remained, of others. The name apostle thus became the designation of a class of itinerant Christian prophets which, for reasons no longer known, in time so degenerated that strenuous rules were laid down to prevent their unduly annoying the churches. But this was, after all, a relatively sporadic use of the term.¹¹ The main stream of usage in Christian circles remained the same. It was still commonly used of the founders of the church, those men of the first generation, contemporaries of Jesus who put their stamp upon the new religious movement and had no successors.

¹¹ Cf. the usage prevailing at about the same time in Jewish circles, mentioned under 1 above.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AND MINISTERIAL EFFICIENCY

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There is perhaps no branch of human learning with a more venerable history than systematic theology. For centuries it has been developed by the most gifted minds, and has passed through many stages of formal perfecting until it might seem that it, at least, should represent that superiority supposed to be guaranteed by the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. But to the great perplexity of many Christian leaders and teachers, we are today witnessing a widespread dissatisfaction with the traditional theology. It would be taken for granted by the average layman that a "theological" sermon would be abstruse, uninteresting, and superfluous. "What we want is practical preaching without any theology," is the demand made on many a minister. In the minds of some of our most intelligent church members systematic theology is classed with scholasticism as something fossilized and impotent to play any part in the making of an efficient Christianity.

However we may judge this common complaint, whether we lay it to ignorance or to lack of religious interest on the part of the layman or to defects in method on the part of the theologian, the actual presence of this attitude of adverse criticism ought to lead us to ask whether the department of systematic theology can do anything to commend religious thinking to those who are now indifferent. It is the purpose of this paper to ask what is demanded of the department if it is actually to have a share in the making of an efficient ministry.

When we consider our problem from this point of view, we meet with the somewhat surprising discovery that the organization of theology has not in the past been dominated by the efficiency test. It has been taken for granted that the concern of theology was to reproduce faithfully and to expound logically the

content of faith delivered to the church. For centuries, therefore, the theologian has thought of himself primarily as the custodian of a system which he was to explain to students in such a way that they in their turn could explain it to others. It must be acknowledged that until comparatively recently this ideal proved itself to be highly effective. Indeed, during the Middle Ages, systematic theology was the "queen of all the sciences" in the sense that it gave the best obtainable information on all subjects. In the catalogue of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, published in 1898, occurred the statement that theology, as taught in that institution was "the science of sciences, the philosophy of philosophies, and the ultimate solvent of all the great questions, political, social, religious, which have agitated the minds of men." If this promise could be fulfilled, there would be no lack of interest in the subject. But, as a matter of fact, theology is no longer able to speak the word of highest authority on some of the most important problems of our modern life. The specialized social sciences have so efficiently developed a means of interpreting many realms of human experience that the theologian becomes an amateur. Theology can no longer profess to be the "queen of all the sciences" in the older sense. It is only in localities where the messages of the newer sciences have not penetrated that men look to theology with anything like the old-time eagerness for help in forming their conclusions. The first step in the direction of ascertaining how the statement of religious doctrines may make for the efficiency of the church is to recognize this important change in modern life. A further word on this point will not be amiss.

Christianity was the one organized power which survived in the struggle for mastery during the centuries of decline of the ancient culture. To Christianity, therefore, the western world looked for its education and its training. The barbarians who conquered Rome were conscious of their intellectual inferiority to those who had created the mighty civilization of the classical world. They coveted for themselves those intellectual and political gifts which were necessary to the maintenance of so splendid a dominion. They realized, therefore, that out of antiquity could come a knowledge and a skill which they could not hope to produce out of their

own resources. Consequently, they assumed the attitude of docile pupils, learning from the authoritative representative of that ancient glory—the Christian church. In order to understand the tremendous hold which this conception of authority has gained over the western mind, it is necessary to remember the centuries when honest confession must be made of one's inability by inductive processes to attain the highest ideals. It was only by thus sincerely seeking to appropriate the greater treasures of the past that the present could become great. If it had not been for this attitude, the light of ancient learning might have perished even more completely from the earth than is the case, and the progress of civilization have been retarded.

But one consequence of this natural attitude of docile dependence on antiquity was the elaboration of theology as consisting partly in a system of truths unattainable by the natural powers of man. Indeed, some theologians did not hesitate to say that this arbitrary irrationality of theology was something in which to glory. Tertullian could exclaim, *Credo quia impossibile*. Gregory the Great could declare that there is no merit in believing what can be demonstrated. It is only by holding as true those things which do not seem to us to be true, but of which we are assured on the basis of divine authority that there is any merit in believing; for only in this case is there an exercise of the moral will. While this courageous defiance of reasonable tests has not usually characterized theologians, it has nevertheless been common to speak of "revealed truths," which, if not "contrary to reason," are at least "above reason."

If this position be held, it evidently makes little difference whether a doctrine is intrinsically interesting or not. Its truth is guaranteed by revelation, and this truth must be wholesome for the soul, no matter whether the soul evinces a craving for it or not. The system of doctrine can therefore be taught intact. It can be put into catechisms and learned by heart. It can be expounded in thoroughgoing fashion by preachers. It is accepted as an essential discipline of the mind and heart. Like the study of Greek and Latin, which also reached their position of pre-eminence under the influence of that conviction that the highest truth must come from

antiquity, theology has been living on the reputation of its magnificent past, not supposing that it would be called upon to justify itself at the bar of a frankly utilitarian age. And like the classics, it is just now seriously embarrassed to know how to answer the current call of "efficiency." It may be that the call itself involves a demand that surrender be made of some indispensable elements of human welfare. It may be that the real contribution of the classics and of theology is ridiculously underestimated by the current spirit of practical criticism. But it surely will not be a bad thing to be compelled to study our situation in the light of a standard which looks forward and not backward. It may help to illuminate the problem if we remember that the traditional theology and the mastery of the classics belonged together as the dominating features of culture until the developing enterprise of the modern age made men less conscious of their dependence on antiquity.

The loss of prestige of the traditional theology, therefore, goes hand in hand with the disappearance of that spirit of distrust of present human resources which found expression in the theological dogma of human inability. In the eighteenth century the western world became fully conscious of the possibilities opened by the use of natural reason in the exercise of patient investigation. The dogma of human inability gave way to the optimistic proclamation of the rights of man, which took expression in the revolts against aristocratic authority, not only religiously, but politically and socially as well. Freed from the sense of dependence on authority, the century witnessed the attempt to construct a purely reasonable religion which everyone could understand and approve, and which therefore was expected to become highly efficient.

But after all, deism represented no religious insight corresponding to the new attitude of mankind. It really belonged to the older régime. Its spread was largely confined to the cultured classes. Its theology was simply a reduction of the older system by the elimination of those elements which could not be rationally proved. But since the system itself belonged to an aristocratic order, where the many were dependent on the few for their doctrines, where the truths of theology were derived from an authoritative source rather than from the immanent experience of men, even the rationalistic

modifications did not eliminate the aristocratic features of the older system. Thus it never became a popular theology in a democratic world.

The real problem of efficiency is disclosed when once we recognize the fundamental difference between the ways of thinking and acting in the mediaeval world, where an aristocratic guidance of the many by the divinely appointed few was taken for granted as the natural constitution of things, and our modern world where every man has a right to think for himself, and where such independence of thinking has resulted in inventions and discoveries which have marvelously enriched our life. The traditional theology retains the presuppositions of aristocracy. It is efficient just in so far as men still live under the sway of the older aristocratic conceptions. In lands where there are class distinctions, the hereditary aristocracy is apt to be devoted to the church theology, and the peasantry who have not felt the spirit of revolt are satisfied with it. But with the awakening of the belief in the rights of man and its democratic implications, come revolt from orthodoxy and a distinct tendency toward anti-Christian free thought. In our own country, men who believe in an aristocratic management of business and who are quite willing to preserve class distinctions are likely to find supreme satisfaction in what they call the "old gospel"; while those who are interested in the struggles of the new democracy to gain a foothold in social and industrial life are likely to find it difficult to co-operate with orthodox theology. Of course there are many individual exceptions to this natural alignment of sympathies; but in general those who have ceased to believe in "divine rights" in the realm of politics or industry are suspicious of a theology which appeals to "authority."

Along with the development of the democratic spirit has come the marvelous extension of our knowledge of the resources of this world through the achievements of modern science. The conditions of life are coming to be thought of in relation to forces close at hand. Many indeed are the marvels of our modern life. Some of them are so great as to make miracles of olden time comparatively uninteresting. The presence of hundreds of iron ships carrying thousands of human beings across the ocean every year is surely

more wonderful than the floating of an ax-head. Yet this greater marvel is attributed by us to forces always available in the world. We are made conscious of tremendous dynamic possibilities close at hand. The fact that every day we must reckon with unseen forces like electricity or bacteria means the feeling that we are in the thick of the battle where human activity and enterprise count for much. The issues of life are brought close home. Our health and happiness, our religion and our morals are felt to be involved with all the complex factors which make themselves felt in our environment. But these factors may be so directed by human skill as to make for our weal, or so neglected as to make for our woe. Thus the application of scientific invention and skill to our modern life combines with the democratic movement to focus attention on the immanent forces of this world rather than on the content of an ancient literature guarded and expounded by men whose interests and sympathies are in the ancient rather than in the modern world. There results an attitude of mind which is unappreciative of a theology which is concerned solely to expound a system of truth coming out of the distant past or which employs the deductive method of arriving at conclusions. What is demanded is a first-hand contact with the actual immanent realities which mean so much for our life. Theology cannot escape being judged by this active eager desire for the "real thing."

Thus it has come about that our day is witnessing a strong demand for a theology based on "experience." Schleiermacher prophetically interpreted this modern demand when he stated that the content of theology should be nothing else than the deliverances of the religious consciousness. This proposal to appeal to experience represents an attitude which is entirely congenial to the democratic and scientific spirit of our age. But when the appeal is acted upon, there emerge certain perplexities which are somewhat confusing. Whose "experience" shall we take as the source of our religious exposition? What is to prevent the agnostic from setting up his "experience" as the norm? The German theologian Frank discovered in his "experience" grounds for affirming all the details of orthodox Lutheran dogmatics. But there are many Christians

whose "experience" would not take that direction. Where, now, is the "true" experience to be found?

It is here that the department of systematic theology today must bring order out of confusion. It is the business of the theologian to show the relation between doctrine and life, so that it may be possible to make the statement of doctrine contribute helpfully to the wholesome enrichment and assurance of religious faith. Simply to take the "facts" as they stand in the realm of modern religious thinking brings bewilderment; for there are so many "varieties of religious experience" clamoring for attention that it is difficult for one to know what to do unless some reliable means of criticizing experience is at hand. There must be some principles established by which we may judge doctrines.

This has, indeed, been the task of theology in the past. It has distinguished true doctrine from heresy, and has furnished a guide for the perplexed. The way in which it has been done has been to establish the possibility of an appeal to some super-empirical standard with divine authority. The question must now be raised whether this way of guiding the religious beliefs of men is actually the best if we wish to bring about "efficiency" in the proclamation of the gospel.

There can be no doubt that it is highly efficient for perhaps the majority of church-goers. Religious education has ordinarily meant learning from the Bible what one ought to believe. Thus a preacher who validates what he has to say by the appeal to revelation is sure to feed the souls of all who have not been affected by the newer movements of our age.

But we ought not to blind ourselves to the fact that to meet the needs of untroubled minds is only a part of the pastor's work. One of the perplexing aspects of the modern minister's task is due to the presence of many earnest men and women who are not edified by the traditional attitude. If we characterize this group by the name which has been supplied by the Roman Catholic church—Modernism—it becomes evident that in so far as a church follows the example of Catholicism, and insists on the exclusive authority of the older standards, it actually cuts itself off from the possibility of

efficient ministry to large numbers of people naturally in its communion. The appeal to a super-empirical authority means an attitude of hostility toward all types of religious thinking which do not conform to the one standard thus erected. However successful such an exclusive policy may be for those who still live under the domination of the mediaeval way of thinking, we can hardly give our unqualified approval to a theology which was compelled to drive from the church such men as Loisy and Tyrrell.

In Protestantism we are having distressing evidence of the evils due to retaining this appeal to authority in theology. It is responsible for the attitude of hostility and of exclusiveness existing between different sects; for each denomination insists that its particular polity and its particular usages and beliefs are divinely authorized. Justification is thus found for a sectarian zeal which actually harms the cause of Christianity. Can it be said to be an "efficient" ministry which divides the meager Protestant population of a small town into several poverty-stricken churches able to support pastors only on such beggarly terms that really adequate preaching becomes impossible? So long as the notion of guarding intact the "faith once delivered" is retained, we shall have a situation in which the church frankly gives up the attempt to minister to the needs of those whose experience is not promoted by the particular type of theology which alone is declared to be "authoritative." The minister who knows of no other way of expressing religious aspirations and beliefs will find himself again and again baffled and confuted by the religious ideas of intelligent men and women in the community who have learned to think out their Christian ideals in terms for which the traditional theology provides no vocabulary. This means a decided narrowing of the minister's field of service. It is a standing reproach to our Christianity today that so many of our most intelligent and high-minded young men and women are convinced that there is no positive place for them in churches which bear an orthodox name, and that their conviction is reinforced when they find so many ministers actually incapable of understanding their personal religious problems. An efficient ministry must surely mean the ability to meet the needs of

these men and women, as well as the needs of those who do their thinking in terms of orthodox doctrine.

But in attempting to make this adjustment, it should always be remembered that an out and out "liberal" theology may be just as exclusive as an out and out "traditional" theology. As a matter of fact, we are living through a transition period in our religious thinking. Almost never in the history of Christianity has the minister been confronted with such a heterogeneous "social mind" as that which greets him from a typical congregation of today. To speak of religion in such a way as to bring edification and conviction to all alike is a difficult undertaking. Can the department of systematic theology furnish any help in the solution of this pressing problem?

The primary essential to success here is an appreciation of the fact that there are "varieties of religious experience," proving their right to exist by their power to satisfy men's needs. But when we have stated this fact, we have not yet reached the root of the matter. What is needed is an understanding of the reasons *why* such varieties exist, and *why* under certain circumstances one type of theology is adequate where under different circumstances a changed form of doctrine would be imperative. A Roman Catholic would be utterly impotent in his endeavors to influence a Modernist, if he did not understand the reasons for the existence of Modernism. To do as was done in the famous papal encyclical—viz., to ascribe the movement to "curiosity" and to "pride"—means to evoke from all who are in sympathy with Modernism only an amused pity for the provincialism of mind there exhibited. An adequate understanding of any type of religious thinking is absolutely indispensable to one who proposes to have anything to do with the shaping of the ideals of men who adhere to that type. The man whose notions of the nature of religion are derived from the study of one particular system, which he regards as the sole divinely accredited one, is hopelessly incapacitated for any such sympathetic appreciation of the religious needs of our present complex age as will lead to an efficient ministry.

The first task of the department of systematic theology, then, is

to inculcate such a breadth of view as shall make possible the elimination of a narrowly parochial conception of religious life and belief. The older conception of theology as a single system of divinely authorized truth required that the first task be that of establishing the divinity of the norm to be used. But the conception of theology as an infinitely adaptable means of bringing to expression the religious convictions of human hearts demands that the first task shall be the understanding of what is involved in this flexible process of historical evolution by which the interesting story of religion comes to take objective form. In other words, where the traditional theology would begin by establishing a theory of revelation, so that the truths of the system might be properly validated, the modern theologian must begin with a historical understanding of the religion which he is to expound. The history of religious belief must take the place in the curriculum formerly occupied by a theory of inspiration. The introduction to the study of Christian theology must be the actual knowledge of the history of the Christian religion rather than the establishment of a theory concerning the nature of the literature in which we have the records of biblical religion. This being done, the determination of Christian doctrine will be continuous with the historical appreciation of the Christian religion, exactly as in traditional theology the determination of doctrine has been continuous with the theory of inspiration which constituted the introduction.

I cannot here discuss in detail the matter of method involved in this apprehension of the task of theology. In a previous article in this journal I attempted to outline the task of systematic theology from this point of view.¹ I am here concerned to ask how the work of the department should be organized and how it may be conducted so as to aid the minister to an effectual presentation of the Christian message.

I. THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINE

There is serious danger that the student in a modern seminary may become confused if there is not a proper correlation between the

¹ "The Task and Method of Systematic Theology," *American Journal of Theology*, XIV, No. 2 (April, 1910), pp. 215ff.

work of the biblical and historical departments and the department of constructive theology. We are so dominated by the conception of a single authorized system of belief, that it is quite easy to retain in our treatment of theology certain presuppositions and methods which are in contradiction to the methods and presuppositions of the work of the other departments. The particular temptation of the theologian is to follow the traditional method of settling a question by a "Thus it is written." To have established that a given doctrine is biblical has been for centuries accepted as a sufficient guaranty. Instead of searching for the deeper reasons for holding a conviction, theologians have too often felt that external validation was sufficient, and have devoted themselves to the practical task of giving an exegesis of the idea provided by revelation.

Now in the departments of biblical theology and church history the historical method of giving to events and beliefs a genetic explanation has come to prevail. Consequently, when the student in these departments comes into the presence of a doctrine, he learns to explain it by discovering what function it performed in helping men of a given age to meet certain problems of the age. The value of the doctrine is thus derived from a broad and sympathetic understanding of the aspirations and perplexities of men in the time when the doctrine came to be felt to be of supreme importance. One learns to become enthusiastic for belief just because of a sympathetic understanding of the conditions of human experience in relation to historical data. There is thus secured a vivid realization of the vitality and intimate power of religion in the life of men at epochs in the distant past. If this attitude is not carried over into the department of systematic theology, if the student here is allowed to be satisfied with a mere external validation of doctrine, the content of the theology which he is to preach today will inevitably seem more formal and less vitally significant than was the content of the theology of some ancient time. But if once a minister gains this attitude, he becomes merely the priest of an established order. The prophetic spirit, which sees large significance in the present, disappears.

Now it cannot be denied that there is still much of this inherited

feeling concerning the sufficiency of an external validation. Doubtless many students of the Bible employ critical methods in their historical exegesis, who all the time think that when the processes of criticism are complete we shall be able to take from the Bible the "essentials" of Christianity and to present these essentials in deductive fashion as truths authorized by the Scriptures. Are we not constantly being urged to hurry up with the processes of critical study so that we may arrive at the "assured results" of criticism, it being assumed that these "assured results" may serve as the objective starting-point of a new dogmatics which in method shall not be dissimilar to the old? In so far as the student is permitted to retain any such conception of theology, he will inevitably be satisfied with a scholastic explanation of his beliefs instead of linking them to the actual life of which he is a part, and to which he must minister. The department of systematic theology must make impossible any such divorce between the attitude assumed in the historical study of the Bible and the attitude assumed in the formulation of doctrine. To see in the Bible an interpretation of supremely significant human experience in the one department, and to use it as a mere source-book of doctrine in another department means to destroy the unity of theological education, and worse than this, by isolating theology from the history of religion, it tends to induce a formalism which cannot further the welfare of the church.

The teacher of theology can, of course, assume that the detailed historical work has been done in the other departments. It is not his task to repeat the history which has already been made familiar. That is, he is not to repeat it as mere *history*. He can scarcely expound his subject without constantly referring to the historical achievements of the race whenever these illustrate his theme and reveal the nature of his problem. But his attitude toward history is conditioned by the nature of his special task. The fact that Isaiah or Paul held this or that belief is to him secondary to the question as to the meaning of the belief in the life of the man who uttered it and in the life of those to whom he addressed himself. The historian has to establish the exact facts and to set these in genetic relations. The theologian takes history as it has been expounded by experts, and uses it as a well-equipped laboratory of

human experiments, where he may find the particular kind of experiment which he needs in order to understand the particular problem before him. The historian is bound to set forth those events which occurred within the limits of the period of time set by the definition of his course. He cannot select only the particular experiments in religious life and the particular beliefs which are especially pertinent to modern problems. But the theologian selects his material according to the exigencies of his theme, not according to the demands of chronological continuity. In all this, however, he is dependent upon the historian for the exact research and the general knowledge of the times essential to a proper valuation of historical forms of belief.

But in this selection of material for the special purpose of illuminating the problems of theology, the utmost care should be exercised to prevent the incursion of a method and a point of view inconsistent with that of the historical departments. Probably the most important outcome of the application of the historical method in the realms of biblical literature and in church history is the discovery that former generations have misread the literature in question because the exclusive point of view inculcated by centuries of dogmatic prepossessions had entered into the work of the historians. In the Old Testament we have learned that the religion of Israel cannot be isolated from the general movements of politics and of culture which were abroad. The positive contributions of what would once have been excluded as "pagan" sources are now recognized in the evolution of Hebrew thought. Thus it is no longer possible to think of the Old Testament theology as a "pure" form of religious thinking, so that it can be used as a norm by which to distinguish a "true" from a "false" theology. Indeed, such a variety of theologies arose during the thousand or more years covered by the literature of the Old Testament, that the careful student finds in that literature an amazingly rich and fruitful field for the investigation of religion under widely varying circumstances. To attempt to isolate any one type as an absolute norm is extremely difficult.

What is true of the Old Testament is also true of the New. Scholars here are ceasing to draw any sharp line between "sacred"

and "profane" literature. In order to gain an adequate understanding of the New Testament, we are compelled to take into consideration the information furnished by all available sources from which we may learn the aspects of life in the first century. The apocalyptic literature of contemporary Judaism has within the past twenty years been used to help in interpreting early Christian thought, and has compelled men to ask new and searching questions concerning the real meaning of some of the crucial words and phrases of the New Testament. Today we are seeing the beginnings of a wider use of gentile sources, and are realizing how impossible it is to do justice to the New Testament if we continue to isolate it from the total life of the age in which it took its rise. The little information which we possess concerning the religious aspirations and practices of the oriental redemption-cults of the first century is already leading us to question whether we have hitherto adequately understood what was in the heart of the apostle Paul. In order to understand the New Testament, it is imperative that we shall take a wider view of the origins of the religious beliefs recorded therein. But when this wider view of the matter is once attained, it makes impossible the simple isolation of the New Testament as an all-sufficient compendium of Christian doctrine.

The upshot of the matter is this. If it be true that the theology of the Bible cannot be rightly understood apart from the total historical process in which it stands as a part, it is equally imperative that we should not isolate systematic theology from the historical process in which it should stand. The attempt to guide the formulations of religious convictions by the use of norms which are formally external is made impossible by a more accurate understanding of the history of our religion. There is no way in which to determine what ought to be believed save the pathway of careful and critical examination of religious problems and the endeavor to think things through in the light of all that we know about the history of religious beliefs and all that we can learn from present experience. It is only as the appeal to a formal and external norm shall be eliminated that theology can be constructed in living contact with the needs of the age. It is only as historical continuity shall be preserved through an actual appreciation of the meaning of

history that the momentum gained from the past can be carried over into the present.

The above considerations make it seem desirable that the study of the history of doctrine shall be carried on under the direction of the department of systematic theology. Only as a thoroughgoing use shall be made of the results of historical study can the construction of doctrine be undertaken in a wholesome manner. It is true that theology has always made use of the history of doctrine to some extent; but too often it has been merely for the purpose of classifying beliefs so that they should appear as either "orthodox" or "heretical." If historical doctrines were to be treated in this fashion by the theologian, it would be imperative to correct this mechanical view by asking the department of history to expound matters in true perspective. But if the department of systematic theology shall heartily adopt the historical attitude, there are good reasons why it should deal with the history of doctrine. I am aware that this is a departure from the usual alignment; but it finds a precedent in the custom of assigning the history of philosophy to the department of philosophy rather than to the department of history in our universities. Such an assignment has the great advantage of compelling the man whose business it is to formulate theories concerning ultimate realities to take account of the historical conditions of human thinking. It will tend to correct any tendency to adopt abstract and formal methods of settling questions. There can be no doubt as to the humanizing effects of such a correlation of philosophical work with the record of the strivings of the human soul after the truth.

Indeed, there can be no more effective means of bringing the student face to face with the inevitable conditions of successful theologizing than to trace the way in which, in answer to the stimulus of great experiences, men of deep insight wrought out the answers to the questions which men are always asking. As has been said, the proper appreciation of history furnishes a vast human laboratory in which the necessary experiments may be observed so as to induce skill in the diagnosis of a theological problem. We can watch men as they apprehend the problem; we can see where they obtained the material which they built into the

system; we can see whether the resulting doctrine was successful or not, and can discern the causes of its success or its failure. We can observe how in religious warfare misunderstanding and misrepresentation easily arise if the combatants are not more than usually conscientious. Out of this study of the history of doctrine come certain results which are of great value, and which can scarcely be obtained in any other way.

In the first place, there is developed the capacity for accurately understanding a doctrine which is alien to one's present mode of thinking. When, by historical analysis, one gets behind the scenes, as it were, one discovers precious interests in many a seemingly barren controversy. It is easy to do injustice to a position which one does not himself hold. Perhaps there is no more damaging characteristic than for a minister of the gospel to be guilty of serious misrepresentation of some cause or some doctrine which he is combating. When men discover, as they are likely to discover sooner or later, that a dogmatically minded minister does not know what he is talking about as he engages in denunciation of some enemy to the faith, the discovery is sure to undermine confidence in the work of men who ought to be examples of truthfulness in the community which they serve. The practice which is gained in the attempt to state accurately some historical doctrine will serve to enable the minister to exercise the same spirit of accuracy in his dealings with present issues.

Again, such historical study will make the student acquainted with many varieties of religious experience, and will compel him sympathetically to appreciate many forms of belief which he himself does not hold. If this historical work is thoroughly done, it is the best possible preparation for a ministry of wide sympathies. It will enable one to listen appreciatively to the perplexities of a man whose religious point of view is different from that of the minister. It will enable the pastor to remember that doctrine finds its justification in its ability to help men find God; that if one form of doctrine does not do this, some different approach to the goal must be discovered. It will bring to light the fact that religion itself is a deeper and more unifying basis of fellowship than doctrinal agreement. A sympathetic student of history will probably be able to

say that if he had lived at the Nicene period he would have felt that great issues were at stake, and would have enlisted in the fight for what he believed to be the truth. But he will see that the very terms in which the Nicene theologians did their thinking are foreign to us today; and he will not fall into the mistake of supposing that the inability to affirm the theology of Athanasius necessarily means a total lack of the kind of religious aspiration which impelled that mighty defender of the faith.

In brief, a historical introduction to the study of doctrine will give to one such a sympathetic understanding of orthodoxy that it will remove the temptation to which much modern thought is prone, viz., that of failing to discover the real religious vitality underneath theological expressions which seem formal. Thus in contrast to the exclusive attitude of the minister whose point of view is dogmatic rather than historical, a man whose approach to the construction of doctrine has been such as has been here indicated will be enabled by this very method of approach to enter into the religious life and the actual problems of many types of experience, and will realize that no form of doctrine can be efficient unless it actually helps men to find a satisfying and an uplifting answer to the questions which come from the depths of the soul.

2. THE CONSTRUCTIVE TASK OF FORMULATING DOCTRINE

Important as is this historical appreciation of the story of the development of our Christian faith, it is, of course, only preliminary to the fundamental task of formulating beliefs for today in such persuasive shape that they shall serve to commend to men the realities which they undertake to interpret. In this task of constructive dogmatics, it is of primary importance that the theologian shall constantly remember that his doctrinal formulae are subordinate to the aim of making the realities with which he is dealing seem *real*. The most splendid logical completeness cannot atone for an impression of unreality. The history of doctrine properly studied ought to have opened the student's eyes to the fact that one needs to get behind formal statements in order to apprehend the real essence of religious belief. Indeed, it has often happened that a comparatively crude and vulnerable theology has

displaced some intellectually more respectable system just because the former, in spite of its defects, did allow men to feel a sense of genuineness, while the latter seemed formal and made the objects of faith seem distant and inaccessible.

This task of formulating a vital theology is peculiarly difficult in our day. Almost never in the history of Christianity has there been so radical and revolutionary an alteration of the conditions of religious thinking as in the generation now passing. It is no exaggeration to say that precisely those people whose thoughtfulness and conscientious intelligence are imperatively needed in the work of the church are very likely to be aware that for them the older type of theology has lost its convincing power. But they are also painfully aware that as yet nothing of a strong positive character has come to take its place. One reason why more fruitful constructive results have not appeared is because theologians have not yet come to feel at home in the use of the inductive method. Too frequently the appeal of the modern man is met with a method which fails to face squarely the eager questioning which is the first step toward vital faith. The subtle temptation to "harmonize" contradictory elements by clever analogies, so that new meaning may be read into old words and the semblance of an unchanging theology may be retained, is all too frequently yielded to. It may be that for a time this attempt to pour new wine into old bottles was best for the church. We may perhaps in the future be grateful for the conservatism which delayed the crisis in religious reconstruction until confidence in a better method of reconstruction could be established. But the time has come when the dangers of such adaptations of old words to new meanings are evident. We are rapidly becoming accustomed to the application of the method of empirical analysis as the most effective way of securing conviction. Think, for example, of the direct means of arousing a sense of real responsibility which is employed in the great exhibitions, where photographs and statistics and models and moving pictures are used to make it all seem *real*. One who attended such an exposition as that held recently in Chicago to set forth the problems of child welfare was made suddenly aware that the thousands who thronged the Coliseum were unconsciously being trained to value the method

of a direct facing of the facts as the best way in which to come to their conclusions. As this method becomes more widely used and more familiar, it is bound to make any exposition which proceeds in less direct fashion seem artificial.

Now the theologian who retains the traditional feeling that his first business is to defend an authorized system of doctrine is incapable of adopting this direct method of investigating the facts. Constantly there is in the forefront of his thinking the sense of a duty to conserve the system. In so far as this feeling is uppermost it is impossible for him to appreciate the exact nature of the religious crisis which we are called upon to meet today. It is not a difficult task to discover plausible arguments by which willing minds may be made to feel that they can affirm a traditional doctrine without mental dishonesty. But such smoothing of doctrinal obstacles is not conducive to a vigorous theology. The great beliefs of Christianity have not been formed by any such pleasant method. They have been wrested from the situation through agony of spirit. It should not be the work of the department of systematic theology to lull the waking spirit by smoothly phrased formulae containing carefully premeditated ambiguities. Unless the minister shall have reached the point where he is willing to ask any questions which may be necessary in order to discover the truth, he can never be efficient in an age which is more and more becoming accustomed to asking for the facts.

The first task of the department, then, is to analyze the problems of theology in so honest and thoroughgoing a fashion that the student shall know that he is dealing with reality and not with mere doctrines. Indeed, the teacher of theology ought to open all critical questions in so fundamental a form that the student shall himself feel the agony of uncertainty which is so prevalent in our day. To save those who are to be the leaders of the church from such radical questioning is to do them doubtful service. There are many ministers in active work today, whose best energies in the prime of their life have been absorbed in wrestling with questions which they have been obliged to face, but which they were prevented from facing in their student days by the well-meant but unfortunate zeal of their teachers in preventing radical investiga-

tions from being considered. A student has a right to demand that the department of theology shall give to him so thoroughly critical an examination of the grounds and the nature of religious beliefs that he shall not find after entering active service in the world that other men have really gone deeper into the matter than did his teacher in the seminary. It is not a bad thing to jeopardize one's comfortable sense of assurance by the discovery that it costs something to get the truth in theology as well as in other realms. Those who have passed through the deep waters of doubt and have emerged with a faith earned by bitter struggle are grateful for the enrichment of life and the increase of power which comes from just such an experience. It is not the business of the department to make preaching easier in a superficial way, by furnishing ready-made material which may be directly transmuted into sermons. A year or two of preaching on this basis would soon exhaust the material. Indeed, the preaching of certain sorts of sermon will be made more difficult by the work which the student does in the department of theology. For the glib exposition of doctrines which have been simply externally validated will become impossible. Only what has passed through one's own experience and has become one's own personal possession will one feel warranted in proclaiming to men; for only so can one convince them of the *reality* of the message.

Having analyzed the problems of theology in such a way that the real issues may be seen, the department is then to help the students to find adequate formulation for the beliefs which belong to a Christian experience. Much help, of course, will come from those great souls in the past who have become leaders of theological thinking. The deep underlying realities which found expression in the creeds of the church will be duly appreciated and distinguished from the more or less adequate language in which they were expounded. The meaning of traditional doctrines will of course be sympathetically set forth.

But after all, the construction of religious convictions today must take into account the facts of our modern world, with its belief in the uniformity of law in contrast to the older belief in miraculous interventions; with its consciousness of the ceaseless evolution of

all things in the place of the older conception of finished creations; with its outlook on an indefinite future history of this world in the place of the older expectation of a sudden catastrophic ending; with its growing confidence in the possibility of the scientific control of the conditions of life, in the place of the older attitude of helpless dependence on forces out of human control; with its confident faith in the natural power of man to achieve ideals of goodness, in the place of the older belief in human inability; with its consciousness of the intimate unity of the spiritual and the physical in our experience, in the place of the older belief in a "soul" with an independent existence of its own; with its growing certainty that all historic religions are positively but only relatively valuable, in the place of the older conviction that only a given form of the Christian religion was true, while all others were false; with its honest agnosticism concerning things out of reach of any empirical testing, in the place of the older assumption as to the reality of angels and devils in heaven and hell; and with its feeling that tentative working hypotheses which may be altered as new discoveries warrant it are really more likely to keep close to the truth than are doctrines which lay claim to finality of any sort.

The recognition of these characteristic notes of modern experience will inevitably make significant modifications of the older doctrines. The important point is that these changes should be so understood that the theologian can set them forth as positive enrichments of our religious thinking. Such an appreciation of the significance of the changes in religious thought is possible if the work of analyzing the problems of religious thinking has been honestly done. And a theology which can appeal to verifiable facts of human experience can always command a sense of assurance and will minister positively to religious life for that reason.

But it should not be forgotten that every minister will have in his parish men and women who have not been touched by these modern doubts and perplexities. While it is probably true that such a critical study as has been suggested will naturally lead to some kind of a "new theology," this new theology must not lead the minister to take an exclusive and polemic attitude. His very historical training will have enabled him to appreciate positively a

theological attitude which he himself does not hold. He can, therefore, constantly in his preaching and in his conversation, illustrate profound aspects of religious life by interpreting the significance of doctrines in such a way as to evoke in the hearts of those who hold the traditional viewpoint a genuine access of religious emotion, and a strengthening of the will. He can then put by the side of this illustration one taken from a different type of theology and can thus satisfy the needs of those who must think in different categories. Thus he can practically edify divergent types of men and at the same time teach religious breadth of sympathy. Such a catholic use of doctrine is possible when one has once come to see that theology has its functional office, which may be easily comprehended, while its ontological validity may constitute a complicated critical problem. Underneath different types of religious belief the trained theologian can detect the great fundamental fact of the meeting of the human soul with God. To bring to light this actual contact of man with God is the business of the preacher. His material for thus stimulating religious life is immensely enlarged if he has learned to construct his beliefs with a proper understanding of historical doctrines and by the method of directly facing the facts. If the critical investigations of modern problems have been thorough, the preacher will so understand the reasons for the modern religious unrest that he can minister with sympathy and intelligence to all who need his counsel. He can show to distrustful minds the positive and constructive aim that is behind much that is new; he can reveal to those who have become impatient of traditional restraints the actual values embodied in the doctrines which had seemed devoid of vital meaning; he can help conservative and liberal alike to ask the fundamental questions which must be faced, so as to unite them in a common quest for reality.

In short, the primary aim of the department of systematic theology must be to furnish the student with a method of working out his problems which will enable him to cope with the difficulties which he must meet in the modern world. One whose sole means of assuring himself of the truth of his doctrines is some external validation is smitten with dismay as he meets the bold challenge of our critical sciences, which respect no authority save the authority

of verified facts. But one who himself has learned to face every question in the critical spirit is armed for the encounter. To shift the basis of religious assurance from the authority of a ready-made system to the spirit of confidence in the outcome of honest and critical investigation is of more importance than to inculcate this or that doctrine. To admit the tentative character of one's theological conclusions is perhaps a desirable trait in this transitional age. For it would be a pity to crystallize too quickly a form of doctrine which might speedily need further revision.

3. THE APOLOGETIC DEFENSE OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

It is somewhat difficult to define accurately the task of the third division of our department—that of apologetics. Traditionally it has meant the defense of the Christian system of doctrine as a final form of supernaturally revealed truth. But this conception of apologetics is impossible if we define theology in such a way as to preclude the possibility of defending any system as final, and if we recognize the legitimacy of the critical and historical explanation of the origin of religion so that we are unable to locate a supernatural source of doctrines. The apologetic of our day is in danger of proving an actual damage rather than a help to religion, if it seeks to retain the conception of a "final" or "absolute" system of doctrine. There is altogether too much of the spirit which thinks that a great gain has been made for religion if the first chapters of Genesis are "harmonized" with geology, if it be shown that a landslide might have occurred to block up the Jordan valley so as to let the Israelites across to Jericho, and that a convenient earthquake may have shaken down the walls when the invading hosts blew on their trumpets. In all such attempts there is a conspicuous absence of a single-minded desire to know precisely the truth, and an equally conspicuous willingness to snatch at any straw which will help to keep one's predetermined conclusion from sinking beneath the waves of criticism. It is true that these attempts have a soothing effect on the minds of those who are not in need of any apologetic because they have not been led to question matters profoundly. But a man who actually knows geology will be hopelessly alienated by the utterances of a harmonizer who is so ready to stretch both

geological facts and exegetical principles in the interest of his harmonization.

The only apologetic position which can gain the respect of men today must be one which abandons the attempt to defend at all costs a predetermined system. It must rather put at the service of religion that spirit of truth-seeking and that method of ascertaining the facts which alone can command final confidence.

Thus modern apologetics is not primarily a defense of doctrine. It is primarily concerned with the rights of the religious life to produce doctrine adequate to the promotion of genuine religious experience. If the permanent and essential place of religion in human history can be vindicated, we may be sure that religion will always be competent to construct such working hypotheses as are necessary to its welfare. To discover, then, the unquestionable facts of religious life, and vindicate the rights of this life to organize itself into doctrinal and institutional form constitutes the primary task of apologetics.

But every religious man must live in relation to the many interests of life. The theories which he constructs for his guidance in the theological realm cannot be kept asunder from the theories which he constructs in other realms. Theology, therefore, must come to terms with the scientific and philosophical theories which are current. It is the task of apologetics to show the relations between religious theories and the other aspects of our total life, to indicate wherein either science or philosophy becomes unscientific in unwarranted opposition to religious ideas, and to show equally wherein theology is unscientific where it incurs the justifiable reproaches of science or of philosophy. In this way apologetics seeks to discover and to maintain the rights of religion. But it seeks to base those rights on the unquestionable facts of experience. Thus apologetics may require the modification or even the abandonment of elements of the traditional system, if these are found upon critical inquiry to be indefensible. On the other hand, by a more profound analysis of human experience, it may show how superficial are some of the attacks on Christian doctrines which are made by those who have no adequate knowledge of the real meaning of either doctrine or of religious life. The courses in apologetics

will, therefore, serve to furnish the point of view and the method by which the doctrines of the Christianity of a given age may be defended against superficial criticism, and may be shown to be the result of a truth-seeking effort to interpret unquestionable facts of human experience.

Such in brief should be the aim of the department of systematic theology in a modern divinity school. Its purpose is to prepare men to speak with confidence the message of religion to men in our modern age. It should base its message on the study of historical Christianity, and give an appreciative understanding of the past out of which we have come, and from which we inherit our main religious convictions. It should seek so to interpret the past as to prevent it from exercising a tyranny over the present; but it should constantly remind seekers after truth that historical human experience is at the same time the best and the most accessible source for understanding how and why doctrines are constructed. It should recognize the transition character of the present age, and seek to outline a method which shall enable every man to formulate his own convictions positively, while at the same time acquiring the power sympathetically to appreciate the significance of convictions which differ from his own. In the advanced courses in systematic theology and in the department of apologetics it should aim to present the problems of theology in so thorough a way that one may become an expert critic of the doubt and opposition to Christian doctrine which are current. With the preparation thus attained, ministers ought actually to be able to lead in the present task of theological reconstruction, and to win the respect which the world is only too glad to give to those who are competent to take the position of expert leadership.

THE TREND IN THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

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Any reader of the present generation who is at all familiar with the treatments of church history given by writers of earlier generations, even of our own, must have been struck by a general sameness of attitude, by an identity of tone, that colors them all. Not so much that they are colored by partisanship, although that is true enough, but by something more fundamental. They produce an impression of a certain detachedness; one feels that the treatment fails to make proper points of contact with the evolution of society as a whole. The history of Christianity and the church is considered, in and of itself alone, as a religion and an institution that have been revealed by God. Originating in this special and fore-ordained manner, the history of the church is to be treated differently from that of an ordinary institution; it is more alone, and apart by itself. In short, the conviction grows, as one historian has very well remarked, that the church has been treated *in a vacuum*. This, at all events, is the feeling that comes to the secular historian, the man who has been trained in the methods and point of view of history and who has been used to applying these methods in the study of the whole of history. Furthermore, the discovery that this attitude has perpetuated itself in the treatments of church history written in the present century may come to him with something of a shock. For he has the habit of looking at things from the evolutionary point of view; this has become so much a habit that it is hard at first to realize that these ideas have not yet also permeated the study and writing of church history. But, on reflection, it is easy to see why the case should be otherwise with church history than with the whole field of which it is only a branch.

We are confronted by a survival. There has perpetuated itself,

if not in full force, at least clearly, a point of view that has dominated the writing and study of church history from its birth. It is inherent in the conception of Christianity, as a religion revealed by God to man, and in the conception of the church itself. There has been no greater or more compelling conception in the history of the world than this idea of the church of God, a conception evolved by the Jews and appropriated by the Christians. The people of Jahveh, the chosen people, the church of God, the fulfillment of prophecy, the hand of Providence and of God in history. It is this idea which dominates the church fathers, the earliest writers of church history. Under its influence have been written the earliest works dealing with the history of the church, and under its influence, too, have been written the great majority of the works dealing with church history that have appeared later. Nor was church history alone dominated by this conception of providence. Through the whole field of history was traced the guiding hand of God. For this interpretation of history was brought in by the triumph of Christianity, and by the dominant influence it, through the church, exercised on intellectual life. The lines along which the ecclesiasticizing of history were to progress are marked out by Augustine and Orosius. From this bondage the study of secular history began to set itself free when the great currents which began visibly stirring in the twelfth century made themselves increasingly felt at the time of the Renaissance. With the growth in numbers and influence of an educated lay class the domination of the church in intellectual matters was steadily broken down. All the intellectual disciplines profited by this emancipation, history among them. Since that time, the evolution in the methods and points of view of the study and writing of history has been more or less constant. From time to time, new and suggestive points of view for the interpretation of the past have made themselves felt, and the discipline has developed, has become conscious of its methods; but while the discipline of the larger field has been altering itself in this way, that of the narrower field of church history, being relatively conservative, has lagged behind. It has, however, only lagged; it has not remained stationary. For in it, too, is to be noted a gradual change of attitude.

The characteristic of this gradual change has been a tendency to approximate to the attitude taken by that of contemporary secular historians. This alteration of attitude is due in part to changes in the conception of the church, like that brought about by the Reformation. It is due in part, in large part, to the development of improved methods and new points of view in the study of secular history, and the gradual recognition of these points of view and methods by the theological writers of church history. It is due, also, to the steadily increasing amount of attention given by secular historians to the subject of the church. In other words, just as the broader field of history itself has been since the Renaissance resecularized, so, in turn, has the discipline of church history been undergoing a process of secularization. A brief summary of the noteworthy steps in this process will provide us with the best method of approach to this study of the activities of scholars now living, a study which it is the special object of this article to make. To this summary, then, let us turn, for a moment.¹

As with history itself, so also with church history are the beginnings of change connected with the period of Renaissance. It is in the atmosphere of the Renaissance that the leaders of the Reformation drew their inspiration and training for their attack on the intellectual dominance of the church. And from the nature of the case, they were forced constantly to appeal to history. Thence they derived their ammunition for their attack, to it they constantly appealed. Not that the attitude of the great mass of the reformers was a genuinely historical one; they did not turn to the past with the idea of finding out what had been the truth. Of this attitude only two rather isolated figures, Erasmus and Casaubon, stand out as champions. But their influence was relatively slight, compared with that of the men whose appeal was to feeling rather than to reason. Nevertheless, Luther and the other leaders of the Reformation did a great work for the study of church history. Under the influence of the religious feeling and through a study of the

¹ For a very suggestive article that throws much light on this subject see A. C. Headlam, "Methods of Early Church History," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XIV, 1, 31. Compare also Richard Fester, "Die Säkularisation der Historie," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, XI (1908), 441-59; and the still more general sketch by Langlois, *Manuel de bibliographie historique* (1901-4), 241-347.

sources, they had reached the idea that the church of that day was not necessarily the one founded by Christ. When they were led to denying that Peter had been in any way especially marked out by Christ as founder of the church, they were led to a different notion of the church of God; to a wider idea, to a feeling that the conception in Christ's mind was different, less narrowly confined, wider than had been held up to that time. Once persuaded of this, the whole development up to their own time was thrown open to a hostile criticism which resulted in a great change in the whole attitude toward the history of the church, from primitive times to the sixteenth century. As a result of this new attitude toward the history of the church, the amount of attention given to the study of its past has enormously increased. Not only did the Protestants turn to history to show that their contention was right, and that that of their opponents was wrong, but the Catholics also. This activity was beneficial and a gain for historical truth. For it at least brought men more and more in contact with the sources and resulted in the publication of an enormous amount of original material. But of course these treatments were highly colored by partisanship, and were rather narrowly confined in their interests; for both Catholic and Protestant the great matter was dogma. They thus tended to be dominated by a narrow conception of that in which the historical development of an institution consists.

Thus with the attainment of a new point of view, with a changed conception of what the church was, men were led to study its history in a manner more nearly akin to that in which the secular historians were studying subjects of secular history.

Along the lines marked out by the great exponents of the position of the Protestants, namely, the writers of the *Centuries*, and by the great Catholic protagonist Baronius, the main stream of activity flowed. Nor did the remainder of the seventeenth century nor the first half of the eighteenth see any notable advance made in the point of view from which the study of the church was approached. Not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century do we come upon a notable contribution in this line, suggestive of a new point of view from which to approach the history of Chris-

tianity and of the church. This contribution is made by a secular historian, a secular work; the historian is the Englishman Gibbon. Approaching the origin of the Christian church from the broad perspective of the history of the Roman Empire, he asks the question: What were the causes of the spread of Christianity? A simple enough question but one impossible for one to ask who took the causes of the spread of Christianity for granted. Here we find Gibbon invading the field of church history with the point of view and method of the secular historian. His treatment of church history, while it met with strong opposition and raised great outcry, nevertheless has made itself felt increasingly in the study of the subject since his date. It is apparently through the agency of Gibbon that the ideas of Erasmus and Casaubon for the first time made any deep impression on the consciousness of the reading and scholarly public, or at least on an important proportion of it. From the time of Gibbon on, we may say that it was increasingly impossible for any writer on the subject to treat the growth of Christianity quite in the old unreal way. Gibbon's contribution marks an effective step toward removing the study of church history from the vacuum in which it had so long flourished.

The two generations that followed Gibbon are characterized in the field of secular history by the notable advances in method, associated particularly with the names of Niebuhr and Ranke. It is the period in which the discipline becomes conscious of its methods, in which its principles are worked out and formulated into a system—the principles particularly of external and internal criticism. Following this movement in time, though intimated by men who are almost absolute contemporaries of Ranke, come two movements which may be called epoch-making movements in the study and writing of church history. These movements are associated with two groups of scholars—one an English and the other a German group. The latter, if not the former, may be said to represent a conquest, or perhaps more accurately a partial conquest, of theologically trained students of church history by the ideas and methods that were coming to the fore among secular historians. The schools with which these ideas are intimately

connected were, in Germany, Baur and the Tübingen school; in England, Keble, Pusey, Newman, and the Oxford school.

Through the men of the Oxford Movement had come a notion of the church different from that held by contemporary orthodox Protestantism. They had begun to feel that the conception of the Protestants was itself as wrong in its way as the Protestants had thought that of the orthodox Catholics in the sixteenth century had been. When Newman, therefore, went to a study of the records of the early church, he turned to them with a bias to be sure, but with a bias different from that of everyone who had preceded him. As a result the sources appeared in a new light to him, revealing a new world of thought and ideas. There he found Catholicism revealed and with him the world was astonished to find that the historical method which they had thought Rome's worst enemy had much to say for her. It put the whole problem in a different perspective when he made the statement that Catholicism could never have developed out of modern Protestantism. This really led directly to the question, "How did Christianity originate?" and constitutes an enormous advance over the previous attitude toward the subject.

But it was left for Baur to formulate the problem in these words. It was Baur who first brought strongly to people's attention the question, "How did it happen?" This was a decided advance over the position of Gibbon, who inquired merely the cause of the spread of Christianity. Gibbon's question and work made a great break in the ice, but Baur goes further and asks, "How did Christianity itself happen?" This throws the whole Christian movement into the alembic. Thus the origin of Christianity and the spread of the church were put on a par with any other historical events. This was the great contribution of Baur. Nor can we fail to notice in this question an echo of Ranke's famous description of the historian's function, as being the effort to determine how any event in the past actually happened.

The influence of Baur's ideas are seen in Renan, in whom came to expression the fruitful idea that Christianity was greatly influenced by its environment. Renan from the point of view of the

secular historian was a brand plucked from the burning. Having started to acquire training under theological influences, he was repelled by its intellectual atmosphere and sought his training under secular guidance. This training prepared him to appreciate the direction given by Baur to the study of church history. But to this study Renan brought a genius and training much more purely historical than those of Baur. Renan's work taken as a whole is perhaps the most considerable contribution of any one man. When completed it stretched from Hebrew origins and Christian beginnings well nigh through the whole field of church history. With him the connections of ecclesiastical development with that of the evolution of society as a whole were much more fully established than ever before. It is noteworthy, also, that Renan is one of the few if not the first secular historian who, instead of dealing with the church merely in passing, devotes the greater part of his effort to its study. With Renan, then, men come to look into the influence of contemporary institutions, Greek and Roman, upon the development of the church. Along this line, Hatch, of course, made noteworthy contributions.² This we may say is the last great idea which has made itself felt in the systematic presentation of church history.

By this survey, it is seen that, as far as its general attitude is concerned, the study and writing of church history have been brought over onto a similar basis with secular history. It remains to be seen, however, how far in the present generation the implications of Baur's question and attitude have been realized. With what success is church history being studied like any other phenomenon of history? To what extent are the points of view and methods of secular historical students being applied to the study and writing of church history? How nearly complete is the process of seculari-

²The opposition that much of Renan's work aroused is well known. Hatch, it appears, also did not perform his part in the secularizing of church history without inconvenience. According to J. N. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology* (1900), "The late Dr. Edwin Hatch, the one Churchman who in our time has done original and at the same time valid and important service in that field (Christian Origins), appears to have been in a measure positively ostracized in his profession, though the sale of his works show their wide acceptability even within its limits. The corporate interest and organization avail to override unorganized liberalism, there as elsewhere."

zation of the study and writing of church history? To answer these questions two lines of investigation are necessary: In the first place, we must inquire what point of view characterizes the secular students of history; that is, in what regard since the days of Baur have the points of view and methods of secular history developed? In the second place, to what extent are these points of view being applied to church history either by theological students of history or by secular students of history?

No more striking change in the methods of thinking of the historian have been wrought than by the change caused through the spread of the idea of evolution. The point of view of the historian, in common with that of all other thinkers, has been revolutionized by the conception brought forcibly to the attention of the world by LaPlace, Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley, and their successors in the field of experimental science. Yet profoundly as historical thinking has been affected by the process of evolution, even today, its implications have not yet thoroughly permeated the historical thinking and practice. While every discipline has been more or less affected by the conception of evolution, this is particularly true of the sciences that have been born since the evolutionary conception became common property, and perhaps partly because of it, in particular, the sciences of anthropology, sociology, psychology, and religion. These four sciences have already not only almost completely made over our conception of the primitive origins of society, but also have thrown an enormous amount of light on the forces which have been operative in molding the development of society from the beginning to the present day. It would perhaps be impossible to say which of these four sciences has contributed most to our knowledge of society, but it would not be amiss to point out that, at the present, particularly suggestive ideas are coming from psychology and the science of religion. Particularly interesting is it to notice how greater and greater importance is being attributed to the social significance of religion. The whole field of institutions, also, has in the last thirty or forty years increasingly engaged the attention of historians. Their importance for the development of society has been increasingly recognized. Furthermore, in the same period, the two

sciences of geography and economics have suggested yet other points of view for the historian to use in approaching his subject. They have opened up new vistas, new angles of vision for the historian to use in studying and interpreting the phenomena of the past. Of less general significance but of very great importance for the history of classical antiquity and the history of the early church is the increasing amount of attention that is being given to the history of the East and of the oriental nations; that is, of the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Persians. As the result of activities in this direction it is becoming clearer and clearer that the sources of our civilization lie there; and the extent of the debt that we owe to the people of the Nile and of Mesopotamia becomes clearer and clearer. The effect of this increased appreciation of the importance of Eastern origins is to change our point of view toward the Roman Empire itself. It is viewed more and more as only one of several stages in the formation of a Mediterranean state and civilization. The outlines of the great empires that preceded Rome are becoming daily clearer and make more and more evident how rich and how full was the stream of history before it flowed on into the channel provided for it by the Roman political synthesis. So, too, for all movements that figure largely in the Roman Empire must their beginnings be sought in the East.

We must also note as a characteristic of the secular historian of the present generation that, as a matter of course, in studying an institution, he looks at it from all sides; he considers not only how it grows, how it was affected by its environment, but what its significance was, how it affected its environment. For him the only reason for studying a subject at all is because it has some significance, some importance for society. Any study of an institution that stops short of this, or has not this as its ultimate goal, will be bound to appear to him as incomplete and relatively ineffective.

In these ways, then, has the point of view of the historian of the last generation and a half thus broadened since the period of Baur and Renan. So recent, indeed, are many of these new sciences that it is only in the men who are just now at the beginning of their professional career that their full influences are to be traced. The generation of historical students that is now at the height of its

productive power, the men between 45 and 60, received their training in the 70's and 80's, when history had no more than barely won its way into the curriculum as an independent discipline. In its representation, it had hardly outgrown the annalistic period and was of course wholly political. Only the great pioneers of the new social sciences had appeared on the horizon. In so far as the men of middle life have absorbed their ideas into their makeup, it has been by self-education.³

Thus the case stands with the secular historian. Our question now is, How far have these ideas affected the study and writing of church history?

Let us look first at the work being done by theologically trained students, and inquire to what extent the systematic treatments of the whole or large parts of the period of the church in the Roman Empire as distinct from monographic treatments of single aspects are showing a tendency to remake themselves along lines suggested by newer points of view.

Turning to Germany, we find the field occupied to a considerable extent by works that were originally conceived thirty or forty years ago, but which have been reissued in successive editions, either by their first projectors or by continuators. Under such circumstances modifications in treatment can make themselves felt in particular subjects but not easily in the attitude from which the whole subject is approached. It is not, then, in the *Kurtz*, the *Moeller-von-Schubert*, the *Karl Müller*, that we would be most likely to find modern tendencies making themselves most strongly felt. It is rather in the works whose outlines have been more recently laid down, namely in the *Loofs*, *Heussi*, and the *Krüger*, that we could most profitably make our search. Of these, the last, as being not only the one that has most recently made its appearance, but also as showing in itself the clearest evidences of newer tendencies, may best be examined.

At the outset, one is struck by the fact that in the plan and general conception of the work there is no *essential* change from

³ It is interesting to note in this connection how much hard work it has required for even so progressive a student as Professor James Harvey Robertson of Columbia to incorporate these ideas into his historical thinking. Compare his recent book of essays entitled, *The New History*.

that of the great apostolic succession from which it derives. Periods, divisions, paragraphs, present themselves in much the same fashion as in Germany they have since the days of Matthias Flacius and the other Centuriators. The author has not availed himself of the opportunity to break away from stereotyped and rather deadening forms. And with the form goes the general conception of the task, and attitude toward the treatment. If new points of view have found entrance they will affect only details of the treatment.

Evidence of such influence may be found in several places, most notably in the passages dealing with the oriental religions and with the relations of Christianity to its environment. The general importance of eastern origins finds reasonable recognition, as well as the importance of the oriental religions in the history of the Empire. This is an important step toward regarding the first three centuries of the Empire as a great stage in the religious evolution of the Mediterranean people. If the attitude were fully attained, it would involve a treatment of Christianity in the terms of the evolution of religion, and as only one factor in the whole process. But a study of the paragraphs dealing with the oriental religions, Greco-Roman faiths, and the origin and development of Christian beliefs and practices does not reveal such a treatment. We are still in an atmosphere of *religions*, rather than of *religion*. We miss a thoroughgoing psychological treatment; there is too much dealing with terms, the meaning of things which are not interpreted in human experience. In the same way on the social side one notes both decided approaches toward a sociological treatment of the Christian society, and at the same time survivals of older points of view and methods of treatment which rob the newer elements of their full effect.⁴

⁴ The statement dealing with the task of the church historian, which says: "Sie (die Kirchengeschichte) wirkt sich aus in Gottes Dienst und die Bestätigung, in Lehre und Verfassung, in Sitte und Recht, in steter Wechselbeziehung zu Staat und Gessellschaft, Wissenschaft und Kunst, wo immer die Kräfte des Evangeliums Leben spenden, da ist Kirche, und Kirchengeschichte da, wo diese Kirche sich gegenständlich zeigt an Personen und Einrichtungen. So verstanden sind Geschichte der Christentum, und Geschichte der Kirche eins und daselbe" is excellent. The matter incorporated in the paragraphs dealing with "The Social Tasks" (No. 20), "The Victory of the Church" (No. 26), and the "Church and the World" (No. 24) is also admirable. The

Thus the points of view that dominate in the study of secular historians have not in Germany come to a complete expression in the systematic treatment of church history by theologically trained students. In England this is even more clearly the case, to judge from the recent work of Professor Gwatkin, whose position as professor of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge would make him the spokesman for a considerable body of English scholarship.

From this work it would appear that the older ideas and attitudes still control in England, to a marked degree, the study and interpretations of church history. While in many regards the work would indicate that, as Richard Fester has written, "the church historian has finally become the secular historian," in regard to the special subject, the history of religion, of which he makes the remark, the statement would be entirely inapplicable.⁵

How far removed from the point of view of a secular historian the work is on its fundamental side can be seen from the following quotation: "Given the revelation of God, comparative religion may help to show us how the forces of human nature clothe it with the religions of men; but the application of comparative religion to the revelation itself is a fundamental error."⁶

On the evidence of these volumes, the systematic presentation of church history in England has yielded far less than in Germany to the influence of ideas prevalent among contemporary secular historians. As typical of a body of scholarship in France there may be taken in the same way a systematic treatment of the first three centuries of the church recently issued by Duchesne.⁷ Almost ideal in its form and method of presentation, it shows that in the thinking conception here is decidedly favorable to keeping in view constantly the social significance of Christianity, the subordinating of the whole subject to this point of view. As a matter of fact, however, so strong is the traditional tendency to center attention inward on the church, to treat it in and of itself alone, without clearly and consciously regarding it as a social phenomenon, whose chief importance lies in its significance for society as a whole, that this point of view, that is, the point of view of the effect of environment on the church rather than that of the church's significance for its environment, dominates the presentation.

⁵ Richard Fester, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

⁶ Gwatkin, *Early Church History to A.D. 313*, 2 vols., 1909, II, 3.

⁷ Louis Duchesne, *Early History of the Christian Church, from Its Foundation to the End of the Third Century*. Rendered into English from the 4th ed. London, 1910.

of the author there may have been constantly present the concurrent transformation of the empire, the influence of the East, the relative importance of the oriental religions. It is not, however, so apparent that the development of Christianity is viewed strictly in the light of the evolution of religion. Nor, while there is a considerable tendency throughout to emphasize the social significance of the church, can it be said that the development of Christian society is treated in sociological terms. As judged by the work of Duchesne, the points of view of contemporary secular historians have become operative to a marked extent in the systematic presentation of church history as written in France.

But the systematic treatments from their very nature will afford less speedy indications of the direction in which scholarship is tending. Among the mass of monographic literature we will expect to find the plainest indications of the trend among the ecclesiastical students of church history. Here we find some interesting and suggestive works.

Of the works indicating the trend among German scholars, that by Pfeiderer, *Primitive Christianity, Its Writings and Teachings in Their Historical Connections*, the second edition of which appeared in 1902, has a good deal of interest. The book, while it partakes more of the nature of a very developed and extensive commentary than that of a history, is an interesting attempt to treat the origin of Christianity in the light of the evolution of religion. However one may regard the success of Pfeiderer's effort, there is a significance in the attempt itself and in the attitude which he has taken toward his task. Of the attitude of his theological colleagues, Pfeiderer says: "In Germany, even more than elsewhere, it is still customary to take up a shy and suspicious attitude toward the application of the Science of the Comparative Religion within the domain of Biblical Theology. The few who venture to make use of it draw on themselves, as I know from my own experience, the reproach of 'paganizing.'" He then states that his inspiration came from Baur and that in spite of Baur's erroneous conception of the development of Christianity he affirmed that "the principle of development, which he introduced into the historical study of theology, retains its position by an incontestable right, a position

which the temporary reactionary tendency of traditionalism and dogmatic positivism will not ultimately affect in the slightest degree." He continues: "I believe, moreover, that this tendency is already on the wane, and that the time is not far distant when the application to Biblical Theology of the historical and comparative methods of the Science of Religion will be generally welcomed."⁸

In France the work of Loisy is of great significance. While Loisy's interest is not primarily a historical one, but rather a religious one, nevertheless he is a thoroughly trained historical student and his religious interest has made him an earnest student of the origins of Christianity. Moreover, his attitude is a thoroughly historical one. In fact, one might say that Loisy is the personification of the critical spirit. He is helping to modify the Protestant conception of the church and of Christianity in much the same way as did Newman. In fact, in regarding Christianity as an evolution that constantly proceeds, he is much more historical than the great majority of Protestant students.

In the work of the late Professor Bigg, Professor of ecclesiastical history at Oxford, a note of a somewhat different character is struck. The title of Professor Bigg's book is itself suggestive, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*.⁹ The implication is that the church was an active agent and that it had something to do, and that consciously or unconsciously it was affecting its environment. In the preface the object of the book is further expressed as being "an attempt to sketch in broad outline the nature of the task which lay before the Church when she set out in obedience to a divine call to evangelize the Greco-Roman world and the degree to which she was enabled to fulfil that task within the compass of the first five centuries." In this passage, and in others that follow in the preface, as well as in the treatment in the book itself, where the author discusses "Education under the Empire," "Religion under the Empire," "Moral and Social Condition of the Empire," the author shows his feeling that it is the social significance of

⁸ Otto Pfliegerer, *Primitive Christianity, Its Writings and Teachings in Their Historical Connections*, 4 vols., translated by W. Montgomery and edited by W. D. Morrison. New York: Putnam, 1906.

⁹ Charles Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, Oxford, 1905.

Christianity and the church that should be the main concern of church history. His aim "is to direct attention to the extreme importance of studying the relation between the Empire and church even in those days which preceded the recognition of Christianity by Constantine." And by this he does not mean the legal status of the church, which is all that this phrase means to the great majority of church historians, but rather the social relationships. This is made clear by the remaining words in this paragraph. He also aims to emphasize the importance of ascertaining as clearly as possible the condition, intellectual, moral, and material, of the people who filled the ranks of the church; and he says further, "if we knew exactly what the Empire was, and what it made of its subjects, we should know also what each individual Christian was, down to the moment of his conversion, and it would then be much easier to know what change came over the man after his conversion."

In thus emphasizing the social significance of church history, and in attempting to turn the attention of church historians to working at the task in this way, Canon Bigg not only reflects the point of view of the secular historian, but he is marking out a fruitful course for future investigation.

A book which gives yet stronger expression to the significance of Christianity, to the tendency to treat Christianity from this point of view, is Mathews' *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*. While the goal of this book is a theological one, it is essentially a historical study, which the author is led to make at the end of a study of the development of Christianity in apostolic times. Some indication of the point of view taken is given by the last four chapter headings, "The Messianic Fraternity," "The Messianic Fraternity in an Evil Age," "The Family and the Age," "The Economic and Political Bearing of the New Life." Here is a treatment which not only emphasizes the social significance of Christianity, but sets about studying it and presenting it in the terms of group life. It attempts to treat Christianity not only in the terms of sociology, but also from the point of view of the psychologist, since it interprets religious terms in terms of human experience.

Harnack, *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, is an interesting and suggestive monograph. It is, however, a singular instance of a book dealing with the aggressive side of Christianity, that yet fails to consider it as affecting its environment. All the way through it is subtly tinged with a recessive attitude. How was it that Christianity came to be as large as it was? The whole interest is in Christianity; the effect that this spread had on persons directly involved and upon the society from which they were eventually partly withdrawn is not consciously envisaged. Harnack's book is merely the most perfect answer so far given to Gibbon's question: What were the causes of the spread of Christianity? Its interest is inward; it is detached from the evolution of society as a whole; it does not consider what effect it had on Roman society. An entirely different aspect would have been given to his material had he asked, How did Christianity come to be the dominant force? Nevertheless, as the book stands, it shows the tendency to give more and more weight to the social significance of Christianity. This is shown by his treatment of the organization as a factor in Christianity's spread. The same kind of book written ten years hence would probably place this item at the beginning instead of at the end of the first volume. The same tendency comes to expression in the volume by von Dobschütz, *Life in Primitive Christianity*.

If now we ask ourselves in regard to the extent that these ideas are being applied by students of church history, that is, to what extent secular students are turning their attention to the study of church history, an equally interesting, if not more interesting, field is exposed to view.

As there are almost no systematic presentations of church history, by secular students, we may pass directly to the monographic field.²⁰ On the side of comparative religion as applied to the early history of Christianity we find much activity. The radical wing of this group, composed of philosophers and students of primitive religion, discredits the testimony of the Christian sources, of the life of Christ, and tries to evolve Christianity from

²⁰ F. C. Flick, *The Rise of the Mediaeval Church*, New York: Putnam, 1909, is a significant, if not a notably successful, beginning.

the general seething of religious movements in the early Empire. The most notable exponents of this method are J. M. Robertson in England, W. B. Smith in this country, and Arthur Drews in Germany.¹¹ As yet, these men, ill-trained historically, have not succeeded in making their point of view generally acceptable. We have, however, a notable impulse to the study of the origins of Christianity in the light of the evolution of primitive religion.

Guided by a much sounder method is the work by Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals, a Study in Christian Origins*. Behind his book, according to the author, lie twenty years of study of the Christian literature and rituals of the first five centuries. It is a study in the essential elements of the history of the church, rather than an attempt at a systematic presentation of the development. The author's attitude toward his subject may be gathered from the title, and from the following selections from his preface: "As for myself, my comparative study of religion has convinced me that the sacrament as administered, no less by our modern sacerdotalist clergymen than by Latin, Greek, and other priests, is nothing else than a survival of the most primitive, unpurified magic; and therefore, should occasion arise, I should not scruple, with due courtesy, to inform the ardent Archbishop of Canterbury, or the Pope himself, that such was my opinion." "There is no use in not recognizing that the attitude of the church—where animistic beliefs are allowed to color and shape the rites of communion—where the women come fasting and officiating clergy use white gloves in handling the elephant, where a bit of red carried about in procession for the admiration of the faithful, is an atmosphere which, if we encountered it among the medicine men of the Congo, we should not scruple to say was impregnated with a belief in fetish and taboo." Some indication of the extent to which the theological students of Church history have not been secularized may be gathered by the amount of criticism directed by them against this book.¹²

¹¹ For bibliography and discussion of this movement see Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*.

¹² One reviewer, in *The Saturday Review*, January 22, 1910, goes so far as to say "This book is not the work of a scholar or a gentleman."

Closely allied to this work is the work of Cumont, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*. While scrupulously refraining from dealing with Christianity it has probably done more to change the conception of students of church history of the Roman Empire than any other book that has appeared for a long while. It treats the whole subject with a broad point of view of religion as a whole, and prepares the way, and almost compels a similar treatment of Christianity. So suggestive and convincing is the treatment that its influence may be traced in much of the literature written on the subject from the day of its publication.¹³

The work of Seeck is also noteworthy for the treatment accorded Christianity and the church in his volumes on the *Downfall of the Ancient World in the Fourth Century*. For it is in relation to this downfall that the subject of the church is looked at. He treats it from the standpoint of the social significance of the church. With the name of Sohm there is also associated one of the most noteworthy treatments of the origins of the church that has been given. Like the work of Cumont, it has affected every work written on the subject since its own appearance.¹⁴

What shall we conclude from this survey? To what extent has the process of secularization completed itself? Or to what extent is it completing itself, and what is its meaning for the study and interpretation of church history?

In the first place, we must say that the theological student of church history is conscious of the necessity of treating his subject by the same methods as are used by the secular historian. This view is constantly insisted upon. In this connection Harnack gets his greatest significance. He has devoted his energy to make this idea operative. He has done much to stimulate the work of making critical editions of the sources, the necessary preliminary to scientific historical work. As far as points of view are concerned, the process of secularization has not gone so far. The probability is that, in this regard, the work of theologically trained students of church history must always be somewhat behind, in so far as the

¹³ Compare the book by Bigg above cited and the article in the *Cambridge Mediaeval History* on the "Religions in the Third and Fourth Centuries."

¹⁴ Sohm, *History of Church Law*, 1892.

training to which they submit themselves is not that of the trained historian. As long as the great volume of energy expended on the study and writing of church history is expended by theologically trained students, connected with theological seminaries, as is the case largely today in all countries, the output will continue to be conditioned by their training. That this must be primarily theological and secondarily historical is determined, at least as far as Germany is concerned, by the requirement that a man to teach history in a seminary must have a theological degree. Under these conditions it will necessarily be more difficult in Germany to broaden the training although there is a movement in this direction.

But the secularization of church history proceeds not only through domestication of points of view, developed among secular historians, but, as we have seen, by an actual invasion of the field of church history by the secular historian himself. In this connection, compare for example the work of Sohm in the *History of Church Law*, Seeck as already cited, and the work being done on the origins of Christianity by the students of religion. In this country, there is even an invasion of the theological seminaries themselves, where in some cases it is possible for theological schools to intrust the teaching of church history to a secularly trained historian.¹⁵

Thus along these various lines the study of church history is tending to be viewed and studied by the same methods and from the same points of view as are used in the larger field of history. Under the influence of these ideas, what new tendencies in interpretation are making themselves felt? From the survey which we have just completed, one thing is very clear; namely, with a rapid extension of the study of the Science of Religion our conception of this whole matter is being daily changed and broadened; and, while this study has in the first place concerned itself with religious origins, and has dealt more with primitive religions and all religions except Christianity, the advancing column of scholarship is now turning more and more determinedly to the study of the

¹⁵ Compare, for instance, the recent inclusion at the University of Chicago of the Department of Church History in that of the regular Historical Department, at the head of which is a layman; at Harvard the teaching of church history has long been in the hands of Professor Emerton, who is a layman.

origin and development of Christianity in the same light. At the present date, such investigation has not got beyond the question of origin; but it is clear that the movement must go on until it includes in its survey the whole development of Christianity and the Church. In other words, the whole history of dogma must be set in this general framework.¹⁶

In the second place, there is a notable tendency to treat Christianity in the terms of modern sociology. In other words, it is being regarded from the point of view of its reactions on its environment. These tendencies have come most clearly to view in the books of von Dobschütz, Mathews, Harnack, and Bigg.

¹⁶ An interesting attempt in this connection is the book by Charles Guignebert, *L'Evolution des dogmes*, Paris, 1910.

CRITICAL NOTES

DID MARK USE Q? OR DID Q USE MARK?

In the introduction to his *Commentary* on Mark,¹ Bacon says that the dependence of Mark upon Q "can be demonstrated," though he does not, at that point or in any thoroughgoing way in the pages of his commentary, give the demonstration, or say in what it would consist. Wellhausen also says that "independence (between Mark and Q) is not to be thought of." Several students of the synoptic question, notably Harnack and Wernle, do apparently think of it. But some literary connection between the two being for the moment assumed, the question whether Mark used Q or Q used Mark, is to be determined by the presence of demonstrably secondary characteristics in the one or the other. That this is not a closed question is sufficiently indicated by the fact that Harnack argues for the priority of Q and Wellhausen for the priority of Mark.²

But this priority of Mark or of Q is again dependent upon the verbal reconstruction of Q. That Matthew and Luke in their present forms, and even in the present form of the Q tradition in one or both of them, are secondary to Mark, no one disputes. If, therefore, where Matthew and Luke draw from Q, the secondary traits of Matthew and Luke or of either of them are ascribed to Q, then Q stands later than Mark, and a literary connection being assumed, Q must have used Mark. This is Wellhausen's position. But if the primary traits found in Matthew's and Luke's versions of Q be removed from Q by the ascription of them to the independent work of Matthew and Luke, then, literary connection still being assumed, Q is earlier than Mark and Mark used Q. This is Harnack's contention.³ An approach to a decision upon this question cannot be made without an examination in some detail of those passages common to Mark and Q in which such traits of priority or dependence, upon one side or the other, may be observed.⁴

¹ "The Beginnings of Gospel Story."

² The relative dates of Mark and Q will of course be determined in the discussion of the priority.

³ Harnack maintains the priority of Q but not necessarily its use by Mark.

⁴ As no one can here pretend to be independent of the work of Wellhausen and Harnack, our discussion here acknowledges its indebtedness; but it will not be necessary to distinguish in all cases what has been added to their discussion; and to avoid the appearance of settling a dispute between two authorities, direct quotation and reference will not usually be made. The reader is referred to section 8 of Wellhausen's *Einleitung*, and to section vi of chap. ii in Harnack's *Sayings of Jesus*.

In the messianic preaching of the Baptist, which is admitted to have stood in both Mark and Q, a secondary trait may be detected in Mark. For Mark predicts the Messiah as the Messiah was interpreted by the church after the historical career of Jesus; saying, "He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit." Q, on the other hand, says "with the Holy Spirit and with fire; whose fan is in his hand, and he shall thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his barn, but the chaff he shall burn with unquenchable fire." Q therefore appears to make his prediction uninfluenced by the life of Jesus, predicting him as Fire-Judge. It is highly probable also that the words "Holy Spirit" did not stand in Q, though they appear in both Matthew and Luke, but have been added; since in the statement which follows about the Messiah in Q, the idea of the Holy Spirit is not alluded to, but the idea of the Fire-Judge is developed. With these words "Holy Spirit" elided from Q, Mark here, so far, does seem to be prior to Q. On the other hand, "and with fire" may have stood originally in Mark, and have dropped out of the text because unsupported by the context.

But the account of the preaching must be taken with what follows, also in Q and in Mark; and that is the baptism and the temptation of Jesus. If it be so taken, the secondary character of Q throughout the three sections disappears, since Q introduces the Baptist, not merely and baldly as the introducer of Jesus, but gives him and his preaching much more a character of their own.

In the account of the baptism there is also an apparently secondary trait in Q. It is the discussion between John and Jesus as to the propriety of Jesus' baptism. That the trait is secondary can hardly be denied. But considering its omission by Luke, its assignment to Q is doubtful, and it should probably be credited to Matthew or some special source of his. The argument that the presence of this item cannot be accounted for except by its presence in Q is robbed of its force by Matthew's well-known habit of mingling his sources. It may be said, therefore, that up to this point, the arguments for the secondary character of either Mark or Q are rather evenly balanced.

The next material from Q is the Sermon on the Mount (Plain). Mark has parallels to but four of its sayings. The saying, "In what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you" is identical in Mark and Q, and therefore affords no criterion as to priority. The saying, "Salt is good, but if the salt, etc.," is listed by Wernle as doubtful in Q. If the saying be attributed to Q, as well as to Mark, it will there be represented by its form in Matthew. In this form the saying makes the salt refer

to the disciples, whereas in Mark its bearing is not apparent. If, however, the form in which Q gives the saying would be taken by most students to betray the feeling of the early church, it may be argued from the similarity of the saying as given in Q to the other saying given in the same connection, "Ye are the light of the world," that this was the original form of the saying. But to this it may be replied that Luke not only agrees with Mark in not referring the saying about salt to the disciples, but that he omits the first part of the saying about light ("Ye are the light of the world"), while including the rest of it. Either Luke here shows himself not very deferential to Q, or Matthew got the first part of both of these sayings from some other source, and mixed them with his Q material. This would remove from Q, and assign to Matthew or his special source, the secondary trait of the saying. Among these conjectures it is hard to make out a very certain case for the secondary character of Q.

The saying about the light, with its introduction in Matthew, "Ye are the light of the world," certainly has a secondary sound. The only question is whether this introduction belongs to Q or to Matthew. The reasons given in the last paragraph would incline one to ascribe it to Matthew, or at least would show the impossibility of proving it to have stood in Q. The conclusion that it did not so stand is strengthened by the fact that Luke, in one of his two uses of the saying (for it is upon the strength of the doublet in Luke that the saying is assigned to both Mark and Q), agrees with Mark in referring the saying to the preaching of Jesus instead of to the disciples; and when he gives it from Q he omits this reference. The reference to the disciples, then, which is the only secondary trait about the saying, must probably be attributed to Matthew and not to Q. If this is accepted, there is nothing here to show Q secondary to Mark.

The passage about divorce is given once by Mark and Luke, and twice by Matthew. Since Matthew agrees with neither of the others in the insertion of "except for adultery" in both his passages, it is difficult, and perhaps immaterial, to say which of his passages represents Q. In either case the reference to adultery may obviously be assigned to Matthew, and so, though in itself secondary, cannot prove the secondary character of Q. If Matthew's passage as it occurs in the Sermon on the Mount be taken to represent Q, the difference between the two, aside from the reference to adultery, is that Mark says, he who puts away his wife and marries another, commits adultery with her, i.e., with the second wife, and if a woman who has divorced her husband

marries again, she commits adultery. The reference in Mark is to the adultery of the first husband, his divorced wife, and his second wife. But he does not mean that the divorced woman is an adulteress by reason of her divorce, but only upon the assumption (said to be justified among the Jews of Jesus' time by uniform custom) that she will marry again. Matthew says he that puts away his wife makes her commit adultery, and whoever marries her commits adultery. His reference is therefore to the adultery of the divorced wife, and of the man who marries her after her divorce. But he certainly means to imply that the man who divorces his wife commits adultery, because he will marry again. Mark also, though he does not mention the adultery of the divorced woman, but only of the man who marries her, certainly implies the adultery of both. The difference between the sayings is therefore only a difference in what is expressed and what is implied in both Mark and Q. The evident meaning of both is that, in the case of a man and his wife who are divorced and who both marry again, four persons are involved in the adultery. In spite of the fact that Harnack says that "the saying in Mark is feeble in comparison" with that of Q (thus substantiating his assumption of the priority of Q), it is hard here to get out of this passage (the reference to adultery being excluded) any distinct indication of priority on either side. The reference of Mark, however, to the woman divorcing her husband, sounds secondary; since it is an apparent reference to a custom exercised in Rome but not among the Jews. It may have been added, to be sure, out of mere love of symmetry, as Jülicher suggests. On the whole, the passages seem to indicate that Mark is later than (secondary to) Q; though here again, as is indicated by the remark just quoted from Jülicher, nothing is entirely conclusive.

In the answer of Jesus to those who have accused him of being in league with Beelzebub, the primary character of Mark or Q depends upon interpretation. Q says whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven. This looks like a primary trait, omitted by Mark because of the growing respect for Jesus. On the other hand, Mark's omission of the mention of the blasphemy against the Son of Man, and of the distinction contained in Q between Jesus as a historical character and the Holy Spirit (in the church), may be as well taken to mean that Mark identifies the utterance of Jesus with that of the Holy Spirit, and so says that all sins shall be forgiven except that of which the Pharisees have just been guilty, namely, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit in their accusations against Jesus. In this latter interpretation, the identifi-

cation of the utterance of the Holy Spirit with the utterance of Jesus, would give Mark a primary character; while the statement of Q would allow those outside the church, the unbelievers, to offer some criticism upon Jesus with hope of forgiveness, but to those inside the church, who were in daily experience and observation of the Holy Spirit, and who blasphemed that Spirit, no forgiveness could be promised; which would give Q quite a secondary character. But upon the commoner interpretation, that Q represents blasphemy against Jesus as forgivable, and Mark does not, Q is here primary. As either interpretation is permissible, no positive conclusion can be reached.

If the saying of Luke about the woman who congratulated the mother of Jesus, and Jesus' reply to the woman, be allowed as a doublet of the saying in Luke about the true brotherhood of Jesus, the latter must also be assigned to Q and Mark. If it is so assigned, the statement of Mark, that the family of Jesus came for him because they thought he was beside himself, may naturally be taken as an introduction to this saying about the true brotherhood. Even so, it should probably not be assigned to Q, because Q seems to have contained few if any such historical data. But taking it as a part of the story in Mark, the whole story in Mark thus appears to be decidedly primary in comparison with Q—this, upon the assumption that Q is here represented by Matthew. Upon the other assumption, that Matthew and Luke here follow Mark, and that Q is represented by the variant in Luke, the primary character of Mark over Q is all the more apparent. But the section should probably not be assigned to Q.

Concerning the Sermon on the Mount as a whole, the secondary character of it, as a sermon addressed to the Christian community, or to a great company of disciples at a time when Jesus had very few, seems evident. But here again we must attribute to Matthew and not to Q the placing of the sermon at this point, and probably the agglutination of its various members (not altogether homogeneous or well arranged) into one discourse. Q probably had little or no reference to chronology; and Matthew is pre-eminently a combiner. The Sermon as a whole therefore can argue for the secondary character of Matthew, but not necessarily of Q.

In the saying about saving and losing one's life, Mark's wording "for my sake and the gospel's" has a distinctly secondary sound. The fact that Matthew and Luke, in the passage where they evidently take the saying from Mark, both omit the mention of the gospel would seem to indicate that it was not in the Mark that lay before them, and is

therefore a later addition. The saying, otherwise, is substantially like the form which Matthew and Luke take from Q. There is therefore no indication of priority here.

We have limited ourselves, in this consideration of the priority of Mark and Q, to a comparison of those passages which are admitted to have stood in both documents. If we go outside of these, and compare Mark as a whole with Q as a whole, individual utterances may be found in Q which, like the saying about the perpetual validity of the law, have a decidedly primary sound. On the other hand no one can question the impression made by Mark as on the whole a primary document. In other words, the total impression will be that both Mark and Q are among the earliest documents of the church; and the balance of priority will be extremely hard to strike, and impossible to strike with certainty, on either side. But there is no advantage in such a comparison for our purpose, which is to prove whether Mark used Q or Q used Mark. Upon this question we have come, so far, to a standstill.

The inquiry may be carried a short step farther by a comparison of the vocabularies of Mark and Q, not, however, with more definite results. Hawkins, between the first and second editions of his book,⁵ made a second and more diligent search for linguistic peculiarities in Q, and announces himself as unable to find any. Harnack, on the contrary, believes that he finds some such.

Sentences in Q, to begin with, are generally connected by *καί, δέ* being used but seldom. The same is true of Mark. But the coincidence of the two in this point merely indicates the comparative nearness of both of them to the Semitic. The same may be said of the preponderance of simple verbs in distinction from compound, in both Mark and Q. *ἔάν* is used twice as frequently as *εἰ*; Mark also appears to use *ἔάν* 36 times and *εἰ* but 15. This fact seems to have more significance by reason of the other, that Luke uses one word 32 times and the other 33; however, Matthew uses *ἔάν* exactly twice as often as *εἰ*. When it is remembered that all we have of Q is contained in Matthew and Luke, and only a very small portion of it in Mark, these facts do seem to indicate a preference for *ἔάν* over *εἰ* as between Mark and Q on the one side and Luke on the other. In other words, Mark and Q display a common literary affinity as contrasted with Luke; but when compared with Matthew this contrast disappears. They are here no nearer to each other, or very little, than either of them is to Matthew. The

⁵ *Horae Synopticae*.

particle $\tau\epsilon$ is never found in Q.⁶ It occurs 5 times in Matthew and 7 times in Luke, and but once in Mark. $\Omega\zeta$ in temporal clauses seems to be absent; so it is in Matthew, while Luke uses it 19 times and Mark once. Clauses with $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, frequent in Matthew and Luke, are absent; they also occur in Mark; their absence from Q is probably due to the fact that Q consists largely of discourse material. $\Pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}$ and $\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$ are absent; the first is used about evenly by Mark and Matthew, and more frequently by Luke; the second 3 times by Matthew, 5 times by Mark, and 24 times by Luke. These facts do not all point in one direction. They seem sometimes to indicate a linguistic affinity between Q and Mark, but this affinity usually extends to Matthew also. What seems to be proved by them is that Mark and Q and Matthew all stand nearer to the Semitic than Luke; but this is only the obverse of the statement that Luke is the best Grecist; it throws no light upon the literary relation of Mark and Q.

The item which makes the determination of any such relation practically impossible is the still unknown character of Q. So long as it is possible to make Q later than Mark by identifying Q with either Matthew or Luke as best suits the need, and so long as it is possible to make Mark later than Q by ascribing the secondary traits of Q to Matthew and Luke, no certain conclusion can be reached. It does not at present appear whether the question provides the data necessary to lift it entirely out of this uncertain stage.

Meanwhile there are two considerations that weigh against any literary dependence between Mark and Q.

If Mark is earlier than Q, Q could hardly have had any motive for making use of Mark. For all the author of Q could want from Mark would be sayings of Jesus, unattached to, or at least detachable from, historical connections. He could scarcely have found a poorer document for this purpose than the Gospel of Mark. Q had, as we now know, more or less extended sayings of Jesus upon at least twenty different topics. It may have had many more; for much of the discourse material which is peculiar respectively to Matthew and Luke may have been taken from Q, without having left any trace by which we can identify it. Q also had perhaps twenty very brief sayings, mostly consisting of single sentences or verses, which Mark also had. It is much more natural, until the contrary is proven, that these twenty scraps

⁶ It must be remarked that all these statements refer to Q as reconstructed by Harnack. Some of them might apply equally well, and some not, to Q unreconstructed.

belonged with the rest of the Q material. Where this was we have no means of knowing. It is difficult to explain, also, how it happened that if the author of Q had Mark before him, and borrowed from him, he did not borrow more. He has included at least one narrative. Mark also has narratives in which there is much discourse material; but Q does not use these.

On the other hand Mark could hardly have used Q without using more of it. If he borrowed from Q the discourse material which the two now have in common, why did he not borrow more? While Mark's interest is not primarily in discourse material but in narrative, he has found a place for some discourse material of his own, and upon the theory of his use of Q he has also made a place for the inclusion of some twenty sayings from that source. If for these 20, why not for more? And why for these instead of for others? Reasons can be assigned for the omission by Matthew and Luke of much Markan material, but upon the theory that Mark used Q, can any reasons be assigned for his omission of the greater part of the Q material?

The fact is, we are stopped here by our lack of knowledge of Q. We know that it contained certain material. Whether it did not contain much more, or how much more it may have contained, or of what sort this was, or whether some of it may even now be contained but undecipherable in Matthew and Luke, or whether it has escaped us entirely, we do not, and at present cannot, know. Upon general principles we cannot say whether it is likely that two such writers as Mark and the compiler of Q, among the comparatively small number of authors in the early Christian church, should have been ignorant of the work of each other; for the likelihood of this all depends upon the dates and places of the two writers. Q is apparently Palestinian. Mark has often been asserted to be Roman. If the difference in time was as great as the difference in distance, it is not at all impossible for the two to have been entirely unacquainted. On the other hand, the apparent date to be set for both Mark and Q is somewhere around the year 70. Q may have been, but need not have been, several years earlier. It seems, as Jülicher says, "To have awaited the parousia for some time," yet betrays no knowledge of the destruction of Jerusalem. This would, however, suit the year 69 as well as the year 60. One gets the impression from it on the other hand that the author is looking back through a considerable time upon the life of the man whose sayings he quotes.

⁷In the story of the Temptation, how could Mark have omitted the fasting if he had Q before him? Or have *added* the beasts and the angels?

If its date be put between 65 and 70, or between 60 and 65, then the material which Mark has in common with it may have come to Mark from an independent source; or Mark may have heard Q read, or passages from Q, or have been, as we say, "acquainted with it," but for some reason, perhaps because he possessed no copy, did not use it as a source. If one prefers the other, and as it seems the less likely hypothesis that Q is later than Mark, then the material which Q has in common with Mark may have come to it from some independent source; or the author may have once or twice seen a copy of Mark, or heard all of it or parts of it read, but, so far as we can prove, did not use it as a source. This is not a very definite conclusion; but perhaps it is as near as we can expect to come to one, when one of the factors of our problem is so largely an unknown quantity.

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THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION: A PROPOS OF MR. W. K. WRIGHT'S DEFINITION

In a paper entitled, "A Psychological Definition of Religion," published in the July number of this *Journal*, I find the definition that I have offered of religion so incompletely stated as to convey a substantially wrong impression. I am reported as defining religion "a belief in a psychic, superhuman power." That religion is adequately defined as a belief in any one, or several particular objects, is one of the opinions against which I have long contended. What I have said is that "Religion is the mode of behavior in the struggle for life in which use is made of powers characterized here as psychic, superhuman, and usually personal. In its objective manifestations, religion appears as attitudes, rites, creeds, and institutions; in its subjective expression, it consists of impulses, desires, purposes, feelings, emotions, and ideas connected with the religious actions and institutions. According to this biological view the necessary and natural spring of religious and non-religious life alike is the 'procreant urge' in all or some of its multiform appearances. The current terms 'religious feelings,' 'religious desires,' 'religious purpose,' are deceptive, if they are intended to designate specific affective experiences, or distinctive desires and purposes. It is the belief in several kinds of powers which has made possible the differentiation of types of behavior and in particular the division into secular and religious life. The objective existence of personal divinities or equivalent psychic powers is an assumption necessary to religion; but the mere

belief in their existence is quite insufficient to account for the important place it has occupied and still occupies among the factors of human development."

To the first part of Mr. Wright's definition, I would make no other change than the addition of the word "increase." It would then read, religion is "the endeavor to secure the conservation and increase of socially recognized values." Thus stated and considered as only a *part* of the definition, the affirmation seems to me unexceptionable. I criticize Professors King and Ames because they substitute "highest values" for "values," and chiefly because that is for them the whole of the definition. The establishment of and the endeavor to preserve values are of the essence of life itself; they are coextensive with it. So that if one is to differentiate religion from the rest of life on that ground, as these authors have done, one must indicate which are the values belonging exclusively to religion. Professor King admits that "There are, of course, many values that are not religious, and there are consequently many value-attitudes that have no religious significance." The particular values characteristic of religion are, according to him, those possessing the greatest significance, the greatest permanence, the highest power. Professor Ames writes similarly: "The religious consciousness is just the consciousness of the greatest interests and purposes of life, in their most idealized and intensified forms." "The ideal values of each age and of each type of social development tend to reach an intensity and volume and a symbolic expression which is religious." (E. S. Ames, "Religion and the Psychic Life," *Inter. Jour. of Ethics*, October, 1909, Vol. XX, 49, 52.) Now, all the recognized values can be arranged in a graded series, each term of which will better deserve the epithets *permanent*, of *high power*, than the preceding term. Where, then, is the line to be drawn between those that are to be called religious and those that are not? Wherever it may be drawn, it will mark only a difference of degree between religion and the rest of life. The experiences on one side of the line will be only of greater value, more permanent, more inclusive, than those on the other side.

It turns out, then, that this attempt to define religion instead of providing a means of *differentiating* it from the rest of life, offers a means of *connecting* together the whole of life. One of the unfortunate results of this conception is that magic cannot be held separate from religion: "In a community of . . . loose organization," writes King, "magic might be so thoroughly taken up by the group as to be indistinguishable from religion." As a matter of fact, a natural line of cleavage between

religious and non-religious behavior is made possible by the presence in them of ideas of forces of different character. Some of these forces are of the sort to which the name "physical" is applied; others respond to intelligence and feeling, as if they themselves had mind and heart. Religion is that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them.

Mr. Wright separates himself from Professors King and Ames in that he rejects "highest values" as the differentia of religion. But I do not see that he is successful in his efforts to provide a satisfactory principle of differentiation. To be religious, actions must, according to him, be believed "to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency." This admits, it seems, within the pale of religion man's dealings with merely *physical* forces when he uses them for the conservation or the production of values, and when he feels dependent upon them. For the ordinary physical forces—heat, and electricity, for instance—are agencies different from "the ordinary ego of the individual, and from other merely human beings," and upon them we are dependent. Does Mr. Wright intend to include in religion the many specific actions by which we use these forces? If not, the agency must be described so as to exclude them. That is what I have tried to do by using the adjectives "psychic" and "anthropopathic."

Thus, Mr. Wright appears to me to be no better off than the two authors above quoted whose conception of religion he thinks too inclusive. For him also, "Animism and magic may or may not be religious. They become religious when employed in the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values."

A definition which does not draw a clear line of demarkation between magic and religion fails of an understanding of religion, or of magic, or of both; for although the purpose of magical and of religious action may be identical, the psychic experiences involved in each are substantially different because the power appealed to in each case is of different nature. This I have endeavored to make clear in the second part of a book, *A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future*, from which I draw in this discussion.

The conception of religion I present does not admit of that frequent, excessively broad use of the term which includes anything that is of considerable value to man—music, science, civilization, democracy, duty. I cannot, for instance, agree with those who say that "habitual

and regulated admiration" is worthy to be called a religion, and that "art and science are not secular . . . it is a fundamental error to call them so; they have the nature of religion."¹ Neither do I find satisfaction in Professor Ames's affirmation that "It is also psychologically evident that the man who tries to maintain religious sentiment apart from social experience is to that extent irreligious, whatever he may claim for himself; while the man who enters thoroughly into the social movements of his time is to that extent genuinely religious, though he may characterize himself quite otherwise."² This is not putting new wine into old bottles; it is refusing to admit the existence of the bottle! To bestow upon one the appellation religious because he enters thoroughly into the social movements of his time is to cause confusion by juggling with the word.

But if the conception I defend excludes, on the one hand, those excessively broad interpretations destructive of all precise meaning, it includes, on the other hand, the primitive religions in which low desires find gratification through grossly anthropomorphic beings, as well as the highest of the historical religions. It finds room even for the experiences of those who feel themselves in relation with an Impersonal Absolute, a mere "Principle of unity in a world of which we are not only spectators but parts." These experiences I would, however, distinguish from those which have given rise to the historical religions by classifying them under *passive religiosity*.

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¹ Seeley, J. R., *Natural Religion*, Boston, 1882, pp. 122, 120.

² Ames, E. S., "Non-religious Persons," *American Journal of Theology*, XIII, 543.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON ISAIAH

As stated on the title-page, the commentary on Isaiah in this Series,¹ has been "with a view to the speedier completion of this series" assigned to two writers, Professor Gray and Professor Peake. The present volume of 472 pages contains the first instalment and extends to the close of chap. xxvii.

The first paragraph of the preface has a special interest. "This Commentary should have been written by another; and all who are in any way familiar with the work of the late Dr. A. B. Davidson, and conscious of the profound sympathy and penetrating insight that he always brought to the interpretation of Scripture, must regret that he had made no substantial progress with the Commentary, which the editors of this series had intrusted to him, at the time when Christian scholarship and Christian life were left the poorer by his death."

All who are interested in the study of this great book will be in full sympathy with the sincere and graceful tribute thus paid to the departed scholar who exercised, during the last generation, such a wholesome influence in the sphere of Old Testament criticism. One remembers the articles published in the *Expositor* more than a quarter of a century ago on "The Servant Question" and how strong an impression was made that if the Servant was a personal Messiah those special poems could not have been written in the Exile. There was a certain naturalness then in Duhm's suggestion that as they did speak of an individual Messiah they were of different authorship and later date. The integrity of the section and the collective interpretation has since been strongly maintained by Budde, Giesebrecht, Marti, and others. Further, the publication of the small volume in the "Temple Bible Series" showed that Dr. Davidson had accepted, in principle and in main outline, if not in all its details, the analysis of the book that is now generally accepted and which is represented in the present volume. However, it was evidently too late in a day that had been full of noble service for Dr. Davidson to attempt a new review of all the problems in criticism and exegesis that had been raised by recent discussions on this great collection of prophetic literature.

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Isaiah*. By George Buchanan Gray. New York: Scribner, 1912. ci+472 pages. \$3.00.

Perhaps, after all, it was well that the preparation of the volume for this series was postponed until the present time, when a much fuller review of the critical discussion could be taken into account. English editions of Isaiah, with more or less comment, have not been lacking in recent years, as we are reminded by reference to the names of Cheyne, G. A. Smith, Skinner, Whitehouse, Box, Kent, Glazebrook, McFadyen, and Wade, but there is still a place for a book like the one before us, which covers in a scholarly fashion and in moderate space the whole field of introduction, textual criticism, translation, and exegesis. A careful examination even of a small part of the book convinces us that it is a credit to British scholarship and up to the high level maintained by this series in the Old Testament. (See Professor A. R. Gordon's review of a similar volume by American scholars, *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1912, pp. 285 ff., and for one of the New Testament volumes cf. the statement by Professor Shirley Jackson Case, p. 301 of the same issue.)

At the present time we may describe the standpoint of the volume as conservative as well as critical; that is, the main outlines of the analysis worked out by Duhamel and Cheyne, as a continuation and completion of much earlier research, is accepted but intelligently examined and its uncertain nature on many points admitted. But of course the book does not represent "the radical wing scholarship" in any such sense as Professor Kennett's recent volume (see *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1912, pp. 287 ff.). See Dr. Gray's reference to Professor Kennett, p. lx. The exilic date of Deutero-Isaiah (chaps. 40-55) is accepted, and much of chaps. 56-66 referred to the fifth century B.C. It will thus be seen that the modifications with regard to those sections suggested by Professor Kent (in connection with studies by Drs. Cobb and Torrey) are not accepted by Drs. Gray and Peake. The "North Arabian Theory" and Gressmann's suggestions receive careful statement and sober criticism. We are glad to note that Professor Gray pays a well-deserved tribute to Gesenius' edition: "but with Gesenius' Great Commentary (1821) comes a fresh and plentiful source of valuable information and suggestion." Scholars are, of course, well aware of the fact that the movement of criticism, notwithstanding the brilliant rushes of particular critics, has on the whole been slow, but it is well that the general body of students should be reminded that over ninety years ago the great Hebrew grammarian gave a clear statement of the exilic date of chaps. 40-66, and of the later origin of chaps. 24-27. When we turn to Gesenius, p. 180, and read his note on 2:3, "In a very pure form and

worthy of both prophets is the representation that the peoples will go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem not to offer sacrifice but to learn the ways of God—a noble presentiment which has passed into fulfilment through Christianity," we feel that the commentator is, in this case, more than a grammarian, that he is an interpreter in the fullest sense.

But to return to Dr. Gray: one feels the difficulty of doing in a brief note any justice to the vast amount of solid work here presented. The critical literature that has gathered round the book of Isaiah is in quantity so immense, in its range so wide, that we are in danger of getting lost in it, and the writer of this commentary has certainly qualified himself to be a competent guide. To keep the thing from becoming too bulky and to preserve something like a due proportion of the parts must have been a difficult task, but our author has mastered it. In a modern commentary repeated lists of names and opinions are of little service, and yet there are times when it is highly helpful to be shown, as is done here in several cases, that the exegesis of important passages has had a real history.

The author's style in dealing with disputed passages is shown in the following quotation. On 2:2 ff., "Judged by itself, without prejudice derived from its present position, the poem does not betray its origin unmistakably. But if the arguments that have been adduced be insufficient to prove that it was not written in the eighth century, still more insufficient are the arguments to prove that it was. The spirit of the whole and some of the particular ideas, as hinted in the commentary that follows, leave the impression of a passage that was written nearer the time of chaps. 40-55 and Ezekiel than of Isaiah." This may strike some as being a little too judicial, but at any rate it is not dogmatic. To the present writer the conclusion seems to be right, but then one's *impression* comes not simply from the reading of this passage but from one's whole idea as to the growth of the religion. A radical critic like Duhm only maintains the possibility of an early date for this passage by, as we think, unduly narrowing its meaning.

One would like to examine some of the translations, but lack of space forbids the attempt; the author tells us that he has "deliberately, where necessary, sacrificed form and style, in order to make them as expressive as possible." Here is one specimen, which may be used to illustrate the statement:

1:16c: Cease to do evil,
Learn to do well;
Seek out the right

Make the violent(?) keep straight
Secure the right of the orphan
Undertake the cause of the widow.

Here is another with some real poetic liveliness in it:

23:16: Take thou the lyre,
Walk with the throng,
Harlot whom all forget;
Play, play with fire,
Sing oft (thy) song.
To be remembered (yet).

Is not "play with fire" rather ambiguous?

This may be compared with Cheyne's four-line version of the same words:

Take thy lute, and go about the city,
Harlot forgotten *now by men*
Play thou with skill, sing many a ditty
To win remembrance *then*.

The introduction contains a brief discussion, nine pages, devoted to the important question "The poetical forms of the prophetic literature, and of the Book of Isaiah in particular"; in which he takes the position generally held by Old Testament critics, viz., that "more elaborate analysis of Hebrew texts, such as Bickell or Sievers offers, rests on too precarious a basis to be made as yet a secure instrument even of textual criticism." He recognizes the *balancing rhythm* or the couplet of equal lines and the *echoing rhythm* or couplet of unequal lines (the so-called Kinah rhythm). The latter he prints as a couplet, while Duhamel, Cheyne, etc., give it as a *line* with a pause after the third accent. "If the preceding remarks suggest that there is considerable uncertainty or irregularity in Hebrew rhythms or meter they will very correctly convey the impression left on the present writer by his study of them." Hence it is "rarely wise to insist on any textual change merely on rhythmical grounds." Thus we have the same cautious temper throughout the commentary; no attempt is made to give any revolutionary contribution, but the results of wide study on the different departments are presented in a clear, unpretentious form.

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CONFUCIUS' ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

Dr. Chen Huan-Chang of Columbia University, New York, has given to the world a large and comprehensive treatise on the economic features of the Confucian philosophy.¹ It is in two volumes covering 756 octavo pages, printed and published last year by Columbia University and forming the 44th and 45th volumes of the series of "Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law." This treatise is of peculiar interest just at the present time, when China is entirely changing her old form of government and modeling a new one that is to incorporate whatever is found suitable or desirable in western systems. Equipped with a wide acquaintance with the English language, with a close familiarity with our western methods both ancient and modern, and with a good knowledge of the Confucian system, there is perhaps no one living who ought to be more eminently qualified to handle this timely and important subject.

Dr. Chen's publication bears on its surface many of the marks of ripe scholarship. He tells us in his preface that his treatise is "essentially a study, of the old régime in China" and is a "survey of the Chinese thought and Chinese institutions which developed independently of the Occident." He takes into consideration the teachings of Confucius as well as of his disciples through successive generations. For purposes of comparison he also refers to the opinions of the leaders of other Chinese schools of philosophy. He professes to base all his statements on the actual words of the texts or the spirit they embody. So far, so good.

Unfortunately the careful perusal of this work impresses one with the amount of oriental exaggeration with which it abounds, as well as with the curious conceit which characterizes many of its pages. A few instances may be selected here and there at random by way of illustrating these defects.

Dr. Chen tells us that his "is the first attempt to present the economic principles of Confucius and his school in a systematic form in any language." But very few of his readers who know anything of the subject will agree with such sweeping self-assertion which overlooks the writings of some of our best sinologues and authorities on Chinese affairs. Not only foreign writers, but even the long list of Chinese scholars who have labored in this direction both separately

¹ *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*. (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University.) By Chen Huan-Chang. New York: Columbia University, Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. Vol. I, xv+362 pages; Vol. II, 363-756 pages.

and in encyclopaedias, are overlooked or at any rate regarded as not "systematic." Even some of the works he professes to have consulted are systematic enough in their way—although perhaps not in Dr. Chen's way. How about the elaborate compilations on this subject in the great Chinese encyclopaedia, the *T'u-shu-ch'i-ch'êng*? How about the recent exhaustive work by E. T. C. Werner, entitled *Descriptive Sociology* and covering the whole data of the Confucian system, classified and arranged in groups according to Herbert Spencer's direction? Surely this ponderous monument of diligent research is systematic enough for any ordinary mortal! But Dr. Chen evidently thinks otherwise. So much the worse for Dr. Chen.

After having summarily disposed of all competitors in the field, the author goes on to express his own views in an equally reckless manner. For instance, he tells us "there are two reasons why China has made so little progress for many centuries. These are the economic and the ethical reasons. Confucius teaches us to subject the former to the latter, and hence the Chinese people are ashamed to talk about money-making. They respect social order and public interest. Their competition in business is therefore not very sharp and moral influences still control their economic motives," etc. Now we all know that this statement is not borne out by facts. Money-making forms the continual subject of conversation among all classes. Walk behind a couple of Chinamen on the streets or go into the tea-shops and listen to the conversation that goes on. It would be something unusual not to hear the all-absorbing topic referred to. It is safe to say that competition is carried on in China to an extent and with a keenness that is not found in any other country. But Dr. Chen thinks differently. He lives in the ideal and ignores the real.

In another place he tells us that "Confucius is the founder of a new religion" and that he was "a great religious reformer who swept away the old and established the new." And yet Confucius himself tells us that he was not a founder but merely a transmitter and that he only handed down and emphasized the doctrines of the ancient sages. Dr. Chen furthermore makes Confucius say that man is not only the "Son of God" but also the "assistant and co-ordinate of God." Also that the most famous ruler of a dynasty is a "companion to God." In support of this view he mentions that in the *Analects* Confucius, by tacit implication, compares himself with God and that in the *Doctrine of the Mean* Confucius is called the "equal of God." Now the merest tyro knows that Confucius was too much of a philosopher to have ever expressed himself so foolishly. Dr. Chen has entirely misapplied

the words of the classics to suit his own purposes. This is far from being the only instance where he has done the same thing.

The rights of woman and the taxation of land values are two subjects which are handled by the author with the same disregard of the actual existing facts. But perhaps the most glaring defect in the whole of Dr. Chen's book is his tirade against Christianity, with which he concludes. He deliberately states that "China enjoys complete religious freedom"; while the "Sacred Edict," the Tientsin massacre, the Boxer outrages, and a long series of other disgraceful facts show the very opposite. He tells us that "all the good points of Christianity are found in Confucianism, and besides Confucianism gives still more. From the philosophical standpoint Christianity is not so deep or so rich as Confucianism, nor as Buddhism and Taoism. From the practical standpoint Christianity is not so human or so related to man as Confucianism. . . . It is opposed to the feelings of the people. In the first place it is antagonistic to their ancestor-worship. In the second place it has been introduced by arms, protected by treaties and extra-territoriality. . . . In the third place there are exceedingly few Chinese who honestly become Christians."

It is doing a real kindness to Dr. Chen and his readers to refer them to a book entitled *Letters to a Chinese Official, Being a Western View of Eastern Civilization*, by William Jennings Bryan. In that little treatise will be found a much better refutation of the views advanced by Dr. Chen than could be condensed into this short review.

In conclusion it is extraordinary that an institution with the prestige of Columbia University should publish such a work as the one under review without first giving it a thorough revision, eliminating its various inaccuracies, and modifying its exaggerated statements. If this had been done Dr. Chen's otherwise excellent and valuable treatise would justly deserve a far higher place in the world's literature than it is likely to attain.

F.

HOSKIER'S STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT VERSIONS¹

In two stout volumes on the origin of the versions of the Gospels, (1910, 1911), Mr. Hoskier seeks to deal with the perplexing problem of textual variations in our oldest witnesses, and sets up the theory that

¹ *Concerning the Genesis of the Versions of the N. T.* Remarks suggested by the study of \mathcal{P} and the Allied Questions as regards the Gospels. By H. C. Hoskier. 2 vols., xvi+469 and viii+423 pages. London: B. Quaritch, 1910, 1911.

Concerning the Date of the Bohairic Version: Covering a Detailed Examination of the Text of the Apocalypse and a Review of Some of the Writings of the Egyptian Monks. By H. C. Hoskier. viii+203 pages. London: B. Quaritch, 1911.

they are the result of copying from polyglot exemplars. Back of Sinaiticus indeed, Mr. Hoskier thinks he can observe the influence of a trilingual (Syriac-Greek-Latin) or even a quadrilingual (Syriac-Coptic-Greek-Latin) polyglot. In support of this idea, he appeals to the fact that ancient codices sometimes show three or even four columns, and he might have adduced Origen's Hexapla to the same purpose. He further presents a mass of individual textual notes, with an occasional paragraph of bold generalization: The Syriac underlying the Diatessaron (for Mr. Hoskier holds there was such a Syriac) early influenced the Old Latin; Syriasm is apparent in the text which Justin used; in short, the earliest Old Latin manuscripts show that about 100 A.D. they were using Greek and Syriac together (p. 342). Vol. II (the appendices) is mainly devoted to collations of the Fleury Palimpsest (*h*), the Book of Dimma, and the Book of Moling. For his chosen position that Greco-Syriac bilingual texts shaped Greek, Latin, and Syriac and even Coptic texts, and that bilingual, trilingual, and even quadrilingual codices of which we have practically no record lay behind the whole process of textual modification, Mr. Hoskier adduces a series of readings and comments which may bewilder but will not convince the cold and critical reader. The most of this evidence is clearly capable of a much less picturesque explanation, as the result of ordinary mixture, harmonistic corruption, or easy transcriptional variation. That it all demands for its explanation Mr. Hoskier's quaint theory few will believe, while the extreme positions in which that theory involves its advocates and the anterior improbability of the existence or use of such polyglots in antiquity complete its discomfiture. Mr. Hoskier's view might have been more clearly and compactly and less dogmatically presented. In particular his criticisms of Dr. Hort's textual methods and conclusions suggest that he, like many of Hort's critics, has not fully understood them.

Recent study of the Coptic versions has led some scholars to transfer the origin of the Bohairic version from the third century to the seventh. This view fits badly with Mr. Hoskier's theory of quadrilingual polyglots, more especially as his "Coptic" always includes the Bohairic (II, 406). It is natural therefore for him to come to the relief of the Bohairic. In his new volume on the date of that version, he reiterates his contention that a great quadrilingual polyglot lies back of Sinaiticus, and undertakes to support this view by lists of readings in the Apocalypse, and by a collection of readings supposedly of Bohairic origin from Egyptian writers of the fourth century. Some of this evidence may be interpreted quite as well in the opposite direction, and

some of it proves altogether too much. Thus if Macarius' use of *νοῦς* for *καρδία* in Matt. 6:21 "shows the retranslation of one familiar with Coptic and Greek" (p. 126), what does the same thing in Justin (*Apol.* 15:16) show? Coptic idioms in the Greek writings of Macarius and Serapion do not prove the existence of the Bohairic version in their day. The late date of the Bohairic made so probable by the work of Guidi, Leipoldt, and others must be challenged, if at all, on stronger grounds than these.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

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EARLY CHRISTIAN MARTYROLOGY

The moving stories of martyrdom and miracle told in the texts here published¹ contain very little historical truth—not much more, indeed, than the names, and not even all of these. As an unconscious and unintentional reflection of eastern Christianity's life and thought in the times when those Christian legends known as Saints' Lives were in process of evolution, these martyrologies with their literary offspring are of somewhat greater historical value. There are, furthermore, some hints as to the conditions of life in general in Edessa and the surrounding country in the centuries during which the mercenary armies of Byzantium haunted those regions in the constant wars of eastern Rome against the Sassanid Persians. But the chief value of the texts does not lie in the historicity of their contents.

As the name of the first collector and sifter of much of the material here published, Oscar von Gebhardt, would lead us to expect, it is the textual history, the transmission of the texts by copy and translation and again by copy of the translation, the use of them in song and sermon and liturgy, with the influence of one upon the other threading back and forth, that gives interest and value to these legends and homilies and justifies so extensive and expensive a publication of them. The book is published as a posthumous work of Oscar von Gebhardt, edited by Ernst von Dobschütz. And it is true, as stated above, that the idea of the publication emanated from von Gebhardt and much of the material had been collected by him. Yet, not only was no small portion of this material far from ready for publication at von Gebhardt's death, but von Dobschütz has added not a little of his own finding and work. In

¹*Die Akten der edessenischen Bekenner Gurjas, Samonas und Abibos.* Aus dem Nachlass von Oscar von Gebhardt herausgegeben von Ernst von Dobschütz. Texte und Untersuchungen, herausgeg. von Harnack und Schmidt, XXXVII, 2. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. lxxiii+264 pages. M. 12.

fact the whole edition is carried out in the spirit of the deceased master rather than by treading slavishly in his footsteps. And the result is such that it would surely have pleased von Gebhardt, had he lived to see it, and that it must be highly gratifying to Professor Harnack, to whom it is dedicated.

A wonderfully thorough introduction of 66 pages carries the history of the texts from the Syriac original and its manuscript transmission through its devious ways in an Armenian, one Latin and three Greek, versions, and their transmission in 50-odd manuscripts, to their use in the homily of Simeon the Metaphrast and in an Enkomion of Arethas (one of the first of the original works of this master-mind in a barren time to be published in the Greek). A special chapter is dedicated to the historical and literary appreciation of both the acts and the miracle-story which the Greek appends to them. The close is made by an exhaustive treatment of the cult of the confessors, as it appears in ancient *calendaria*, in sermons and hymns, in chapels and churches dedicated to them, in paintings, and finally in popular worship.

The text is then printed in five separate sections, the first of which presents the Syriac-Armenian in literal German translation and the two older Greek versions; the second, the third Greek version and the Metaphrast, together with the Greek miracle-story; the third, the Latin version; the fourth, the Enkomion of Arethas; and the fifth, the text of a number of Greek Menaea and of one Latin one, all of these accompanied by a twofold apparatus, one giving the biblical references, the other an exhaustive statement of textual variants. This is followed by 35 pages of indices, treating in turn the biblical quotations, the proper names, and the Greek words in general. A page of Addenda and Corrigenda to which the reviewer can add only one omitted colon on p. 178, l. 12, concludes the work. As a whole the work stands as a marvel of the printer's art and a model of an edition of a series of texts meant to set forth clearly and concisely an exceedingly complicated textual history.

MARTIN SPRENGLING

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LEO XIII AND ANGLICAN ORDERS

The present volume¹ treats an important problem. It has been the Roman practice since the Reformation period to reordain Anglican ministers who submit to the papal obedience before permitting them to

¹ *Leo XIII and Anglican Orders*. By Viscount Halifax. London, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. \$3.50.

exercise priestly functions. This means, of course, that Anglican orders have been treated as invalid, and it has been one of the hindrances which have defeated the efforts made from time to time to bring about a better understanding and more hopeful relations between the Roman and Anglican communions. The Roman policy has been to disregard the claim of the Anglican churches to be Catholic churches with which corporate reunion can be seriously considered, and to treat Anglicans as so many detached individuals who need to be converted and brought into the Catholic church.

This policy has not represented the uniform convictions of Roman Catholic scholars. Courayer's famous *Dissertation on the Validity of the Ordinations of the English*, published in 1723, although it involved its learned author in disciplinary consequences, gave expression to the views of numerous French Catholics in favor of the validity of Anglican orders.

As can be shown by a long array of quotations, Anglican writers of every generation have maintained the identity of the Anglican priesthood with that of the mediaeval Catholic church, and have claimed for it the sacerdotal powers associated with the name "priest." The Tractarian movement, initiated in 1833, brought with it a revived emphasis (after a period of comparative indifference) upon this claim, and also renewed efforts to promote a better understanding with the Roman church. These efforts were thwarted partly by the aggressive proselytizing policy of the "Italian mission" in England, partly by the "no popery" agitation of the Evangelicals, and especially by the infallibility decree of the Vatican Council in 1870. Time seemed to show, however, that the Vatican decree was not so unambiguous as the Ultramontanists desired to make it, and that it was capable of being interpreted in a sense that would leave the final dogmatic authority of the universal episcopate intact.

At all events the impulse to labor for unity was too strong to be permanently quenched, and many continued to see possibilities of explanation that would open the way to an understanding which would neither stultify any essential elements in the positions of the two communions nor involve an undoing of what had been legitimately accomplished by the Anglican reformation. These hopes appeared highly chimerical to Ultramontanists and were regarded with grave suspicion by Evangelicals, but engaged considerable sympathy among the more broad-minded Roman Catholics on the Continent. The members of the Italian mission in England were aggressively hostile to anything in

the nature of a recognition of the English church as entitled to be treated as a corporate ecclesiastical entity.

Under such conditions Viscount Halifax, president of the English Church Union, a High-Church society having over 40,000 members, was undesignedly brought into familiar contact with Abbé Portal, a very broad-minded French priest. The Abbé was much impressed with what he learned of Anglican conditions, and the outcome was that the two men began to co-operate in efforts to reduce the barriers which separate the two communions involved. Their efforts took the direction of trying to bring about an understanding concerning Anglican orders. Neither Lord Halifax nor High Anglicans generally had any misgivings as to the validity of Anglican orders; and, as Lord Halifax takes pains to show, the part taken by Anglicans in what followed was not dictated by uncertainty on that point, but wholly by a desire to have an important barrier to friendly relations removed. No doubt these Anglicans were oversanguine, but great things are usually achieved by men who are generally regarded as seeking the impossible. The achievement of reunion is one which can never be regarded as negligible by those who enter into the spirit of the Master's prayer, "that they all may be one." This means that the removal of barriers to reunion, whether between the Roman and Anglican communions or between those who are commonly described as Protestants and Catholics, will necessarily engage the strenuous endeavors of Christian men, regardless of the pessimistic skepticism of others.

It is impossible within the brief space of this notice to give the story the details of which are exhibited in this most attractive book. A pamphlet of Portal's *Les ordinations anglicanes*, which left the question undecided, led Abbé Duchesne to acknowledge the validity of Anglican orders. Pope Leo became interested, and his utterances in private audiences raised high hopes. The *Revue anglo-romaine* was started in Paris, and during its twelve months' continuance gave place to numerous Anglican articles. A commission was appointed by the Pope, four of its members being friendly to Anglican claims *in re*.

But Archbishop Vaughan, head of the Roman mission, ably seconded by several subordinates, succeeded in drawing things his way. The story of their methods and misrepresentations is a painful one. The Pope yielded to his curia, and issued the well-known bull condemning Anglican orders as null and void. Fortunately reasons were given—reasons largely hinging on questions of fact. The door of hope is not hermetically sealed. Another generation can review the facts and revise

the decision. So Lord Halifax argues, and those who are not obsessed with the notion that, unlike other things human, the papal mind cannot change, will at least perceive that his hope is not wholly baseless.

Lord Halifax was severely condemned for his part in the business, and his loyalty to the Anglican church was impugned. This book resembles Cardinal Newman's *Apologia* in one respect. It establishes beyond all question the sincerity and consistent loyalty of its saintly author. No one can read it through without recognizing in Viscount Halifax one of God's noblemen: a man of lofty inspirations, transparent sincerity and charity, and rare devotion.

FRANCIS J. HALL

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A NEW HISTORY OF THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE

This volume is not a history of Byzantine civilization.¹ Such a history, Professor Bury thinks, cannot be written for a long time, not indeed until many specialists have accurately traced the curve of the whole development. He is no doubt correct, but since this work cannot be done in our time, it is very gratifying to have the best interpretations of a competent scholar of such sources as are available on a period that to most readers is not well known. It is more than twenty years since the author published his *History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene*. This volume is a continuation of that work, but on a larger scale. It covers a period of two generations—from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I—802 to 867. For the sake of convenience he calls the period the Amorian epoch.

Professor Bury, as is well known, combines with exhaustive scholarship the charm of literary style, and in his four hundred and fifty pages he surely comes very near to giving us a lively description of Byzantine civilization during sixty-five years. The earlier chapters treat of the emperors, their methods, their brutalities, and their achievements—also of the revival of iconoclasm. He then turns his attention more especially to financial and military administration, the Saracen wars, the Saracen conquest of Crete and Sicily, relations with the Western Empire, Venice, Bulgaria, the conversion of the Slavs and Bulgarians, the empire of the Khazars, and the peoples of the North.

The closing chapter on "Art, Learning, and Education in the Amorian Period" is very interesting. For example, the impression has been

¹ *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I.* By J. B. Bury. Macmillan, 1912. xv+530 pages. \$4.00 net.

general that iconoclasm destroyed art—but here we learn that exactly the opposite was true. The iconoclasts limited their destruction to Christian art, and even here the most that can be said is that it resulted in the destruction of Christian sculpture. They not only did not destroy secular art, but positively encouraged it—and the probability is that if they had not attacked the very inferior Christian art the world would have been satisfied with it, and the superior secular art would have had no development at all.

We are to understand, too, that education and learning attained a very high degree of excellence, in striking contrast to the prevailing contemporary barbarism of the Western Empire. Yet in all this great number of scholars and in this atmosphere of culture not a single creative genius arose whose creations could command the interest and respect of the whole world and of all time. "The higher education was civilizing but not quickening; it was liberal but it did not liberate." The human spirit was hampered by two authorities—the authority of religion and the authority of the ancients. "The great Greek thinkers proved powerless to unchain willing slaves, who studied the letter but did not understand the meaning. . . . Age after age innumerable pens moved, lakes (*sic*) of ink were exhausted, but no literary work remains that can claim a place among the memorable books of the world."

There are twelve appendices, a very complete bibliography, and English and Greek indexes.

J. W. MONCRIEF

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

HOLTZMANN, OSCAR. *Der Tosephtatraktat Berakot*. Text. Übersetzung und Erklärung. [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, XXIII.] Giessen: Töpelmann, 1912. xvi+99 pages. M. 7.

Beer and Holtzmann are editing a complete edition of the Mishna. Older than the earliest commentary on the Mishna is the Tosephta—a kind of supplement to the Mishna. Like the Talmud the Tosephta presupposes the text of the Mishna. It is based for the most part on the same authorities, namely, the Tannaites. A knowledge of the Tosephta for an understanding of the Mishna is more important than a knowledge of both Talmuds. The significance of a knowledge of the Mishna for the understanding of Judaism is self-evident; and its value in a correct understanding of early Christianity is being recognized more and more.

Up to the present no printed text of the Tosephta has ever appeared. Holtzmann gives us such a version of the Traktat Berakot, after the text of Zuckerman (Pasewalk, 1880) without the variants. It is printed in metrical lines to display clearly

the distinctions of the legal language. The same careful rhythmical representation is preserved in the German translation of the printed Hebrew text. The divine name is printed *Jeja* (יְהוָה); the same as Theodoret's *Αιδ*.

The Hebrew text occupies about one-quarter of each left-hand page, and the translation the same space on the right-hand page, while the lower part of each page is given to notes on the text or its interpretation. The work is put in splendid form.

NEW TESTAMENT

ZORELL, FRANCISCUS. *Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum*. (Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, Pars Prior, Vol. VII.) Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1911. xv+646 pages.

The publication of a new lexicon of the New Testament within a few months of the appearance of Preuschen's *Handwörterbuch des Neuen Testaments* (1910) is fresh evidence of the present activity in New Testament lexicography. In size the two lexicons are about equal. Zorell has a slightly smaller page, but makes up in his larger number of pages. His book is somewhat more convenient to use on this account and his use of heavy type for lexical forms makes them stand out more clearly than they do in Preuschen. The chief difference between the books lies in that Preuschen includes along with the New Testament the apostolic Fathers and the early gospel fragments, while Zorell omits these but makes good use of the lexical material furnished by the Greek papyri. These it will be remembered Preuschen did not employ. Zorell makes less reference to special lexical treatises and articles on individual words than Preuschen did, and it may of course be questioned how far this bibliographical task belongs to the lexicographer. It is good to find Catholic scholars skilfully at work upon the Greek Testament as well as upon their long-preferred Vulgate. Zorell takes account of the texts of Tischendorf, Westcott-Hort, Hetzenauer, and Brandscheid. Such readings of the *Textus Receptus* as have met with some support from modern editors are likewise covered. A compact introduction deals with Zorell's principles of orthography, in which he occupies a position more moderate than Dr. Hort took in his introduction, but in some details (*Ἱεροσαλήμ* e.g.) more advanced than Preuschen. The lexicon, accurately printed, seems to be complete, though an initial is lost from the head of pp. 324, 328, and in some matters Catholic interpretations naturally appear ("super hoc saxo," qui est petrus, p. 452), but scholars of all schools will find value in Zorell's compact and learned dictionary. The articles are of course in Latin.

LELONG, AUGUSTE. *Le Pasteur d'Hermae*. Texte Grec. Traduction française, Introduction et Index. (*Textes et Documents: Les pères apostoliques*, IV) Paris: Picard, 1912. cxii+347 pages. Fr. 5.

The fourth part of the *Textes et Documents* edition of the apostolic Fathers follows the general plan of the other volumes of that convenient series. LeLong ascribes the Shepherd to Hermae and places its composition under Pius (140-54). He recognizes that it has probably sustained some expansion at the hands of its author, but thinks this need not have extended over more than ten years. LeLong's statement of the Christology of Hermae is a very temperate one. He does not undertake to elicit the later Christology from the crude, confused ideas of this Roman freedman. He treats the polity of Hermae in a similarly moderate tone. The text printed is that of Funk (1901) supplemented by the use of the interesting Hamburg fragment

(1909) of Sim. 4:6—5:1:5, which LeLong prints in full and discusses at length. With the recent facsimile of Codex Sinaiticus, with its parts of Hermas, and Lake's excellent edition of the Athos leaves of Hermas, with facsimiles, LeLong shows no acquaintance. His knowledge of Grenfell and Hunt's publications of Hermas fragments seems indirect, for he does not indicate where or when their publications of some of them, e.g., Oxyrhynchus Papyri 5 and 404, appeared, and he gives no dates for these nor for the Amherst pieces. Oxyrhynchus P. 404 really begins nearly a verse earlier than LeLong states, and the sixth Amherst fragment continues part of a verse farther than he has noted. Little is given by way of variant readings, and the system of manuscript designations chosen leads to some confusion. It is difficult to understand why LeLong has not included in his text the materials, most of which he gives in his introduction, which Amherst P. 190 and Oxyrhynchus P. 404 give for the restoration of the Greek text of Sim. 9:30:3, 4 and 10:3:2-5. In this he falls behind the latest form of the Gebhardt-Harnack-Zahn edition (1906). The bracketing of certain words in Sim. 9:30:1,2 is, since the discovery of Amherst P. 190, superfluous. In short LeLong has followed Funk's 1901 edition altogether too closely. The Greek is on the whole carefully printed, though $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\chi\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ (p. 330) is wrong.

LEWIS, REV. GEORGE. *The Philocalia of Origen*. Translated into English. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911. xvi+242 pages.

"The days are past," wrote Richard Crawley in the introduction to his translation of Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* in 1876, "in which the translation of a Greek author could attain to the proportions of a national event." Nevertheless translations, especially of material pertaining to the origin and growth of the Christian and Jewish religions, seem again to be coming into favor. But to be really useful they should be first-class translations of the most important and interesting material.

Rev. George Lewis' translation of Origen's *Philocalia* is not bad, as translations go. But neither is it of such brilliance as to stand out from the common run. There seems to be no very good reason why the translation of the same Greek should differ so widely, e.g., on pp. 28 and 51. The translation of such biblical quotations as were recognized is not made afresh from Origen's Greek, but follows the King James Version of the Massora in Eccles. 5:1, pp. 27 f., for example. The list of biblical references is not full, John 1:1 being omitted on p. 27 and Jer. 44:22 (LXX 51:22) on p. 51. The Klostermann text of the Jeremiah Homilies, if known to the translator, has not been used by him.

As for the subject-matter, the *Philocalia* of Origen are important enough in themselves, but they will hardly make highly fascinating reading for many modern laymen. And the scholar who has occasion to use them may be trusted to read the Greek.

WAYLEN, HECTOR. *Mountain Pathways*. A Study in the Ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, with a New Translation and Critical Notes. Introductory Letter by F. C. Burkitt. 2d ed., revised and enlarged. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1912. 128 pages. 3s. 6d. net.

It is very evident that the author is a Quaker. He is close to the mind of Jesus; his whole attitude, revealed in the simple, clear, and almost intuitive interpretations, shows that in an unusual manner he has entered into the spirit of Jesus. The work is original and unconventional, and is characterized throughout by rare spiritual insight.

The translation is based largely on Syriac readings. It is extremely literal. The excessive transliteration of Greek words and phrases into English letters cannot be of any help to the reader who is unfamiliar with Greek, while it is annoying to one who knows Greek. To call Jesus "Ieshua" and to write "Terushalem" is of doubtful advantage.

BOYSSON, A. DE. *La loi et la foi. Étude sur Saint Paul et les Judaisants.* Paris: Bloud & Cie., 1912. viii+339 pages.

"Nihil obstat." The book will doubtless serve well its purpose of instructing Roman Catholic priests and seminary students. But the conclusions are too easy, the sources are not handled in a sufficiently critical manner, and the intention to remain in harmony with authorities is too obvious, to give it independent value. For example, Paul could not have written the Epistle to the Hebrews, our author thinks, and yet in a real sense he is responsible for it. Jesus and Paul agree in their teaching substantially on every point.

The work is divided into two parts, the first giving the history of the Pauline controversies and the second setting forth his doctrine.

DOCTRINAL

GRAY, ARTHUR. *An Introduction to the Study of Christian Apologetics.* With a concluding chapter by W. Lloyd Bevan. Sewanee, Tenn.: The University Press, 1912. 7+237 pages. \$1.50.

The author of this book rightly begins by a vindication of the right to believe, and passes to a consideration of rival beliefs with a view to showing their insufficiency. But the course of the argument is encumbered for the serious student by such curious distinctions as that between pragmatism and Christian pragmatism, the latter apparently beginning with all the presuppositions which are later to appear as evidence while the former "commences with nothing" and, of course, does not arrive at the goal which the author has in mind. As a literary defense of idealism, the book is edifying, but the scientific issues are not so carefully defined as one might wish.

BALLARD, FRANK. *Does Faith Need Reasons?* London: Charles H. Kelly, 1912. 7+164 pages. 1s. net.

Dr. Ballard is one of the most indefatigable advocates of a Christianity which is not afraid of grappling with all the questions which modern men are asking. This volume is a stirring appeal to the leaders in the churches to recognize the fact that the intellectual defense of Christianity is a supreme necessity when all realms of science and social endeavor are commending themselves by sober reasons. A merely emotional Christianity is doomed. The fearless spirit and the practical suggestions of this little volume deserve favorable attention.

HORTON, ROBERT F. *How the Cross Saves.* New York: Revell. 93 pages. \$0.50.

Four chapters have been added to this little book by the popular English preacher, Dr. Horton, issued in 1905. The book now reviewed bears no date. The original consisted of addresses delivered to students who were supposed to be in danger of surrendering the Christian doctrine of the atonement. The style is hortatory. The

author is aware of "an extraordinary distaste in our time for the idea that Christ bore our sins." He regards the modern attitude as lax and easy-going. There is nothing to indicate that the author enters sympathetically into the social spirit of our day.

 PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

REU, JOHANN MICHAEL. *Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts in der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands zwischen 1530 und 1600*. Erster Teil: "Quellen zur Geschichte des Katechismusunterrichts." Zweiter Band: "Mitteldeutsche Katechismen." Erste Abteilung: "Historisch-biographische Einleitung." Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 496 pages. M. 20.

Professor Reu is putting forth a series of excellent and valuable source-books for the study of the Reformation catechisms. The subject is of interest alike to the student of the history of theology and of religious education. In the July issue of the *Journal of Theology* we noted the appearance of the volume (Zweite Abteilung) containing the text of the Middle German catechisms. This is the companion volume, discussing the same catechisms from the historical and biographical point of view. The work maintains the same standard of thoroughness and high scholarship.

WARD, HARRY F. (Editor). *Social Creed of the Churches*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1912. 185 pages. \$0.50.

This book is a series of articles elaborating the social creed of the churches as adopted by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. It treats of social justice, child and female labor, the sweating system, a shorter working day, one day's rest in seven, unemployment, a living wage, protection, arbitration, the prevention of poverty, and distributive justice. The book is one of great value for ministers and for all who are interested in the social gospel.

AGNEW, JOSEPH. *Life's Christ Places*. Edinburgh: Clark, 1911. vii+206 pages. \$1.25.

The author sketches the life of Christ in a non-critical and homiletic way. The material was originally prepared for a Bible class.

DU BOSE, W. P. *Turning Points in My Life*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. 143 pages. \$1.10.

This book is made up of biographical material together with comments philosophical and theological. The author makes a search for the principles upon which church unity may be re-established and argues for "the fearless principle of freedom."

HOBART, A. S. *Seed Thoughts for Right Living*. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1912. 303 pages. \$0.50.

This is a practical book for teachers of Christian ethics and for ministers in particular. It treats of "general principles of right living," indicates the relation of Christianity to these principles and the helps to right living, together with special application to various callings, trades, and duties.

HOBEN, ALLAN. *The Minister and the Boy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. 171 pages. \$1.10.

This is a book of great practical value, written in a most readable style and treating a subject of prime importance.

MISCELLANEOUS

LOGOS: *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*. Unter Mitwirkung von Rudolf Eucken, Otto von Guericke, Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Meinecke, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Wölfflin herausgegeben von Richard Kroner und Georg Mehlis. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. M. 9 per annum.

This remarkably interesting and suggestive periodical was established in 1910 and has since appeared regularly three times a year. As its title indicates, it is devoted to the more profound aspects of higher culture, but it commits itself to no specified school of thought. Among the significant articles in recent numbers is one by Troeltsch on *Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums*, in which he indicates clearly certain radical conflicts between modern culture and traditional Christian doctrines. He believes, however, that such adjustments of Christian thinking are possible as to retain the dominance of Christian ideals. Simmel, under the title, *Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur*, shows how the very perfection of culture is apt to lead away from the more primary human instincts, so that any type of culture tends to become over-refined. Rickert on *Lebenswerte und Kulturwerte*, Kühnemann on Herder, Kant, and Goethe, Meinong on the critical psychological aspects of value-judgments, and other leading scholars on various problems of modern culture make the publication a valuable promoter of critical investigation into the higher life of our day.

STRONG, AUGUSTUS HOPKINS. *Miscellanies*. Vol. I. Chiefly Historical. Vol. II. Chiefly Theological. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1912. Vol. I, xi+493 pages; Vol. II, viii+503 pages. \$1.00 net per vol.

President Strong has gathered together in these two volumes sermons and addresses on various subjects delivered on various occasions. They thus serve to give interesting and valuable glimpses of the many-sided interests and activities of a man whose personal life was much richer than might be suspected by one who knew only his technical theological writings. Those who have known Dr. Strong are fortunate to have these two volumes which embody a distinctly personal touch.

Periodical Articles on Religion 1890-1899. Compiled and edited by Ernest Cushing Richardson with the co-operation of Charles S. Thayer, William C. Hawks, Paul Martin, and various members of the faculty of Hartford Theological Seminary, and some help from A. D. Savage, Solon Librescot, and many others. Author Index. New York: Scribner, 1911. 876 pages.

This volume indexes by authors the materials included in the editors' subject index and so is a useful supplement to that earlier work.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

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
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